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ABSTRACT 
 
Maura Connolly Allaire: Adapting to Extreme Events: Household Response to  
Floods in Urban Areas 
(Under the direction of Dale Whittington) 
 
This dissertation is an economic study of household-level decisions related to flood risk 
mitigation.  It is composed of four chapters that focus on the 2011 Thailand flood, the world’s 
most costly flood event in the past 30 years.  The first chapter examines the magnitude and 
composition of economic costs that households in Bangkok bore during the 2011 flood.  Two 
rounds of surveys with 469 Bangkok households collected detailed information on a broad set of 
flood costs.    Results indicate that total flood cost was substantial.  The median cost was 
equivalent to half of annual household spending.  However, structural damage to homes was 
surprisingly low, given the depth and duration of the flood. 
 The second chapter assesses how online information can enable households to reduce 
flood losses.  Propensity score matching is used to test for evidence of a relationship between 
social media use and flood loss.  Results indicate that social media use enabled households to 
reduce mean losses by 37%.  Social media offered information that was not available from other 
sources, such as localized and nearly real-time updates of flood location and depth.  With 
knowledge of current flood conditions, households could move belongings to higher ground 
before floodwaters arrived.   
 The third chapter shifts focus to longer-term mitigation actions.  It presents results from a 
randomized experiment that tests the effect of information on household uptake of flood 
iv 
 
insurance and home retrofits.  A sample of 364 flood-prone households in Bangkok was 
randomly split into treatment and control groups.  The treatment group received practical details 
on home retrofits and subsidized flood insurance as well as social norm information regarding 
insurance purchase decisions of peers.  Results indicate that the information intervention 
increased insurance purchases by about four percent, while no effect was detected for home 
retrofits.   
 The fourth chapter evaluates the social benefits of the information intervention presented 
in the third chapter.  Results suggest that the intervention raises welfare of households, but not 
society.  Furthermore, greater benefits are associated with better informing households that have 
high insurance demand, compared to using social pressure to persuade those with low demand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
The costs of natural disasters have increased dramatically around the world in recent 
decades (Munich Re Group, 2005; Miller et al., 2008; IPCC, 2012).  Multi-billion-dollar 
disasters are becoming common.  While flood-related mortality has declined due to improved 
early warning, property costs continue to rise (White, Kates, & Burton, 2001).  Increased disaster 
costs are largely driven by greater concentrations of people and assets in disaster-prone areas.  In 
particular, coastal cities around the world face rising flood exposure due to growing population, 
greater asset values, land subsidence, and sea-level rise (De Sherbinin et al., 2007; Dixon et al. 
2006; Hanson et al., 2011).  The world’s population is urbanizing and moving to these vulnerable 
areas, nearly two-thirds of the global population is expected to live in cities by 2050 (United 
Nations, 2015).  In addition, more severe and frequent precipitation events due to climate change 
could further increase flood frequency and intensity (World Bank, 2010).   
 As the prospect for more frequent and severe weather-related disasters gains scientific 
support, many nations are weighing options for risk mitigation and adaptation.  Several notable 
challenges confront planners and decision makers as they seek to manage the consequences of 
flood events.  The magnitude and composition of flood costs must be known so that interventions 
can be targeted at cost categories that can readily be reduced.  In addition, effective strategies 
must be identified for mitigation of flood costs, both through short-term prevention and longer-
term adaptation actions.
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 Mitigating losses of life and property in vulnerable areas is a growing policy concern.  
However, limited knowledge of disaster costs and household mitigation behavior make informed
public policy challenging.  There is a worldwide lack of accurate, disaggregated, and comparable 
estimates of the economic costs of disasters.   This limits analysis of disaster risk.  Flood risk 
analysis has major two components – a hydrological assessment of the flood hazard (probability 
and physical intensity) and estimation of economic consequences (Mileti, 1999).  While 
hydrological hazard models are well developed in the engineering literature, economic damage 
models are not and could be greatly improved (Wind, Nierop, de Blois, & de Kok, 1999).  A 
major barrier to the improvement of damage models is a lack of reliable and disaggregate flood 
cost data.  International datasets on disaster damage underestimate indirect and production 
interruption cost.  Furthermore, these datasets do not include non-financial costs or costs to the 
informal economy.  Most engineering studies focus only on property and contents damage, while 
economics studies typically seek to find evidence of changes in macroeconomic indicators, such 
as gross domestic product (GDP).   
Full costs of disasters extend beyond property damage and include impacts on health, the 
environment, and interruption of business and public services.  Worldwide, there is a great need 
for comprehensive disaster cost data and improved understanding of factors that affect types and 
magnitude of damage.  A lack of comprehensive loss data means that most economic 
assessments do not include a full picture of mitigation costs and benefits.  Improved data and 
understanding are crucial for selecting and prioritizing flood risk mitigation policies. 
 Once disaster costs are better understood, the challenge for policymakers is to identify 
interventions that reduce expected costs.  Historically, within the field of water management, 
flood control and structural defense measures have been the focus of flood management efforts.  
3 
 
The focus has been on decreasing the probability of a flood and intensity.  Under a more modern 
approach, flood control structures are assumed not to be fail-safe and communities are prepared 
for the possibility of inundation.    This risk management approach considers the extent to which 
a given intervention can reduce those costs (Messner et al., 2007).  A wide variety of mitigation 
strategies, both public and private, are conceivable under this modern approach and are not 
limited to publically-funded flood control structures.  Private mitigation actions could play a role 
in reducing flood impacts.  However, even after disasters, households often do not take risk 
mitigation actions and therefore remain vulnerable to future events (Burby et al., 1988; 
Kunreuther et al., 2009).  Furthermore, little is known about how households prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from disasters (e.g. Bruneau et al., 2003; de Bruijn, 2004; Zhou, Wang, 
Wan, & Jia, 2010).   
 Household flood risk mitigation decisions tend not to be privately, let alone socially, 
optimal.  For example, despite mandates and possible benefits, uptake of insurance against floods 
and other natural disasters tends to be low globally (Dixon et al., 2006).  In U.S., only half of 
households in flood-prone areas are insured against flooding (Kriesel and Landry, 2004; Dixon et 
al., 2006).  The failure of households to take mitigation actions is partly due to the fact that 
individuals rely on heuristics to assess hazards with low probability and can treat low-probability 
events as having zero probability (Kunreuther et al., 2002).   Other reasons for household 
inaction include (i) lack of awareness of cost-effective mitigation actions, (ii) financial cost as 
well as time and inconvenience costs, and (iii) reliance on disaster relief.  Understanding 
adaptation barriers is crucial for managing the economic cost of disasters.  Household inaction 
creates a burden on taxpayers who bear the cost of disaster response and recovery.  The Thai 
government spent nearly US$ 757 million for disaster response due to the 2011 flood, of which 
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US$ 97 million was cash transfers to compensate flood-affected households (DDPM, 2013).  
Therefore, as assets become more concentrated in coastal cities, both households and taxpayers 
bear costs. 
My dissertation addresses how the economic cost of climatic disasters among households 
can be reduced.  A particular focus is placed on how information can improve household 
decision-making.  In four chapters, I examine the types of costs households bore during the 2011 
Bangkok flood, how online information allowed households to reduce flood costs, and how 
households can be encouraged to take flood loss mitigation actions.  In all four dissertation 
chapters the 2011 Bangkok flood is used as an illustrative example in all four dissertation 
chapters.  Bangkok is a highly relevant field site for issues regarding the economic costs of 
flooding and household decision-making.  The 2011 flood ranks as the world’s most costly 
flooding disaster in the past 30 years (A.M. Best, 2012; Orie and Stahel, 2013).   
Information provision could improve household decisions related to flood risk mitigation 
since there is often a lack of complete information.  My dissertation addresses the role of 
information in improving flood mitigation decisions.  One chapter examines how online 
information can inform short-term loss prevention actions, while another investigates if 
information campaigns can encourage households to take longer-term adaptation actions.   
In order to take effective short-term prevention measures immediately before a flood, 
households require accurate and timely forecasts of expected conditions and recommended 
actions.  When confronted with natural disasters, individuals around the world increasingly 
utilize online resources.  During the 2011 Bangkok flood, most households had access to 
multiple information sources and faced a challenge of assessing the quality and accuracy of 
conflicting messages.  As floodwaters progressed, government sources could not predict the path 
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and timing of the flood through the urban environment with much precision or lead time.  Online 
sources, especially social media, may have offered households different types of information not 
provided by government or other traditional information sources.  Online sources can be used as 
a tool to improve household preparedness and address new challenges presented by urban flood 
management.  
When deciding to take longer-term flood mitigation measures, households evaluate 
information on flood loss (both magnitude and likelihood) as well as the cost of the action.  Yet, 
even when measures are privately beneficial, households might fail to take action due to lack of 
awareness or incomplete information, inconvenience costs, or reliance on disaster relief.  
Mitigation actions could be encouraged via practical information on flood risk and mitigation 
options as well as social messages that convey the actions of others.  Increasingly, practical and 
social messages are used in policy interventions to influence individual decisions.  Experimental 
research has begun to investigate the effects of information on household behavior.  The 
effectiveness of practical information has been demonstrated in research on environmental 
hazards (e.g. Smith et al., 1995; Hamoudi et al., 2012).  Meanwhile, the impacts of social norms 
on household behavior has been assessed within the realm of electricity and water conservation 
(e.g. Ferraro and Price, 2013; Allcott, 2011).   In these water and electricity conservation studies, 
households are informed of peer use of services and how their behavior compares.  There is 
evidence that information on social norms might be able to produce similar size effects on the 
quantity purchased as price incentives (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Allcott, 2011). 
Bangkok is susceptible to flooding due to its location on a river delta, flat topography, 
and subsiding land surface.  In addition, flood risk in Bangkok has increased over the past 
several decades due to rapid urban growth.  Therefore, the Bangkok case provides insight into 
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how flood impacts can be mitigated and managed in the face of urbanization and climate change.  
Low-lying megacities, such as Bangkok, present new challenges for disaster risk mitigation.  In 
these productive urban centers, neither massive evacuations nor limits on concentrations of 
people and assets are desirable.  Rather than encourage relocation of people and assets, risk 
mitigation strategies in megacities must focus on how to reduced expected losses.  Information 
could play a vital role in allowing individuals to take effective actions to reduce flood losses.   
The 2011 Bangkok flood is an especially interesting case study because it offers a 
window on the flood management challenges facing millions of people around.  It represents one 
of the first major floods in a megacity in the twenty-first century.  Asian megacities in particular 
are expected to face higher flood losses due to rapidly growing populations, climate change, and 
vulnerable low-income communities (Hallegatte et al., 2013; Shah, 2011).  Slum populations 
face relatively high disaster losses since they tend to be located in hazard prone areas with poorly 
constructed dwellings.  More than half of the world’s slum population lives in East and Southeast 
Asia (Shah, 2011).  Risk mitigation measures could reduce vulnerability and expected disaster 
losses.   
Overall, the four chapters offer insight into the role of information in mitigating the risk 
of natural disasters.  The first chapter examines the magnitude and composition of economic 
costs that households bore during the 2011 Bangkok flood.  The second chapter assesses how 
online information can enable households to reduce flood losses.  The third presents results from 
a randomized experiment that tests the effect of information on household uptake of flood 
insurance and home retrofits.  The fourth and final chapter evaluates the social benefits of this 
information campaign.  Brief overviews of each of these chapters are provided below.   
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Chapter 1 assesses the magnitude and types of economic costs borne by households 
during the historic 2011 Bangkok flood.  This chapter presents the first estimates of flood costs 
based on in-person interviews and modern nonmarket valuation techniques.  It contributes to the 
literature by demonstrating how household-level data on the economic costs of flooding can be 
collected and analyzed in order to inform decision making.  A worldwide lack of comprehensive 
cost data means that most economic assessments do not include a full picture of mitigation costs 
and benefits.  Some countries are beginning to address this knowledge gap in order to inform 
flood risk mitigation policies.  For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is actively 
exploring improved methods to estimate flood costs. 
Cost estimates analyzed in this study represent a broad set of adverse consequences that 
extend beyond property damage.  These costs include preventative costs, evacuation 
expenditures, increased travel time, property damage, health costs, and foregone income.  Two 
rounds of surveys were conducted with 469 Bangkok households.  Households were first 
interviewed immediately after floodwaters receded and were asked about preventative actions, 
expenses to repair and replace property, health care costs, and time lost from work.  The second 
interview was conducted one year later to collect additional expenses incurred to repair and 
replace property damaged in the flood.  This chapter presents summary statistics of economic 
costs as well as multivariate analysis that examines factors associated with these costs, such as 
characteristics of the respondent, household, and neighborhood.   
 The second chapter examines how online information can enable households to reduce 
disaster impacts.  Individuals around the world are rapidly gaining online access and joining 
social networks. This paper is the first to investigate the role of online information and social 
media in enabling households to reduce natural disaster losses.  The historic 2011 Bangkok flood 
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was one of the first major disasters to affect an urban area with a substantial population 
connected to social media.  To explore the role of online information in mitigation of flood loss, 
a mixed methods approach was employed, making use of both quantitative (propensity score 
matching and multivariate regression analysis) and qualitative (in-depth interviews) techniques.  
Regression analysis of survey responses identifies associations between online activity and flood 
losses as well as before flood mitigation actions.  Propensity score matching is used to test for 
evidence of a causal relationship between social media use and flood losses.  The study relies on 
two data sources – survey responses from 469 Bangkok households (also used in Chapter 1) and 
in-depth interviews with twenty-three internet users who are a subset of the survey participants.  
Understanding the effect of social media information on flood losses would have broad 
implications for incorporating online applications into disaster preparedness and response efforts.  
For example, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency is testing the use of social media 
for distributing emergency updates. 
The third chapter shifts attention to loss mitigation actions and how households can be 
encouraged to take action.  Private mitigation actions could play a prominent role in reducing 
flood impacts.  Yet, even after disasters, households often fail to mitigate future losses.  This 
chapter presents a field experiment that tests the effect of information on household uptake of 
flood insurance and home retrofits.  A sample of 364 flood-prone households in Bangkok was 
randomly split into treatment and control groups.  All participants were homeowners who did not 
have catastrophe insurance at the time of the baseline interview. The treatment group received 
practical details on home retrofits and subsidized flood insurance as well as social information 
regarding insurance purchase decisions of households in their district.  The control group 
received no information.  A baseline survey collected background characteristics of participating 
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households.  Six months later, a follow-up survey recorded experiment outcomes such as 
insurance purchase, home retrofits, information gathering, and risk perception.   
This study is the first randomized experiment to address household flood loss mitigation 
actions, such as home retrofits and flood insurance.  Generally, experimental evaluation designs 
are rare in the environmental policy field (Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014).  Yet, such designs are 
important since they are less prone to bias than observational designs.  This chapter also makes a 
contribution to understanding flood insurance demand.  Little empirical work has been done on 
household demand for flood insurance, especially in developing countries (Akter et al., 2011; 
Landry and Jahan‐Parvar, 2011; Kunreuther et al., 2013).  Households tend to lack perfect 
information regarding flood risk and the costs and benefits associated with flood insurance and 
home retrofits.  Information could influence perceptions of flood probability, losses, and costs of 
insurance and home retrofits.  This study tests the hypothesis that household inaction is in part 
due to incomplete and insufficient information.   
The fourth chapter evaluates the social benefits of the information campaign presented in 
the previous chapter.  This study presents the first benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of a practical and 
social norm information intervention.  No previous information experiment has assessed social 
welfare implications of the tested intervention.   However, the value of analyzing welfare 
implications of information treatments and other behavioral nudges has been acknowledged in 
the economics literature (Allcott, 2011; Bernedo et al., 2014).  Without a full accounting of 
economic costs and benefits across all stakeholders, it is unclear if these types of strategies are 
beneficial to society.  Disaster management could especially benefit from rigorous evaluation of 
policy alternatives, given the large amounts of government resources at stake.   
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A key question that this BCA addresses is whether or not the information campaign is 
preferable to the status quo of government compensation for flood losses.  The BCA accounts for 
the distribution of costs and benefits across stakeholders including new insurance policyholders, 
insurance providers, and the general taxpayer.  Taxpayers bear the cost of the information 
campaign, annual expected subsidized claims and administrative costs.  Insured households 
benefit from insurance claims, limited flood aid, and consumer surplus, but must pay subsidized 
premiums.  The net social benefit to society is equal to the consumer surplus, less the cost of the 
information campaign, administrative cost of flood aid and insurance, and deadweight loss.  
Parameter values for the BCA are derived from datasets compiled in two previous chapters.  The 
first is from the randomized experiment that tested the effect of the information campaign 
(Chapter 3), while the second is from the household survey of costs incurred due to the 2011 
flood (Chapter 1).  Sensitivity analysis is conducted for all key parameters, with particular 
attention given to level of government flood compensation, persistence of information treatment 
effect, and household demand for insurance. 
Combined, these four dissertation chapters advance understanding of the economic cost 
of extreme events and household decision making regarding flood risk.  As communities 
consider risk mitigation and adaptation options, greater knowledge of disaster impacts and 
household response can inform crucial policy decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1: ECONOMIC COSTS INCURRED BY HOUSEHOLDS IN THE 2011 
GREATER BANGKOK FLOOD 1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Overview 
This paper presents the first comprehensive estimates of the economic costs experienced 
by households in the 2011 Greater Bangkok flood. More generally, it contributes to the literature 
by presenting the first estimates of flood costs based on primary data collected from respondents 
of flooded homes using in-person interviews. Two rounds of interviews were conducted with 469 
households in three of the most heavily affected districts of greater Bangkok. The estimates of 
economic costs include preventative costs, ex post losses, compensation received, and any new 
income generated during the flood. Median household economic costs were US$3089, equivalent 
to about half of annual household expenditures (mean costs were US$5261).  
Perhaps surprisingly given the depth and duration of the flood, most houses incurred little 
structural damage (although furniture, appliances, and cars were damaged). Median economic 
costs to poor and non-poor households were similar as a percentage of annual household 
expenditures (53% and 48%, respectively). Compensation payments received from government 
did little to reduce the total economic losses of the vast majority of households. Two flood-
related deaths were reported in our sample—both in low-income neighborhoods.
                                                          
1
This chapter previously appeared as an article in Water Resources Research.  The original citation is as follows: 
Nabangchang, O., Allaire, M., Leangcharoen, P., Jarungrattanapong, R., and Whittington, D. (2015). Economic 
costs incurred by households in the 2011 Greater Bangkok flood. Water Resour. Res., 51(1) 58–77. 
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 Overall, ex post damage was the largest component of flood costs (66% of total). These 
findings are new, important inputs for the evaluation of flood control mitigation and preventive 
measures that are now under consideration by the Government of Thailand. The paper also 
illustrates how detailed microeconomic data on household costs can be collected and 
summarized for policy purposes. 
1.1.2 Motivation 
Climate change is increasing the risks populations face from hydrological uncertainty. 
Water resource planners are devoting more and more attention to the development of planning 
protocols and procedures that can better incorporate these new uncertainties surrounding the 
magnitude and consequences of extreme hydrological events such as floods. A common element 
in all methods for addressing the implications of climate change for water resources planning is 
the need for better estimates of the economic costs that hydrological risks impose on households 
and businesses. Decision makers need accurate estimates of these economic costs in order to 
design and choose improved, cost-effective risk management and adaptation strategies. 
 Surprisingly, the methodology for estimating the economic costs to households from 
flood events has not advanced much over the last several decades. Although there have been 
major theoretical and methodological advances in nonmarket valuation techniques in the 
environmental and resource economics field, these have not made their way to research on the 
economic costs to households of major flood events. There are several reasons for this peculiar 
state of affairs. 
 First, by definition the precise timing of flood events are unknown in advance and 
researchers must act quickly after a flood to try to measure the consequences to households while 
they are fresh in people's minds. Funding for most research is not sufficiently flexible to respond 
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in a timely manner to study the economic costs of unpredictable flood events. Second, dealing 
with the humanitarian crisis created by major flood events naturally takes precedence over 
longer-term research objectives. Simply put, researchers have an ethical obligation not to get in 
the way of relief efforts. 
 Third, research on flood damages usually has been conducted by teams of engineers, 
planners, financial analysts, and infrastructure economists, and is largely focused on estimating 
the financial losses to buildings and contents, for both households and businesses. This is 
perhaps understandable when the purpose of the study is to determine financial compensation to 
be paid by government and insurance companies. But the resulting cost estimates will be 
incomplete measures of the welfare costs imposed by the risk of floods that are needed for 
improved decision making. 
 There are no published studies of costs households incur from floods in either 
industrialized countries or developing countries in which the researchers' findings are based on 
data collected from affected households using in-person interviews and modern nonmarket 
valuation techniques. Because the microeconomic literature on estimating the economic costs to 
households is thin, and because much of the existing research has been conducted by 
noneconomists, the terminology used in the literature to describe and categorize different types 
of household costs due to floods is inconsistent and confusing. This study addresses these gaps in 
the literature on the economic costs households incur from extreme hydrological events such as 
floods. 
 In-person interviews were conducted with households in greater Bangkok affected by the 
2011 Thailand flood. The 2011 flood in Thailand is an especially interesting case study because 
it offers a window on the flood management challenges facing millions of people around the 
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world and for their governments in a time of climate change. There are seven megacities in 
South and Southeast Asia with over 10 million people located near the coast that are 
experiencing rapid population growth and must confront the combined threats of land 
subsistence, increased extreme rainfall and storm events, and rising sea levels (Mumbai, Dhaka, 
Kolkata, Karachi, Manila, Jakarta, and Bangkok). 
 In this case study, we examine the magnitude and composition of the economic losses 
experienced by 469 households from the 2011 flood in three of the most affected neighborhoods 
of the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan area. We first interviewed individuals in these households 
in January and February 2012, while their memories of the flood were fresh. A second round of 
interviews was conducted a year later to measure additional recovery costs incurred between 
January 2012 and January 2013. The attrition rate between the first and second round surveys 
was 20%; 589 households participated in the first survey. In the first round survey, respondents 
were asked about the actions they took before the flood arrived to try to reduce the direct and 
indirect costs incurred as a result of the flood, and the financial expenses they expected in order 
to repair and replace their property after the flood waters receded. Questions to estimate both 
health-related and nonhealth-related costs were included in the survey instrument. In the second 
round survey, we were able to collect data on the actual expenses incurred to repair and replace 
property damaged in the flood, as well as time lost from work. 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next, Section 1.2 of the paper provides 
background on the 2011 Thailand flood. Section 1.3 describes the study sites and fieldwork 
protocol. Section 1.4 describes how the different components of households' economic costs 
were estimated and the modeling strategy used to examine the factors associated with these 
costs. Section 1.5 presents the results, and section 1.6 offers some concluding observations. 
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1.2 Background—The 2011 Thailand Flood 
 The Chao Phraya River Basin drains about 30% of the surface area of Thailand. Four 
main rivers—Ping, Wang, Yom, and Nan—merge in Nakhon Sawan province (in Thailand's 
Upper Central Region) to form the Chao Phraya River. The river begins in the northern, 
mountainous region of Thailand, and then flows south through the flat central plains. Greater 
Bangkok is located at the southern, downstream end of the Chao Phraya River Basin in the Chao 
Phraya river delta near the coast. 
 In late 2011, Thailand was hit with the worst floods experienced in 50 years (since the 
floods in 1942). The 2011 flood, which eventually inundated much of greater Bangkok, had three 
distinct phases. The first phase was from March to April when heavy rainfall caused widespread 
flooding in southern Thailand, resulted in 61 deaths, damaged 600,000 homes, and caused 
extensive damage to businesses and transportation infrastructure. Rainfall in March 2011 was 
over 3 times the average for the past 30 years. Land became saturated and further infiltration was 
limited even before the summer monsoon rains arrived. Eight provinces in Thailand were 
declared disaster zones. 
 The second phase was from June to the middle of October when the remnants of five 
tropical storms hit Thailand. Rainfall in June was 128% of the average. In July and August, 
rainfall was 150% of the average. During August and September, monsoon rains were heavier 
and lasted longer than usual perhaps due to the presence of La Niña. Rainfall in September was 
135% of the average and in October 116% of average (AON, 2012). Rainfall in 2011 was 
considerably greater than rainfall that preceded the last major flood to reach Bangkok in 1995. 
Total rain in northern Thailand for July to September was 1156 mm, the highest amount recorded 
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since records began in 1901. World Bank (2012) estimated the annual probability of such high 
rainfall to be 1 in 250 years. 
 Month after month of heavy rains led to widespread flooding in the northern, 
northeastern, and central portions of Thailand. Major dams filled to capacity and 10 major flood 
control structures experienced breaches from mid-September to early October. Flash flooding 
and landslides occurred in central and northern Thailand. This long period of heavy rainfall also 
caused very high flows in the northern sections of the Chao Phraya River, and these floodwaters 
spread southward. By mid-September, many provinces in the central part of the basin were 
affected by the flood. The agricultural lands in the central plain initially served as water retention 
areas and slowed the southward flow of the floodwaters toward Bangkok. 
 The third phase of the flood started in mid-October and lasted through December 2011. 
By mid-October, major industrial estates in the Central Region were flooded. The floods in 
Ayutthaya, north of Bangkok, peaked in October, and flood barriers around seven industrial 
estates failed. These industrial estates flooded for the first time in their history, disrupting supply 
chains throughout the world (e.g., cars, disk drives, and other electronic components). Some 
industrial estates were under as much as 3 m of water. By late October, over 5.5% of Thailand 
was under water, and floodwaters entered greater Bangkok. By mid-November, 5.3 million 
people were affected, over 8% of the total population of Thailand (World Bank, 2012). Efforts to 
protect the central business district were successful, but districts in northern Bangkok and the 
provinces of Nonthaburi and Pathum Thani in the greater Bangkok metropolitan area were hit 
especially hard. Transportation networks were severely affected; several main highways and the 
city's secondary airport were forced to close. In many districts of greater Bangkok, floodwaters 
rose to a maximum of 2–3 m and remained for 2–3 months. In an attempt to drain their 
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neighborhoods, frustrated residents tore down flood barriers, sending floodwaters into other parts 
of the city. By late November and early December, the floodwaters had receded in many areas, 
but some places remained flooded until mid-January 2012. 
 The inability of the two major dams in the Chao Phraya basin, Bhumibol and Sirikit, to 
mitigate the severity of the 2011 flood has been the subject of much public discussion and debate 
in Thailand. Some argued that the dams had been mismanaged since a large quantity of water 
was stored at the beginning of the monsoon, resulting in large subsequent releases after the heavy 
rains occurred in the late summer and fall. Early in the 2011 monsoon season, these dams held 
large amounts of water in storage. During the 2010 monsoon season, rainfall had been low, and 
dam levels were at record lows in June 2010 (Asian Correspondent, 2011a). The Bhumibol Dam 
was filled to capacity in only 3 months, from August to October 2011 (Asian Correspondent, 
2011b). Once the Bhumibol Dam reached capacity, heavy rains continued and releases from the 
dam had to be increased. Of course, had the monsoon rains in 2011 again been low as in 2010, 
the opposite situation would have occurred. Reservoir managers would have been criticized if 
they had released too much water early in the season to minimize flood control risks, and then 
had too little water in storage to meet irrigation needs. 
 Based on flood property loss data from 1950 to 2010, Thailand has had the highest 
average annual property losses from floods of any country in Southeast Asia and ranks 34th in 
the world (EM-DAT, 2011). In Thailand, expected annual property losses from floods are US$ 
2.74 per capita, compared to US$ 1.62 per capita in Malaysia and less than US$ 0.11 per capita 
in Singapore. However, Thailand's flood mortality risk (0.11 deaths per 100,000 population per 
year) is below the world average of 0.86 deaths per 100,000 population per year. 
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 Thailand's relatively low flood mortality risk is partly because residents in flood-prone 
areas of the Chao Phraya River Basin and other parts of the country have coped with regular 
flooding for centuries. People expect floods and have adapted to reoccurring flood events. 
Historically, people in flood-prone areas have constructed their homes on stilts and built two-
story housing so that they can move their possessions and themselves up to the second floor 
during floods. Although the rural areas in the northern Chao Phraya basin are especially used to 
regular flooding, severe flooding in Bangkok is more infrequent. Large parts of Bangkok were 
inundated for 2 months in 1942 and for 5 months in 1983. Before the 2011 flood hit the Greater 
Bangkok Metropolitan Area, the last severe flood was in 1995. However, in 2006, other parts of 
Thailand experienced severe flooding. Bangkok was not affected because local rainfall was not 
excessive, and the city's flood protection system of canals, embankments, and pumps was able to 
contain the floodwaters. In 2011, many Bangkok residents (mistakenly) used the 1995 flood as a 
benchmark of the worst that could happen in their neighborhood. 
 A combination of factors has led to increasing flood risks in Thailand. Increased 
agricultural cultivation in the upstream portions of the Chao Phraya Basin has caused 
deforestation, which has resulted in a decrease in flood retention areas. Urban growth in the 
lower Chao Phraya basin has reduced the ability to disperse floodwaters over agricultural lands 
in a flooding emergency. Many canals in and around Bangkok have low gradients and are filled 
with silt and debris, reducing the ability of the drainage system to remove floodwaters. 
Moreover, the greater Bangkok area is one of the locations in Southeast Asia most vulnerable to 
climate change (Yusuf and Francisco, 2010). A 30% increase in flood-prone area is expected in 
greater Bangkok by 2050 due to increased precipitation and land subsidence of 5–30 cm (Panya 
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Consultants, 2009). Most of the increase in flood-prone area is expected in western Bangkok, 
where flood control infrastructure is especially inadequate. 
 During the 2011 flood, more than 680 people were killed nationwide, and 6 million 
hectares (nearly 12% of the surface area of the country) were flooded over the 4 month period 
from September to December (A.M. Best, 2012). The 2011 Thailand flood was the fifth most 
costly insured loss event worldwide in the last 30 years (A.M. Best, 2012). The World Bank 
estimated economic losses and damages at THB1.4 trillion (US$ 47 billion, or about US$ 700 
per capita) (World Bank, 2012). Thailand's annual GDP growth in 2011 declined from midyear 
estimates of 4.0% to 2.9%. 
 In the past, a major focus of flood damage mitigation has been on early warning systems 
to alert people of the imminent risk of flood events, and the hope has been that people could act 
effectively on this information before the flood arrives to reduce the costs they are likely to 
incur. The 2011 Bangkok flood was the first major flooding disaster to hit a population center in 
South or Southeast Asia in which many people were connected to the web with smart phones and 
other types of internet access. The flood unfolded slowly, and most households in greater 
Bangkok had access to information from multiple sources—television, radio, internet, friends 
and neighborhood leaders, and local and national governments (television was the most 
important information source for the majority of households). The problem for most households 
was not lack of early warning, but rather how to assess the quality and accuracy of conflicting 
information from different sources. This is a relatively new flood management problem, but one 
that will grow in importance, especially for urban residents connected to global media channels. 
 The ways in which households could act effectively on the information they received in 
order to reduce flood losses were limited. Some households in Bangkok managed to move their 
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automobiles to higher ground (e.g., elevated motorways), and some of their possessions to the 
second story or roof of their dwellings. The current transportation infrastructure will not support 
a mass exodus, and there are few places for this many people to go. Moreover, as in many types 
of disasters, some people will not want to leave their homes, due in part from a desire to protect 
their possessions from theft. 
1.3 Description of the Study Sites, Sampling, and Fieldwork 
 The study was conducted in three provinces of the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan Area: 
Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Bangkok. We purposively selected three districts, one in each 
province, that were among the hardest hit by the 2011 flood: Bang Bua Thong District 
(Nonthaburi); Klong Luang District (Pathum Thani); and Don Mueang District (northern 
Bangkok). Within each of these three districts, we purposively selected two middle-income 
neighborhoods and two low-income neighborhoods, for a total of 12 neighborhoods. 
 The depth of the floodwaters at its highest level (about 2 m) was comparable for the study 
areas in the three districts (Table 1.1). The duration of flood (about 2 months) for the three study 
areas was also similar. The three districts differed, however, with respect to the speed with which 
the floodwater rose. In Bang Bua Thong (Nonthaburi), the floodwaters rose to their maximum 
level within 24 h. In Klong Luang (Pathum Thani), the floodwaters rose more gradually, 0.5 m in 
1 week. The Don Mueang District of Bangkok flooded before the other two study sites and water 
rose at a moderate pace (0.8 m within 24 h). 
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Table 1.1 Profile of the Study Area 
 
 Bang Bua Thong, 
Nonthaburi 
Don Mueang,  
Bangkok 
Klong Luang,  
PathumThani 
History of flooding  Major flood in 1995 Did not flood in 1995 Flooded in 1995 
When flood arrived Mid-October Late October Mid- October 
Speed of rising water  
Fast (nearly 2 meters 
within 24 hours) 
Moderate (80 cm 
within 24 hours) 
Slow (50 cm within 
1 week) 
Median depth of flood (on road) 
1.5 meters 
(range: 0.5 to 3 m) 
1.5 meters 
(range: 0.5 to 3 m) 
0.6 meters 
(range: 0.5 to 2 m) 
Population of study area districts 
1
 201,254 166,951 120,766 
Distance from Central Business 
District 
39 km 30 km 45 km 
Elevation(meters above sea level) 0 meter 0.5 to 1 meter 2.30 meters 
Number of districts flooded 4 out of  6 36 out of 50 7 out of  7 
 
Note:  
1 
Population of Nonthaburi province =1,135,299; Bangkok = 5,668,502 ; and Pathum Thani =1,026,934.  
Source:  Department of Provincial Administration 
 
In each of the three districts, we tried to interview 200 respondents; the total target 
sample size was thus 600 respondents. Within each of the 12 residential areas, we set a quota of 
50 respondents to be interviewed. To the extent practicable, we tried to distribute the 50 
respondents in each residential area across the entire spatial area of the neighborhood. For 
example, for one of the two middle-income neighborhoods in Bang Bua Thong (Nonthaburi), we 
selected the Chollada Housing Estate and the Pattaraniwetr neighborhood. The former is a large 
housing estate with more than 1000 households. The low-income neighborhoods in all three 
districts were much smaller. In these neighborhoods, we had to interview almost everyone we 
could find in order to meet our quota of 50 households. In this paper, neighborhoods are 
classified as “low income” or “middle income” depending on the socioeconomic status of the 
majority of the households living there (including the characteristics of their housing). The terms 
“poor” and “non-poor” are used to refer to specific households. Survey data collected from 
households in the sample are used to designate individual households as “poor” or “non-poor.” 
25 
 
Not all households living in a “low-income” neighborhood are poor. In fact, only about half of 
the households in low-income neighborhoods were classified as poor. 
 In all three districts, during the first round of the survey the response rates were higher in 
low-income neighborhoods than in middle-income neighborhoods. For the low-income 
neighborhoods in Bang Bua Thong District (Nonthaburi), the response rate was 93% compared 
to 68% in the middle-income neighborhoods (Chollada and Pattaraniwetr). In the Klong Luang 
District (Pathum Thani), the response rate was of 97% and 61% for the low-income and middle-
income neighborhoods, respectively. For Don Mueang District (Bangkok), response rate was 
91% for the low-income group and 61% for the middle-income group. The locations of all the 
households interviewed were geocoded. We do not claim that our final sample is representative 
of households either in greater Bangkok or within the three provinces. We do believe, however, 
that sample households span a wide range of socioeconomic and housing conditions in some of 
the most severely flooded neighborhoods in different parts of the city. 
 To assist with question selection and design, six pilot interviews were conducted during 
which respondents were told to “think out loud” as they answered the questions. This helped us 
to better understand the respondents' experience with the flood and how they interpreted the 
questions. Before the first round of the survey was implemented, the survey instrument was 
pretested with 36 respondents. During the actual first-round survey implementation four field 
staff supervised 18 enumerators. All of the first-round interviews were conducted during January 
and February 2012, soon after the floodwaters had receded from respondents' houses. On 
average, interviews lasted 40–45 min. Informed consent was received from all respondents. 
Before the second round of interviews was conducted in January 2013, the questionnaire 
underwent further pretesting and refinement. 
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1.4 Definitions, Calculations of Economic Costs Incurred by Households, and Modeling 
Strategy 
1.4.1 Terminology 
There is no standardized methodology to estimate the economic costs of floods (White et 
al., 2001). Nor is there a standardized terminology used to describe the adverse consequences of 
floods. When estimating the economic consequences of a flood event, one should consider the 
effects on households' well-being in three time periods, or stages of the event—(1) before the 
flood arrives; (2) during the flood, (3) after the floodwaters recede. We use the term “economic 
costs” as inclusive of the negative consequences of a flood in all three of these stages. We refer 
to the costs incurred before the flood arrives (stage 1) as ex ante costs; and costs incurred after 
the flood hits as ex post costs during the flooding event and after the floodwater recede, (stages 2 
and 3, respectively). 
 We use the terms “damages” and “losses” to refer to the ex post economic costs of floods. 
We follow Krutilla (1966) and use the term “damages” to refer to the physical impairment of 
structures and other property. We use the term “losses” to refer to all ex post economic costs. 
“Damages” are thus a subset of “losses,” and “losses” are a subset of “economic costs” (Figure 
1.1). 
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Figure 1.1 Economic cost, loss, and damage categories 
 
 
Households make financial expenditures before the flood to reduce economic losses after 
the flood arrives. They also make financial expenditures after the flood has hit in order to deal 
with the economic losses they have suffered. Both types of financial expenditures are 
components of the total economic costs of the flood event. Preventative (ex ante) expenditures 
made before the flood arrives are real costs to the household, but are not best conceptualized as 
“damages” or “losses.” Expenditures made after the flood hits to deal with the consequences are 
one monetary measure of the magnitude of the losses incurred by the household, but such 
expenditures are not a comprehensive or complete measure of the ex post loss incurred because 
residual losses may remain even after financial expenditures have been made to reduce the losses 
(damages). 
Economic Cost
Loss
Damage
Before + During + After
During + After
During   
(physical damage to property)
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 Some of the engineering literature on the costs of floods separates ex post costs incurred 
into tangible and intangible components based on the extent to which the consequences of the 
flood can be expressed in monetary terms Dutta et al. (2003); (Smith and Ward, 1998; Thieken et 
al., 2005). Tangible losses include damages to property, buildings, and business interruptions 
that can be expressed in financial terms. Intangible losses are more challenging to monetize and 
include, for example, mortality and psychological suffering. However, over the past few decades, 
nonmarket valuation techniques (both revealed and stated preference methods) have experienced 
continual methodological improvements, and losses that once were considered impossible to 
quantify in monetary terms (and thus “intangible”) may now be counted as “tangible” and 
expressed in monetary, welfare-theoretic terms (Hanemann, 1992; Smith, 2004).  For example, 
in the past, some studies of flood losses considered mortality and morbidity losses to be 
intangible, but such health effects are now often expressed in monetary terms Dutta et al. (2003). 
 Another distinction sometimes made is between direct and indirect economic costs. 
Direct economic costs often refer to easily monetized costs; often they can be approximated by 
the financial expenditures households make to deal with the negative consequences of the flood, 
such as repair and rehabilitation of a flooded house. Indirect economic costs may include the 
time spent on preventative and clean-up activities. Often indirect costs can be expressed in 
monetary terms, but market prices are not readily available for their estimation. Direct tangible 
economic losses would include damage to buildings and property, while indirect tangible losses 
would include disruptions in trade and business activity. Direct damages may be considered to 
involve physical contact of floodwater with people and property. Much of the flood loss 
literature focuses on direct tangible damages to property (Merz and Thieken, 2004). Many 
studies, as well as insurance claims for flood losses, do not include indirect tangible losses such 
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as depreciated property and business values (White et al., 2001). For households with insurance 
coverage, insurance claims can sometimes be used as a measure of some components of property 
damages. 
In this study, we classify economic costs using three distinctions: 
(i) Timing: before the flood arrives (ex ante); during the flood (ex post), and after the 
floodwaters recede (ex post), 
(ii) Direct and indirect, 
(iii) Health-related and nonhealth-related. 
We do not attempt to classify economic costs as “tangible” versus “intangible” costs. Nor do we 
report damages separately from losses, although we do use both these two terms (as defined 
above). Finally, we do not report “financial expenditures” separately; but these are closely 
associated with our category of “direct costs.” 
1.4.2 Calculation of Household Economic Costs 
We used the data obtained from the first and second rounds of the household survey 
described above and other data obtained from secondary sources to estimate the economic costs 
that sample households incurred as a result of the 2011 Thailand flood. Our estimates of the 
economic costs include both ex ante (pre-flood) expenditures and other costs incurred to reduce 
ex post economic losses (e.g., damages to property, health, and forgone income incurred during 
and after the flood). We do not include residual damages, i.e., property damages that households 
do not plan to repair after the flood event, or any property damages that remain after repairs and 
rehabilitation efforts are complete. 
 We report estimates for five categories of flood-related economic costs: (1) ex ante 
preventative costs; (2) ex post nonhealth-related losses during the flood; (3) ex post nonhealth-
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related losses after the flood, (4) ex post health-related losses both during and after the flood; and 
(5) household contributions to community (both ex ante and ex post). We further report the direct 
and indirect costs associated with each of these five components. In addition, some households 
received compensation from government and other sources, which is a transfer payment to the 
household that reduces the total household costs. A very small number of sample households 
may have received payments from insurance companies for the property damages they incurred.  
We did not collect this information in the surveys because (1) very few households had 
coverage; and (2) these payments would be transfers (i.e., our estimates of property losses 
represent the real resource costs). Table 1.2 presents the various items included in the cost 
estimates for the direct and indirect costs for each of these five categories. Direct costs were 
comprised of expenditures for hired labor and materials to prepare, cope, and recover from the 
flood. Indirect costs included own labor, volunteer labor, and opportunity cost of time due to 
missed work, increased travel time, and caring for sick household members. For the survey 
respondent, indirect costs were calculated as the product of a monetary value of lost productivity, 
days of work missed, and increased travel time to work and home. The value of lost productivity 
was estimated based on the respondent's self-reported income. For all other household members, 
we assumed that the value of lost time was the minimum daily wage rate in Thailand (THB 300, 
US$ 9.7). 
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Table 1.2 Components of Total Economic Costs Incurred by Households 
Cost Component                      Equation 
Total Economic Cost = A+B+C+D+E 
A. Preventative Costs (Ex ante)   
   Direct   
    Hired labor = # of days  * minimum daily wage of THB 300 
    Materials & Activities   
       Parking car in alternate location    
       Preventative materials (sandbags, pumps, etc.) = total preventative materials cost/ 2 
   Indirect   
    Own labor = # of days  * monthly income/ 22 days 
    Volunteer labor = # of days  * THB 300 per day 
B. During-Flood Economic Loss (Non-health related)   
   Direct   
    Preparation expenditures   
       Alternate accommodation (shelter)   
       Kitchenware, food supplies, boats, clothing   
       Other (sandbags, pumps, construction materials) = total preventative materials cost / 2 
    Increased work commute costs = Δ work commute costs  * # flooded days 
    Increased cost to travel home = Δ home travel costs  * # of trips home 
    Increased food cost = Δ weekly food costs  * flood duration 
   Indirect   
   Increased travel time to work 
= Δ commute time * (flood duration*(5/7) –holiday –
work days missed)* (monthly income/22 days) 
   Increased travel time to house = Δ time to travel home * # trips * opp. cost of time a 
   Foregone income    
C. After-Flood Economic Loss (Non-health related)   
   Direct   
   Car Repairs   
   Housing and belongings damage   
       Hired labor for moving + repair = # of days  * THB 300 per day 
       Cost to repair, clean, replace    
   Indirect   
   Housing and belongings damage   
       Own labor for moving + repair = # of days  * monthly income/ 22 days 
       Volunteer labor for moving + repair = # of days  * THB 300 per day 
D. Health-related Cost   
   Direct: Doctor visits; medicine   
   Indirect: Foregone income of patient 
c
 and care taker  = # of days  * opp cost of time 
b
 
E. Household contributions to community    
   Direct: Cash contribution and volunteer time  =contribution + ( # of days  * THB 300 per day) 
       Cash contribution   
a
 Opportunity cost of time for respondent is income, otherwise THB 300 per day is assumed 
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Preventative costs comprised ex ante expenditures and self-supplied labor to prepare for 
the arrival of the floods and hopefully mitigate losses. Households parked cars in alternate 
locations and purchased goods to prepare for the flood such as construction materials, sandbags, 
and small boats. Nonhealth related economic costs during the flood included expenditures for 
alternative shelter, materials to cope with flooding, emergency food and drinking water, and 
increased travel costs. Foregone income due to days of worked missed was also included for 
respondents who were wage workers, self-employed, or business owners. Direct nonhealth-
related losses during the flood included coping costs (shelter, supplies, etc.), increased expenses 
to commute to work and home, and increased food expenditure. Indirect nonhealth-related losses 
during the flood included increased travel time to work and home as well as foregone income 
due to not being able to commute to work. 
 Ex post nonhealth-related economic losses included expenditures for car repairs and to 
repair, clean, and replace housing and other property damage. Ex post health-related costs were 
based on the information reported by survey respondents about flood-related diseases 
experienced by household members. Expenditures on medicine and doctor visits were included 
in direct costs, while indirect costs were comprised of foregone income of the patient and 
caretakers. As for indirect nonhealth-related losses, respondent's time was valued based on self-
reported income, and for sick household members other than the survey respondent, time was 
valued at the minimum daily wage rate of THB 300 (US$ 9.7). 
 In addition, some households contributed to community flood efforts, either through cash 
contributions or volunteer time. These contributions are included in total household costs. Most 
households received government compensation for flood damage. This compensation is a 
transfer from government to households, and is reported separately from total household costs. 
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Some households were able to generate new income during the flood, by offering needed goods 
and services such as prepared food and boat transport. The net economic costs experienced by a 
household are the total costs minus any compensation received or new income generated. 
 In summary, our estimates of the costs incurred by households in the 2011 Bangkok flood 
go far beyond the typical engineering estimates of financial damages to households' dwellings 
and contents. Notably, they include: 
(i) Not only ex post costs, but also ex ante expenditures; 
(ii) Health-related costs; 
(iii) Productivity losses due to lost work and illness; and 
(iv) Households' coping costs for alternative shelter and supplies when they were forced 
to leave their homes. 
Households' payments for flood insurance can be considered one measure of the perceived ex 
ante costs of flooding risks. We have not included these payments because (1) few households 
(less than 1%) in Bangkok had flood insurance at the time of the 2011 flood (Orie and Stahel, 
2013); (2) the policies were subsidized, and thus not a good measures for estimating expected 
real costs; (3) information was not collected on insurance company payments for property 
damage. Including insurance payments to households as a cost component would result in double 
counting real resource costs. 
 Our household cost estimates from the 2011 Bangkok flood can be used to estimate the 
benefits of flood mitigation strategies when such interventions will reduce such costs. These 
measures of potential “avoided costs” are conceptually similar to the use of “coping costs 
avoided” as welfare-theoretic benefits from water and sanitation investments (Pattanayak et al., 
2005), and avoided cost-of-illness estimates as measures of the benefits of health interventions in 
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the public health field (Poulos et al., 2011). Of course, the costs borne by households are not the 
total economic costs of the flood event. For example, they do not include foregone production or 
property damages in the flooded industrial districts of Bangkok. 
1.4.3 Modeling Strategy: Factors Associated With Preventative Costs and Household Economic 
Losses 
We used regression analysis to estimate the association between preventative costs and 
whether the household received a provincial-level flood warning, and respondent, household, and 
neighborhood characteristics. Our model specification was: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = β0  + β1 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + γ𝑗X𝑗 + 𝜇𝑘H𝑘 + ω𝑚V𝑚            (1.1) 
where  PreventCost  = total preventative costs incurred by household 
warning  = household received a district-level flood warning or not 
Xj  = personal characteristic j (e.g. education level) 
Hk = household characteristic k (e.g. annual expenditure, number of cars 
owned) 
Vm  = neighborhood controls  
 
We expected information in the form of provincial-level flood warnings to increase the 
magnitude and effectiveness of preventative actions. However, in addition to being aware of the 
flood risk, households can only take carefully considered preventative actions if they are 
informed about the cost and effectiveness of measures to mitigate flood losses (Thieken et al., 
2005; Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006). Perceived flood risk is not only influenced by flood 
warnings, but also the frequency of past events, how recent the previous flood was, and personal 
risk tolerance. Such variables are not considered in our model. Nor did we include variables 
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related to previous flood experience due to correlation with household income and 
neighborhood. Higher-income households tended to have shorter residence periods in their 
current homes and therefore tended to have less previous flood experience. The household 
decision to undertake flood mitigation measures is also influenced by expectations regarding 
responsibility for flood control and response, i.e., whether these responsibilities lie more with 
individual households or the government. 
 In order to determine which factors were associated with losses incurred during and after 
flooding, ex post household economic losses were regressed on characteristics of the respondent, 
the household, and the neighborhood. We also included depth of flood and whether the 
household received a provincial-level flood warning. Our model specification was:  
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = β0  +  β1 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  β2𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ + γ𝑗X𝑗 + 𝜇𝑘H𝑘 + ω𝑚V𝑚 + ε     (1.2)                             
where  Flood Loss = total ex post flood loss (costs incurred during and after the flood) 
warning  = district-level flood warning received 
flood depth = Depth of flood water (first floor of house) 
Xj  = personal characteristic j (e.g. education) 
Hk = household characteristic k (e.g. annual expenditure, number of 
cars owned) 
Vm  = neighborhood controls 
 
 The association between receiving a provincial-level flood warning and ex post losses 
was expected to be negative since informed households should be better able to prepare and cope 
with the flood. A household's ability to respond to a provincial-level flood warning will be 
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constrained by its income. A similar model was specified for total flood costs (preventative costs 
plus flood loss): 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = β0  + β1 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + γ𝑗X𝑗 + 𝜇𝑘H𝑘 + ω𝑚V𝑚 + ε          (1.3)  
 
Table 1.3 provides definitions and summary statistics for all variables included in the 
preventative expenditure, ex post flood loss, and total flood cost models (i.e., equations 1.1 to 
1.3). Preventative costs were excluded from the ex post loss model (equation 1.2) due to 
endogeneity concerns. We do not have good, household-specific measures of either the objective 
or perceived flood risk. Therefore, there is the possibility that households with higher 
preventative costs knew that they were at greater risk, especially in Klong Luang, and thus spent 
more ex ante on mitigation strategies. Since preventative costs are a function of flood risk, and 
people act on perceived flood risk, establishing a causal relationship between preventative 
expenditures and ex post losses is challenging. This is a common problem in flood cost 
estimation studies, and we do not claim to have a compelling identification strategy. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the association between preventative expenditures and ex post 
losses is still of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 1.3 Summary Statistics of Regression Variables (Obs = 469) 
 
  Definition Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Preventative Cost Expenditures on preventative measures (in THB) 8,235 14,904 0 180,773 
Ex Post Losses Total household losses during and after the flood (in THB) 151,499 187,530 400 1,511,432 
Total Flood Losses Total costs, before, during, and after flood (in THB) 162,050 192,084 1,423 1,519,323 
Annual Household expenditures Total household expenditures per year (in THB) 261,381 192,006 30,600 1,200,000 
Cars owned  Number of cars owned 0.9 1 0 5 
Education  Level 
     
     Elementary or less 
Dummy variable=1, if respondent had elementary school 
education or less 
0.38 0.49 0 1 
     High School or Vocational 
Dummy variable=1, if respondent had high school or vocational 
education 
0.33 0.47 0 1 
     College or more Dummy variable=1, if respondent had college education or more 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Flood warning (district-specific) 
Dummy variable=1, if household received province-specific 
flood information 
0.83 0.37 0 1 
Flood depth (first floor) Flood depth on first floor of house (in cm) 107 57 0 300 
            
 
 
3
7
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1.5 Results 
1.5.1 Socioeconomic Profile of Respondents 
Respondents were located in both middle-income neighborhoods (220 households) and 
low-income neighborhoods (249 households). The 220 respondents living in middle-income 
neighborhoods were mostly self-employed or employed by businesses in the private sector. The 
average monthly expenditure of middle-income households (estimated using data from the 
second-round of the survey) ranged from THB 50,843 in Klong Luang to THB 82,053 in Bang 
Bua Thong to THB 156,391 in Don Mueang. 
 Most respondents in low-income neighborhoods were wage workers; about a quarter 
were self-employed. The average monthly expenditure of households in low-income 
neighborhoods of Bang Bua Thong and Don Mueang (THB 11,643 and THB 12,412, 
respectively) were significantly lower than in Klong Luang district (THB 15,238). The years of 
education and household expenditures of the respondents in middle-income neighborhoods were 
significantly higher than of respondents in low-income neighborhoods. 
 Almost all respondents in lower-income neighborhoods lived in one-story houses. In 
general, households in low-income neighborhoods have lived longer in their homes than 
households in the middle-income neighborhoods. The average length of stay for households in 
low-income neighborhoods was over 25 years. The average length of stay in middle-income 
neighborhoods ranged from 7 years in Don Mueang and Klong Luang to 15 years in Bang Bua 
Thong. Self-reported house values for households in middle-income neighborhoods range from 
THB 1.5 million (US$ 50,000) in Klong Luang to THB 3.5 million (US$ 113,000) in Bang Bua 
Thong and THB 4.7 million (US$ 151,000 US$) in Don Mueang. For households in low-income 
neighborhoods, house values in Klong Luang and in Don Mueang averaged about THB 295,000 
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(US$ 9590) and THB 317,000 (US$ 10,280), respectively. Average house values for Bang Bua 
Thong were slightly higher (THB 368,000; US$ 11,946). 
1.5.2 Total Economic Costs from the 2011 Flood 
Median total household costs were about THB 95,138 (US$ 3089) for the 469 households 
included in the sample for whom both rounds of interviews were completed (Table 1.4). Nearly 
14% of households had economic costs in excess of THB 300,000, although less than 5% of 
households had over THB 600,000. The cumulative frequency distribution of total household 
costs (Figure 1.2) shows how total economic costs varied dramatically across households—even 
in these neighborhoods most severely affected by the 2011 Bangkok flood. About 22% of 
households had economic costs over THB 200,000. Households with losses over THB 200,000 
tended to have more property at risk (e.g., more cars and more valuable homes) and to have 
higher monthly expenditures. These households were also more likely to live in middle class 
neighborhoods in Bang Bua Thong (Nonthaburi), where floodwaters rose quickly. 
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Table 1.4 Summary Statistics of Economic Cost Components, by poverty status 
    
Above 150% 
Poverty Line 
Below 150% 
Poverty Line 
Total 
Cost Component Obs 359  110  469  
          
A. Preventative Costs (Ex-ante) Median 
                    
5,273  
                    
1,893  
                
3,409  
  Mean 
                    
9,756  
                    
3,272  
                
8,235  
  Std Dev 
                  
16,553  
                    
4,610  
              
14,904  
  
Max. 
                
180,773  
                  
30,395  
            
180,773  
B. During-Flood Economic Loss Median 
                  
26,761  
                  
19,304  
              
25,343  
  Mean 
                  
48,714  
                  
27,113  
              
43,647  
  Std Dev 
                  
81,101  
                  
26,565  
              
72,661  
  
Max. 
                
817,932  
                
152,500  
            
817,932  
C. After-Flood Economic Loss Median 
                  
69,652  
                  
21,920  
              
51,709  
  Mean 
                
131,018  
                  
30,774  
            
107,507  
  Std Dev 
                
165,756  
                  
29,480  
            
151,749  
  
Max. 
             
1,051,100  
                
155,800  
         
1,051,100  
D. Health-related loss 
a
 Median 0  0  0  
  Mean 
                       
336  
                       
372  
                   
345  
  Std Dev 
                    
2,633  
                    
2,105  
                
2,517  
  
Max. 
                  
42,630  
                  
17,000  
              
42,630  
E. Household contributions to community  Median 0  0  0  
  Mean 
                    
2,432  
                    
1,939  
                
2,316  
  Std Dev 
                    
6,100  
                    
5,099  
                
5,879  
  Max. 
                  
53,700  
                  
36,900  
              
53,700  
Total Economic Cost Median 
                
121,896  
                  
52,123  
              
95,138  
  Mean 
                
192,256  
                  
63,470  
            
162,050  
  Std Dev 
                
209,018  
                  
45,987  
            
192,084  
  Max. 
             
1,519,323  
                
247,691  
         
1,519,323  
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Table 1.4  (Continued) 
    
Above 150% 
Poverty Line 
Below 150% 
Poverty Line 
Total 
Total Economic Cost (continued)     
   Direct Median 
                  
80,200  
                  
30,807  
              
59,000  
  Mean 
                
139,874  
                  
37,822  
            
115,939  
  Std Dev 
                
169,797  
                  
33,501  
            
155,530  
  Max. 
             
1,088,700  
                
176,800  
         
1,088,700  
   Indirect Median 
                  
27,158  
                  
18,178  
              
24,545  
  
Mean 
                  
52,382  
                  
25,648  
              
46,112  
  
Std Dev 
                  
83,724  
                  
25,207  
              
75,091  
  Max. 
                
807,023  
                
167,159  
            
807,023  
          
Total Economic Cost (% annual 
expenditures) Median 
                      
0.48  
                      
0.53  
                  
0.48  
  Mean 
                      
0.65  
                      
0.60  
                  
0.64  
  Std Dev 
                        
0.5  
                        
0.4  
                    
0.5  
  Max. 
                        
2.8  
                        
2.6  
                    
2.8  
Total Economic Cost (% annual income) Median 
                      
0.27  
                      
0.25  
                  
0.26  
  Mean 
                      
0.35  
                      
0.31  
                  
0.34  
  Std Dev 
                        
0.3  
                        
0.2  
                    
0.3  
  Max. 
                        
3.0  
                        
1.4  
                    
3.0  
Dwelling-Related Cost (% of house value) Obs 
                       
323  
                         
95  
                   
418  
  Median 
                      
0.02  
                      
0.05  
                  
0.02  
  Mean 
                      
0.06  
                      
0.12  
                  
0.08  
  Std Dev 
                      
0.12  
                      
0.20  
                  
0.14  
  Max. 
                        
0.9  
                        
1.1  
                    
1.1  
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Table 1.4  (Continued) 
    
Above 150% 
Poverty Line 
Below 150% 
Poverty Line 
Total 
F. Compensation Median 
                  
25,000  
                  
24,250  
              
25,000  
  Mean 
                  
22,973  
                  
21,450  
              
22,616  
  Std Dev 
                    
9,536  
                    
6,279  
                
8,897  
  
Max. 
                
125,000  
                  
35,000  
            
125,000  
New Income During Flood Median 0  0  0  
  Mean 
                       
739  
                       
326  
                   
642  
  Std Dev 
                    
5,623  
                    
2,895  
                
5,116  
  
Max. 
                  
80,000  
                  
30,000  
              
80,000  
Net Economic Cost Median 
                  
93,987  
                  
31,711  
              
71,789  
  Mean 
                
166,004  
                  
41,395  
            
136,778  
  Std Dev 
                
206,113  
                  
46,154  
            
189,174  
  Min 
                
(33,347) 
                
(26,138) 
            
(33,347) 
  Max. 
             
1,496,323  
                
222,691  
         
1,496,323  
 
a
 Note: In addition, two deaths were reported. Although not included in total loss estimates, using VSL, this loss 
amount is estimated to be between US$ 2.2 to $2.8 million (2012 US$) (Vassanadumrongdee and Matsuoka, 2005)   
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For most households, direct costs were greater than indirect costs (Figure 1.2). As a 
proportion of annual household expenditure, median costs were 48% of annual expenditure. As a 
percentage of annual household income, median costs were 26%. A considerable number of 
households incurred high costs relative to annual expenditure (Figure 1.3).  About 18% of 
households had costs that were equivalent to or greater than their annual expenditure, while only 
2% of households had costs that were equivalent to or greater than twice their annual 
expenditure.  The cost of house repairs was surprisingly low given the depth and duration of the 
floods (Tables 1.4 and 1.5).  Median house repair costs as a percent of house value were 2% 
(mean of 8%).  Most houses incurred little structural damage. 
Figure 1.2 Frequency of total, direct, and indirect costs 
 
 
1.5.3 Composition of Economic Costs 
 The total household economic cost was subdivided into five components: (1) ex ante 
preventative costs; (2) ex post nonhealth-related losses during the flood; (3) ex post nonhealth-
related losses after the flood; (4) ex post health-related losses both during and after the flood; and 
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(5) household contributions to community (both ex ante and ex post). The largest component was 
the ex post nonhealth-related losses after the flood, which accounted for 66% of mean household 
total cost, followed by nonhealth losses during the flood (27% of mean total cost) (Figure 1.4, 
Panel A). 
Figure 1.3 Frequency of total, direct, and indirect costs as a percentage of annual expenditure 
 
 
Median nonhealth-related losses after the flood were about THB 51,700 (US$ 1680). 
Damage to homes and belongings was by far the largest component of ex post economic loss. 
Particularly high losses were incurred for replacement of furniture, cleaning of home, and 
replacement of electrical appliances. 
 Ex post nonhealth-related losses during the flood was the second-highest cost category. 
Median nonhealth-related losses during the flood were about THB 25,343. Foregone income was 
the largest component of nonhealth-related losses incurred by households during the flood (mean 
of THB 27,276), followed by coping costs for alternative shelter and supplies (mean of about 
THB 10,160), and increased food expenses (mean of about THB 3463). About half of the   
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Figure 1.4 Composition of mean household costs 
Panel A. Full sample 
 
 
Panel B. By poverty category 
 
 
 
Note: About 23% of the sample (110 households) had annual expenditures less than 150% of the poverty line. 
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households had no foregone income during the flood largely because salaried employees were 
able to collect their salary even when they missed work due to the flood. It is therefore the 
organizations that employed salaried workers that bore these losses. Only 5% of households were 
estimated to have foregone income over THB 100,000. 
 Few households experienced health-related losses. Only 52 households (11% of the 
sample) had at least one member who suffered from an illness or accident that the respondent 
attributed to the flood. In total, 62 disease episodes or accidents were reported and attributed to 
flood-related causes. Of these, 36 households (58%) reported incurring health costs. The 
majority of reported episodes were due to one of two causes: (1) Tinea pedis, a contagious skin 
infection caused by ringworm fungus, (23 cases), or (2) accidents (13 cases). In addition, 
rheumatism and muscular pain, common colds, and diarrhea were reported by several 
households, but it is difficult to know the proportion of these cases that were actually due to the 
flood. Two flood-related deaths were reported. One was due to electrocution and the other due to 
cramps that resulted in drowning. Both cases involved the death of the head of household and 
were in the poor neighborhoods of Bang Bua Thong in Nonthaburi. We have not adjusted our 
estimates of household economic losses using the value of a statistical life (VSL) in Bangkok 
(Vassanadumrongdee and Matsuoka, 2005) to include these two deaths. Had we done so, the 
total economic losses experienced by the households in our sample would have been much 
higher (roughly double). 
 The majority of health-related losses were borne by only a few households. Most 
households in which a member was ill incurred very modest health losses—median heath loss 
was THB 600. About 29% of households with a sick or injured member bore no health loss. 
However, health costs varied widely across households, from zero to THB 42,630. The 
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magnitude of indirect health losses was much greater than direct health losses. In addition, only 
12 households (representing 23% of households with a sick or injured member) incurred indirect 
health losses due to foregone wages (as a result of a sick or injured individual missing work or 
due to a caregiver missing work). 
 Preventative costs incurred by households before the flood amounted to a relatively small 
proportion of total household cost (Figure 1.4, Panel A). Ex ante preparation costs included 
supplies and labor to mitigate losses and prepare for flooding. Households parked cars in 
alternate locations and purchased goods to prepare for the flood such as construction materials, 
sandbags, and water pumps. Median preventative costs were about THB 3409 (US$ 111). 
However, costs range from zero to over THB 180,770. Less than 6% of households had 
preventative costs in excess of THB 30,000. Indirect expenditures (own labor and volunteer 
labor to take preventative actions) tended to be much greater (median of THB 2500) than direct 
expenditures on supplies and hired labor (median of zero). 
 Nearly all households received disaster compensation, which was provided from various 
sources including the national government, employers, and aid organizations. The median value 
of disaster compensation received was THB 25,000 (about US$800). Few households generated 
additional income during the flood (4% of our sample). Most of these households created new 
income sources such as selling food and drinks or providing boat transportation. By including 
compensation and income from new sources, the median value of net flood losses was THB 
71,789. Seven percent of the sample households had zero or negative net flood losses (i.e., some 
households benefited) after accounting for compensation and income from new sources. Figure 
1.5 presents the cumulative frequency distribution total household costs, compensation received 
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and net costs. As illustrated, compensation paid made a relatively small reduction in the total 
economic losses of the vast majority of households. 
Figure 1.5 Cumulative frequency distributions of economic costs 
 
 
 
1.5.4 Distribution of Economic Costs Across Income Groups 
Economic costs also varied considerably across poor and non-poor households. Poor 
households were defined as having expenditures below 150% of the national poverty line. The 
national poverty line was expenditures of THB 1443 per person per month in 2007 (United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2010). Adjusting for inflation, this is equivalent to THB 
1618 per person per month in 2011. Households with expenditures under THB 2427 per person 
per month were considered to be poor. In our sample of 469 households, 110 households (23%) 
were defined as poor. 
 Poor households incurred much lower total costs than non-poor households, both in terms 
of direct and indirect costs. Median total costs for non-poor households (THB 121,896) were 
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more than twice as large as median total costs for poor households (THB 52,123). For both 
income groups, after flood losses were by far the largest category, followed by losses incurred 
during the flood (Figure 1.6). Median losses during the flood (stage 2) were comparable for the 
non-poor (THB 26,761) and poor (THB 19,304) households. In addition, preventative costs were 
relatively low for both non-poor and poor households (median of THB 5273 and THB 1893, 
respectively). The biggest difference in losses between non-poor and poor households was for 
after flood (stage 3) losses (median values of THB 69,652 and THB 21,920, respectively). This 
large difference in ex post losses was due to wealthier households owning more property that 
was at risk and that was subsequently damaged. 
 
Figure 1.6 Median household costs, by loss type and income group 
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Nonhealth losses during the flood were a much larger share of poor household total costs 
(43% of mean total costs) than of non-poor households (26%) (Figure 1.4, Panel B). In contrast, 
non-poor households had a larger share of costs accounted for by ex post loss (68%) than poor 
households (48%). This is due, in part, to poor households being more likely to forego wages 
when missing work. The ratio of preventative costs to total costs was approximately the same for 
non-poor and poor households (5%). Non-poor households were slightly more likely to evacuate 
from their homes—77% of non-poor households had at least some members evacuate compared 
to 65% of poor households. 
In terms of after flood losses, poor households tended to have relatively greater repair and 
rehabilitation costs as a percentage of housing value (median of 5% of house value, for poor 
households), compared to non-poor households (median of 2% of house value). About 6% of 
poor households (six households) had repair costs that were more than 50% of house value, 
compared to 3% of non-poor households (nine households). One poor household reported repair 
costs that exceeded the self-reported market value of their house. 
The difference between the incidence of flood-related health cases in poor and non-poor 
households was not statistically significant. In addition, incidence of flood-related health cases 
was similar across low-income and middle-income neighborhoods. Neighborhoods are grouped 
into low-income and middle-income categories. Each of the three provinces has one category of 
low-income neighborhoods and one category of middle-income neighborhoods. So, if health 
cases were evenly distributed, the income category within each province would have 16% of 
health cases. Five of these categories (Don Mueang low-income, Nonthaburi low- and middle-
income, Pathum Thani low- and middle-income) have between 16 and 21% of the cases. 
However, the Don Mueang middle-income neighborhoods only have 3% of the health cases. 
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Poor and non-poor households with at least one sick or injured member had similar total health 
losses (median of THB 750 and 500, respectively). 
Non-poor households had higher preventative costs (median THB 5273) than poor 
households (median of THB 1893) because they have more property at risk and are more able to 
afford such preventative measures. However, the vast majority of households in both income 
groups took some preventative measures. A slightly smaller percentage of poor households 
(90%) took preventative action than non-poor households (94%). The proportion of poor and 
non-poor households that moved belongings to higher ground or the second floor were 
comparable, but slightly more poor households built scaffolding structures within the house as 
temporary living or storage space. Poor households were more likely to resort to scaffolding 
because a greater proportion of poor households lived in one-story dwellings. In addition, poor 
households were less likely to build concrete block or sandbag flood barriers. 
Poor and non-poor households tended to bear similar burdens in terms of costs as a 
percentage of annual expenditure. About 14% of poor households and 19% of non-poor 
households had losses that were equivalent to or greater than their annual expenditure. 
Households in Bang Bua Thong and Don Mueang tended to have greater losses as a percentage 
of annual expenditure than households in Klong Luang (Figure 1.7). In our sample, Bang Bua 
Thong and Don Mueang also had larger shares of poor households. About 22% of households in 
Don Mueang (Bangkok) and Klong Luang (Pathum Thani) were poor, compared 27% in Bang 
Bua Thong (Nonthaburi). 
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Figure 1.7 Median household costs, by province 
 
 
 
1.5.5 Results of Multivariate Analyses 
 The regression model (equation 1.1) used to examine the factors associated with 
household preventative costs (i.e., before the flood) explained little of the variation in the data 
(adjusted R
2
 =0.17). Households that owned cars and had a college education spent somewhat 
more on preventative costs (Table 1.5). Whether the household received a flood warning at the 
district level was not statistically significant. Before the 2011 flood arrived in the greater 
Bangkok metropolitan area, most households in the study areas knew it was coming, and almost 
everyone incurred preventative costs to mitigate the expected losses. The majority of households 
received provincial-level flood warnings in Don Mueang and Klong Luang and Bang Bua 
Thong. After controlling for socioeconomic factors and provincial-level flood warning, there 
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were few neighborhood-specific effects on the magnitude of preventative costs that households 
incurred, with the exception of one neighborhood. 
 
Table 1.5 OLS Regression Results for Preventative Costs 
 
Preventative Expenditure 
       
 
(1) (2) 
 
Coeff.   
Std. 
Err. 
Coeff.   
Std. 
Err. 
Annual household expenditures 0.007 **  0 0 
 
0 
Cars owned  2,626 ***  770 2,569 ***  801 
 
  
    
 
  
Education  Level 
  
    
 
  
     High School or Vocational 2,106 
 
1,532 1,704 
 
1,620 
     College or more 7,223 *** 1,829 7,244 ***  2,270 
 
  
    
 
  
Flood warning  
1,582 
 
1,732 -214 
 
1,876 
(province-specific) 
 
  
    
 
  
Neighborhood 
  
    
 
  
     YaJai (low-income) 
  
  1,024 
 
3,063 
     FangNean (low-income) 
  
  -727 
 
2,978 
     Chollada (middle-income) 
  
  -1,834 
 
3,574 
     Pattaranivate (middle-income) 
  
  -2,471 
 
3,504 
     Ruamjairuk (low-income) 
  
  2,597 
 
3,230 
     Promsumrit (low-income) 
  
  1,859 
 
2,959 
     Saraneepark (middle-income) 
  
  6,335  *  3,329 
     Chudapa (middle-income) 
  
  -2,448 
 
5,715 
     Suksombun (low-income) 
  
  1,083 
 
2,903 
     PhinicPark (middle-income) 
  
  4,277 
 
3,055 
     Phapinjad (middle-income) 
  
  4,229 
 
3,302 
 
  
    
 
  
Constant 51   1,909 1,068   2,805 
R
2
 0.138  0.167 
Adj R
2
 0.129 0.138 
Obs 469 469 
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Table 1.6 presents the results of the regression models (equations 1.2 and 1.3) that 
examined factors associated with variation in the ex post household losses (i.e., during and after 
the flood) and total flood costs. These models explain more of the variation in ex post household 
losses (adjusted R
2 = 0.43) and total costs (adjusted R2 = 0.44). Since ex post household losses 
tend to comprise the majority of total costs, the results of both models are similar. Three groups 
of variables stand out as associated with ex post household losses and total household costs. 
First, households with higher annual expenditures and more cars incurred more losses because 
they had more property at risk. Households with a college education or higher also suffered 
higher losses, which we interpret as an additional indicator for more property at risk. 
 Second, even after controlling for socioeconomic factors, neighborhood effects were 
large and statistically significant. Specifically, household losses in middle-income 
neighborhoods Bang Bua Thong and Don Mueang were higher than in Klong Luang. This is 
expected because the floodwaters were deeper in Bang Bua Thong and arrived with much less 
advanced warning than in Klong Luang. 
Third, provincial-level flood warnings were not significant in any of the ex post loss 
model specifications that controlled for neighborhood effects. Such warnings may have been less 
useful during the 2011 greater Bangkok flood than in flood events that unfold more quickly. The 
amount of time households had to prepare before the arrival of the flood appears to be an 
important factor for flood loss mitigation. Longer lead times are usually associated with lower 
damages and lower death rates [Parker et al., 2009]. During slow moving flood events, such as 
the 2011 Thailand flood, more people are informed in advance about the event. By the time 
floodwaters reached greater Bangkok, most households were aware the flood was coming, but 
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these warnings might not have conveyed sufficient information about appropriate mitigation 
actions or the depth of floodwater that households could expect. 
 
Table 1.6 OLS Regression Results for Ex Post Flood Losses, and Total Costs 
 
Ex Post Flood Losses 
       
 
(1) (2) 
 
Coeff.   
Std. 
Err. 
Coeff.   
Std. 
Err. 
Annual household expenditures 0.22 *** 0.05 0.22 *** 0.05 
Cars owned  45,713 *** 8,326 47,927 *** 8,434 
 
  
 
    
 
  
Education  Level   
 
    
 
  
     High School or Vocational -13,702 
 
16,999 -8,347 
 
17,056 
     College or more 46,769 ** 23,639 58,195 ** 23,904 
 
  
 
    
 
  
Flood warning (province-specific) -9,535 
 
19,530 -10,085 
 
19,752 
Flood depth (first floor) 209 
 
146   
 
  
 
  
 
    
 
  
Neighborhood   
 
    
 
  
     YaJai (low-income) 15,690 
 
33,058 27,719 
 
32,255 
     FangNean (low-income) 3,299 
 
31,039 7,394 
 
31,358 
     Chollada (middle-income) 150,169 *** 37,147 146,512 *** 37,639 
     Pattaranivate (middle-income) 67,382 * 36,423 62,957 * 36,901 
     Ruamjairuk (low-income) 15,008 
 
35,232 31,602 
 
34,020 
     Promsumrit (low-income) -841 
 
32,287 14,176 
 
31,160 
     Saraneepark (middle-income) 109,814 *** 34,794 109,661 *** 35,061 
     Chudapa (middle-income) 58,885 
 
59,555 49,067 
 
60,176 
     Suksombun (low-income) -1,047 
 
30,878 11,359 
 
30,572 
     PhinicPark (middle-income) -22,283 
 
32,059 -10,978 
 
32,168 
     Phapinjad (middle-income) 33 
 
34,626 -812 
 
34,773 
 
  
 
    
 
  
Constant -1,470   31,819 18,451   29,540 
R
2
 0.433 0.444 
Adj R
2
 0.412 0.424 
Obs 469 469 
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1.6 Discussion 
The estimates of household economic losses presented in this paper are valuable as one of 
many inputs needed to undertake an integrated water resources assessment of flood control 
strategies for Bangkok. The estimates themselves are not sufficient grounds on which to base 
policy recommendations. However, our results do suggest some policy alternatives should be the 
focus of more serious analysis. 
 First, from the household's perspective, the top priority of the State should be to save 
lives. This is true not only on moral grounds, but on economic grounds as well. Two people in 
our sample households lost their lives in the flood. If we had assigned a monetary value to these 
two deaths using an estimate of the value of a statistical life estimated for Bangkok, the 
economic value of this mortality loss would be more than the estimated total household costs for 
the entire sample of 469 households. Saving more lives would also appear to be relatively 
straightforward and cheap (cutting off electricity to flooded areas more quickly). This finding 
also suggests that it might be useful to design an insurance product that offered protection 
against both against loss of life and property losses. 
 Second, also from a flood insurance perspective, there would appear to be a greater need 
for catastrophic insurance than for insurance against the smaller losses experienced by most 
households in our sample. Our results show that many households even in the most severely 
flooded parts of Bangkok suffered what are best described as moderate, but not catastrophic 
losses. Based on these results, catastrophic insurance should be relatively cheap because even in 
such a severe event as the 2011 flood, few people suffered catastrophic losses. Insurance 
providers that offer households products to insure against such catastrophic losses would have to 
carefully protect themselves against the moral hazard that households would not take sufficient 
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care ex ante to minimize losses if they had catastrophic insurance. However, this is a well-
understood problem for the insurance industry, and copayments and coverage caps should 
provide adequate protection. 
 The findings also bring into sharper focus other important policy questions that we 
cannot yet answer based solely on the estimates of household economic losses. For example, if 
the policy focus is on protecting residential areas, should the Government of Thailand put more 
emphasis on structural or nonstructural flood control strategies? Conventional wisdom holds that 
flood-warning systems are among the most cost-effective nonstructural options to reduce flood 
losses. Having more time to react to the evolving flood situation probably would have helped 
some households reduce their economic losses, but receiving the information contained in a 
provincial-level flood warning did not seem to matter much to the households in our sample.  
Although almost everyone in Bangkok knew the flood was coming, it was challenging for 
people to assess the conflicting information coming from different sources and to determine what 
the likely consequences of the flood would be for them. Despite the massive news coverage, 
many people in the neighborhoods we studied were still caught off guard by the severity of the 
flood in their own neighborhood. This was partially due to the content of the information 
obtained from the media, which often was not of much practical value. For example, instead of 
being informed about the volume of water coming, households could have benefited more from 
information about expected water depth, which would have enabled households to better decide 
whether to move cars and belongings. With better information about the depth of floodwaters to 
be expected, households might not have placed as much emphasis on building barriers to prevent 
water from coming into the house. Households could have devoted more effort to moving their 
belongings to higher ground. 
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Almost all the households in our study took preventative actions to mitigate flood 
losses—such as moving possessions higher—to a second story, roof, or higher ground (86%), 
moving vehicles (46%), and sandbagging (35%). Many of these preventative actions proved to 
be ineffective, and it is unclear how much households knew about the likely effectiveness of 
various loss prevention measures. For the few households that did not take preventative 
measures, some did not take action either because they did not believe their houses would be 
affected, or they wanted to wait and see the progression of the flood. Some people who took 
preventative actions did not receive explicit flood warnings at the province level. They acted 
based on the news coverage and common knowledge that the flood was progressing toward 
greater Bangkok. But even for those who did receive province-level warnings, this information 
did not make much difference because it turned out that there was not much they could do to 
reduce property losses, with the exception of those who moved their cars out of the area and 
moved their possession to higher grounds. 
 Even though members of many households evacuated their homes, our findings show that 
many people did not do so immediately after the floodwaters arrived. Thus, these members were 
at risk of electrocution and other flood-related accidents and diseases. Even after people 
evacuated, many returned often to their homes before the floodwaters receded to check on their 
belongings. Short animations broadcast on television tended to fill information gaps left by 
government sources. These animated service announcements provided instruction on how to 
keep safe, to lower health risk, and how to cope with flood waters if people did not want to 
evacuate. 
 For residents in our study areas who survived, the 2011 flood was a traumatic event, one 
that people will remember all their lives. But for the vast majority of these households, the 
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economic losses they incurred should not be characterized as “catastrophic.” Our findings from 
three of the most severely affected neighborhoods of greater Bangkok show that median 
household economic losses were about THB 95,138 (US$3089). Economic costs were higher for 
middle-income households than for poor households because they had more property at risk, and 
somewhat higher for residents in Bang Bua Thong where people had little warning before the 
floodwaters rose rapidly in their neighborhood and were especially deep. However, economic 
costs as a percentage of annual household expenditures were similar between poor and non-poor 
households (53% and 48%, respectively). 
 The median household economic cost was equal to about 6 months of self-reported 
household expenditures (and about 3 months of self-reported household income), a large loss to 
be sure, but probably not a life-changing economic event. For most households, recovery efforts 
began quickly. Households had to pay for cleaning their homes and making minor repairs, but 
most homes were constructed of concrete or simple wood frames, neither of which suffered 
permanent structural damage. Repair and rehabilitation costs to houses were about 2% of the 
self-reported market value of the house. Very few households experienced morbidity losses, and 
for those that did, the economic value of the losses was very low (less than 1% of median 
household economic costs). 
 Our findings of household economic losses are approximately 2–5 times higher than the 
estimates of the World Bank (2012), depending on the province (Table 1.7). This is largely due 
to two reasons. First, our estimates included cost components that were not included in the 
World Bank study. The World Bank conducted a rapid assessment of all sectors that did not 
make use of household surveys. The World Bank team estimated housing damage based on the 
number of dwellings that were likely inundated, based on flood maps. To estimate cost of 
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damage to buildings, representative costs were determined by type of housing (based on 
construction materials, number of floors). On the other hand, our estimates included both direct 
and indirect costs before, during, and after the flood. We also captured more recovery costs by 
conducting the second-round, follow-up survey 1 year after the floodwater receded. Second, our 
study focused on households in three of the most severely affected areas of the Greater Bangkok 
Metropolitan area where losses were clearly higher. 
Table 1.7 Mean Household Damages, Comparison of Study Results to World Bank (2012) 
Estimates 
  
Housing 
Damage  
Content 
Damage Shelter Prevention 
Other  
(e.g. repair time, 
foregone income, 
health cost) 
Total 
(THB) 
Total 
(US$) 
World Bank Estimates 
  
    
Bangkok 2,565 19,486 17,276 N/A N/A 40,336 1,310 
Nonthaburi 3,240 19,686 19,455 N/A N/A 43,399 1,409 
Pathum Thani 4,701 19,448 22,023 N/A N/A 47,179 1,532 
  
     
    
EEPSEA Estimates 
  
    
Bangkok (Don 
Muang) 136,387 3,770 11,441 37,120 203,222 6,598 
Nonthaburi 
(Bang Bua 
Thong) 99,704 3,780 5,861 47,733 182,864 5,937 
Pathum Thani 
(Klong Luang) 41,342 731 7,707 45,392 108,753 3,531 
 
Our analysis of the composition of the total household economic costs revealed that about 
5% of the total household economic costs were incurred before the flood, 27% during the flood, 
and 66% after the flood. This does not necessarily mean that preventative expenditures were too 
low; indeed, as noted, many of the preventative expenditures undertaken seem to have been 
ineffective. But it does point to the need for government policy to focus on the importance of 
evaluating alternative policies to reduce households' ex post economic costs. Very few 
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households in our sample had any kind of flood insurance. Despite the difficulty of assessing 
risks of future flooding and the moral hazards of encouraging development in flood-prone areas, 
there would seem to be an important role for government to facilitate the development a market 
for catastrophic flood insurance for households. 
 Finally, this paper demonstrates that it is practical and feasible to collect microeconomic 
data from households affected by floods using in-person interviews. Such microlevel data yield a 
much clearer and comprehensive picture of household floods costs. 
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CHAPTER 2: INFORMING MITIGATION OF DISASTER LOSS THROUGH SOCIAL 
MEDIA: EVIDENCE FROM THAILAND 
2
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction  
2.1.1 Overview 
This paper is the first to investigate the role of online information and social media in 
enabling households to reduce natural disaster losses.  The historic 2011 Bangkok flood is 
utilized as a case study to assess how internet use allowed households to mitigate flood losses.  
This event was one of the first major disasters to affect an urban area with a substantial 
population connected to social media.  The role of online information is investigated with a 
mixed methods approach, using both quantitative (propensity score matching and multivariate 
regression analysis) and qualitative (in-depth interviews) techniques.  The study relies on two 
data sources – survey responses from 469 Bangkok households and in-depth interviews with 
twenty-three internet users who are a subset of the survey participants.    
 Propensity score matching indicates that social media use enabled households to reduce 
mean total losses by 37%, using a nearest neighbor estimator.  Average loss reductions amounted 
to US$ 3,708 to US$ 4,886, depending on the matching estimator.  These reductions are in 
relation to comparable households (i.e. those who are well-educated, higher-income, and have 
multi-story houses), rather than the general population.  In addition, regression analysis suggests
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that social media use is associated with lower flood losses (average reduction of US$ 2,743).  
These reductions are notable when considering that total flood losses in 2011 averaged US$ 
4,903.  Social media offered information that was not available from other sources, such as 
localized and nearly real-time updates of flood location and depth.  With knowledge of current 
flood conditions, Bangkok households could move belongings to higher ground before 
floodwaters arrived.  These findings suggest that utilizing social media users as sensors could 
better inform populations during natural disasters, particularly in locations that lack real-time, 
accurate flood monitoring networks.  Therefore, expanded access to the internet and social media 
could especially be useful in developing countries, ungauged basins, and highly complex urban 
environments.  Overall, the study reveals that online information can enable effective disaster 
preparedness and reduce flood losses. 
2.1.2 Motivation 
 When confronted with natural disasters, individuals around the world increasingly use 
online resources to inform themselves of forecasted conditions and advisable actions.  In 
particular, websites that facilitate interaction among users are becoming common sources of 
disaster information.  The emergence of Web 2.0 applications, such as social media, has 
fundamentally altered how the internet is used globally.  Social media sites enable users to create 
and share content.  Through social media, users can access information that is continuously 
updated and interactive.  However, ensuring accuracy remains a challenge. 
 This paper uses the historic 2011 Bangkok flood as a case study to assess how internet 
activity allowed households to mitigate losses.  This event represents one of the first major 
floods in the 21
st
 century to affect a megacity with an online population.  Low-lying megacities 
present new challenges for flood control since massive evacuations are practically impossible 
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with present transportation infrastructure. While evacuations of entire megacities are infeasible, 
information can play a vital role in allowing people to take effective actions to reduce flood 
losses.  Social media is a key focus of this study and the 2011 Bangkok flood is one of the first 
major disasters to affect a substantial population connected to social media.  Nearly one-quarter 
of the Thailand’s population had internet access in 2011 and 61% of internet users actively used 
Facebook (World Bank, 2014; We Are Social, 2012).  When Hurricane Katrina struck New 
Orleans in 2005, Facebook was not available to the general public and Twitter was undergoing 
beta testing.  Therefore, the case of Bangkok represents an important research opportunity to 
identify if and how online activity can inform disaster preparation and recovery.   
 The 2011 flood event unfolded slowly, taking several weeks to reach its maximum extent 
in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area.  As the flood progressed, government sources could not 
predict the path and timing of the flood through the urban environment with much precision or 
lead time.  A complex network of canals and dikes winds through the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Area, making predictions about the precise timing of floodwaters in specific neighborhoods 
difficult.  Social media offered households different types of information not provided by 
government or other traditional information sources.  For example, social media offers the ability 
to communicate and share information with one’s extended social circle.  This information may 
have allowed households to understand the progression of the flood through the metropolitan 
area.  In addition, households would have the ability to share ideas and advice for mitigation 
actions via social media, which may have allowed households to better prepare.  
 No previous study has investigated the role of online information in reducing natural 
disaster losses.  Yet, social media may offer enormous potential to improve disaster 
communication, save lives, and reduce disaster losses.  Worldwide, social media has an immense 
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presence with over one billion users on Facebook and 500 million users on Twitter (WebCertain, 
2012).  Disaster management agencies are beginning to establish a presence on these networks.  
Understanding the effect of social media information on flood losses could allow governments to 
better select channels to disseminate disaster messages.  For example, the U.S. Federal 
Emergency Management Agency is testing the use of social media for distributing emergency 
updates.   
 This study assesses if and how online information can enable households to reduce losses 
due to flooding.  The types of flood losses that are the focus of this study are those borne during 
and after flooding, rather than costs of preventative actions.  Insights into whether online 
information, particularly social media, can allow households to reduce flood losses would have 
broad implications for incorporating Web 2.0 applications into disaster management efforts. 
 To explore the role of online information in mitigation of flood loss, a mixed methods 
approach was employed, making use of both quantitative (propensity score matching and 
multivariate regression analysis) and qualitative (in-depth interviews) techniques.  The study 
relies on two data sources – survey responses from 469 Bangkok households and in-depth 
interviews with 23 internet users who are a subset of the survey participants.   Propensity score 
matching (PSM) is used to test for evidence of a causal relationship between social media and 
flood losses.  Regression analysis of survey responses identifies possible associations between 
online activity and flood losses as well as before flood mitigation actions. In-depth, qualitative 
interviews complement the quantitative analysis, and provide explanations for statistical 
associations.  In-depth interview responses provide further understanding of how households 
used online information before, during, and after the flood 
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The paper is organized into the following sections. The next, second section of the paper 
provides background on internet use in Thailand and the 2011 flood. The third section presents a 
description of study sites and fieldwork procedures, followed by the analysis strategy in the 
fourth section.  The fifth section presents results and the sixth section offers concluding 
observations. 
2.2  Background  
2.2.1 Natural Disasters and Web 2.0  
 During natural disasters, information on the Web 2.0 may offer advantages over long-
established information sources such as television, radio, and print media.  Advantages include 
(i) search functions, (ii) real-time updates and ability to establish chronological records of 
information, and (iii) self-publishing capability and widespread distribution through social 
media.  One key feature of online information is its ability to be searched.  Internet searches 
allow users to quickly find relevant information.  In contrast, traditional media such as television, 
radio, and newspaper require recipients to sift through a considerable amount of information that 
is not necessarily relevant for them.  Search capabilities exist both within social media sites and 
for the World Wide Web.  During natural disasters, search capabilities may allow users to find 
relevant information necessary to make informed decisions regarding mitigation and evacuation 
decisions.   
Social media offers advantages beyond conventional uses of internet.  A key advantage of 
social media is the ability to self-publish and rapidly distribute information through established 
social networks.  Social media sites offer information that might not be available elsewhere since 
users can collectively create and share content among their networks.  In addition, these sites 
offer a powerful way for messages to reach large audiences in a short timeframe.  In some cases, 
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social media can distribute news updates faster than traditional media or government sources 
(Guan and Chen, 2014).  For example, social media users can report earthquakes faster than 
current U.S. Geological Survey procedures are able to, which was illustrated during the 2008 
earthquakes in China (Earle et al., 2010).  Furthermore, social network sites can facilitate 
widespread reach of messages through vast networks of users.  This is possible since messages 
travel via electronic word-of-mouth (Betsch et al., 2012).  A notable feature of social media sites 
is that users receive messages from those who they know and trust.  Therefore, messages 
distributed via these sites may have a larger impact than information from traditional news 
sources since known and trusted sources are more likely to influence beliefs and behavior 
(Betsch et al., 2012).  
 Social media also offers content that would be difficult to obtain from other sources.  
This content includes first-hand accounts from laypeople, which can provide highly localized 
and timely information.  In a disaster situation, reports from users across a geographical area can 
present a dynamic view of real-time disaster conditions.  For example, during the 2007 
California wildfires, social media users were able to gather and share localized information about 
affected areas, which was not adequately provided by traditional news sources (Sutton et al., 
2008).  Social media allows individuals and organizations to self-publish and therefore bypass 
traditional gatekeepers of information.   
 Drawbacks to user-generated content on Web 2.0 application include the possibility of 
inaccurate or incomplete information (Witteman and Zikmund-Fischer, 2012).  Users can easily 
share information without the oversight of an information gatekeeper.  Substantial 
misinformation abounds on the internet.  A challenge for Web 2.0 applications is ensuring 
accuracy.  During natural disasters, reliance on online information could be a drawback due to 
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the vulnerability of internet connections to outages (Laituri and Kodrich, 2008).  However, this 
could change with the spread of mobile devices.  Unlike internet service provided via cable or 
fixed telephone lines, mobile devices can access the internet even during electricity outages if 
they are able to charge their batteries in advance.
3
  Thus, mobile internet access could offer an 
opportunity to improve natural disaster communication and relief efforts.   
 Most of the past literature on natural disasters and Web 2.0 applications is limited to 
descriptions of online activity during an event.  Numerous studies have described the types of 
online information sought and/or the popularity of disaster-related internet searches.  Descriptive 
studies of social media use during disasters have been conducted for floods (Kongthon et al., 
2012; Vieweg et al., 2010), earthquakes (Earle et al., 2010), wildfires (Vieweg et al., 2010), 
hurricanes and typhoons (Chan and Schofer, 2014; Hughes and Palen, 2009; Marcias et al., 
2009), and tsunamis (Acar and Muraki, 2011).  In other contexts, more rigorous studies have 
observed how online activity responds to air quality forecasts (Aldy and Bind, 2014) and 
cigarette taxes (Ayers et al., 2011).   
 A growing literature has also assessed whether information on social media during an 
event can reliably describe disaster impacts (Guan and Chen, 2014; Hughes and Palen, 2009).  If 
the post-disaster situation can be accurately assessed via social media content, then this could 
inform disaster and recovery efforts.  The role of Web 2.0 in disaster relief and recovery has also 
been described in case studies on the Haiti earthquake (Holguıín-Veras et al., 2012; Harvard 
Humanitarian Initiative, 2011; Zook et al., 2010), Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Sutton et al., 
2013), and 2010 Taiwan typhoon (Huang et al., 2010). 
 
                                                          
3
Many mobile phone stations have backup power (e.g. battery or generator) or service providers can deploy 
moveable, temporary stations in disaster situations (Reardon, 2011). 
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No studies have addressed how online information may influence natural disaster 
mitigation actions and losses.  Within the public health literature, studies have also analyzed how 
online information might influence individual decisions, such as preparedness for the 2001 
anthrax scare (Kittler et al., 2004) and vaccinations (Betsch et al., 2012; McRee et al., 2012).  In 
the case of vaccinations, social media appears to have facilitated the wide distribution of anti-
vaccination messages (Betsch et al., 2012).  No study collected behavior or action outcomes 
from individuals, with the exception of Kittler et al. (2004).
4
  This current study represents the 
first to use a rich dataset of household-level observations to understand the effect of online 
information on flood losses.  It is an improvement over past studies because it goes beyond a 
description of online activity during the 2011 Bangkok flood and utilizes in-person interviews. 
2.2.2 Overview of 2011Thailand Flood 
 The historic Thailand flood in 2011 is the world’s most costly flooding disaster in terms 
of insured losses (Orie and Stahel 2013).  More than four months of flooding claimed over 680 
lives and caused massive disruptions to industry.  The disastrous flood was largely caused by 
extremely high rainfall. In the three months before the flood, Thailand had its highest amount 
recorded since records began in 1901 (World Bank, 2012).  The flood began in northern 
Thailand, in the upper reaches of the Chao Phraya River basin and eventually reached Bangkok.  
The Chao Phraya River basin is the major river system of Thailand, draining nearly a third of the 
country’s land surface.  Bangkok is located at the end of the Chao Phraya River, before it 
empties into the Gulf of Thailand.  Bangkok is a megacity built on top of a river delta, has flat 
topography, and the land surface is subsiding.  Thus, the greater metropolitan area is susceptible 
                                                          
4
This study on the 2001 anthrax scare conducted a mail survey (n=209) and found that many of the respondents who 
sought anthrax-related information online (n=44) reported to handle mail differently (n=26) and wash hands more 
often (n=29).  Kittler et al (2004) did not address social media sites since they were not widespread in 2001. 
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to flooding.  In the future, flood risk is expected to rise due to land subsidence and increased 
precipitation resulting from climate change (Shah, 2011). 
2.2.3 Internet Use during the 2011 Thailand Flood 
 Thailand’s population is well-connected to the internet and social media, given the 
country’s level of development.  At the time of the 2011 flood, nearly one-quarter of Thailand’s 
population had access to the internet (World Bank, 2014).  The rapid rise of mobile-broadband 
(i.e. smartphones) offers a large possibility of bringing even more individuals online.  While few 
Thais had smartphones in 2011, subscriptions dramatically rose to 35 million in 2013, covering 
over half the country’s population (Webcertain, 2014).  In addition, social media is popular in 
Thailand, with 61% of internet users in 2011 being active Facebook users, i.e. accessing 
Facebook in the past month (We Are Social, 2012).   
 Social media allowed Bangkok households to share updates regarding progression of 
floodwaters through the city and to share advice on how to prepare, cope, and recover from 
flooding.  Nearly 40% of flood-related messages on Twitter during the 2011 flood were related 
to updates of flood conditions including water level, road conditions, and warnings (Kongthon et 
al., 2012).  Social media was an alternative to official government or media sources.  Over the 
course of the flood, internet usage changed considerably among study households, as shown in 
Figure 2.1.  Internet use was highest before floodwaters arrived to a respondent’s neighborhood, 
with 33% of study households using the internet.  Once floodwaters inundated a household’s 
neighborhood, internet use decreased dramatically and only 14% of households accessed the 
internet at this time.  After floodwater receded, internet use recovered to nearly pre-flood levels 
(29%).       
  
73 
 
Figure 2.1 Household internet use, by period of flooding 
 
 
2.3  Description of Study Site and Fieldwork 
 The study includes three provinces located in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area – 
Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Bangkok.  One district within each of the three provinces was 
purposively selected – Bang Bua Thong District (Nonthaburi), Klong Luang District (Pathum 
Thani), and Don Mueang District (Bangkok).  These districts were among the most severely 
affected during the 2011 flood.  Within each of the three districts, two middle-income and two 
low-income neighborhoods were purposively selected.   
Information regarding internet use during the 2011 Thailand flood was collected by a 
household survey and in-depth interviews with internet users. A summary of the study design is 
presented in Figure 2.2.  All interviews were conducted at respondents’ homes. The survey 
involved two rounds of questionnaires with 469 households.  The survey inquired about 
economic costs incurred during the 2011 flood, socioeconomic status, and flood-related online 
activity.  During the second round, respondents were asked about their general internet use and 
flood-related online activity in 2011.  Questions were related to specific information that 
respondents found online before, during, and after the flood.  Questions were selected and 
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designed based on in-depth interviews with internet users and pilot interviews.  One member 
from each household provided survey responses.
5
  A full description of fieldwork procedures for 
the two survey rounds can be found in Nabangchang et al. (2015).  Informed consent was 
obtained from all respondents and survey protocols were approved by the institutional review 
board of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
 In addition to the two rounds of household surveys, in-depth qualitative interviews were 
conducted with 23 households who were social media households (12 respondents) or 
conventional internet households (11 respondents).  These 23 households are a subset of the full 
survey sample of 469 households.  In-depth interview respondents were selected to represent a 
broad range of wealth and age groups.  In-depth interviews were conducted in person during 
December 2012, just before the second round household survey.  Interviews of approximately 
30-35 minutes were conducted with a household member over the age of 18 years who sought 
online information related to the 2011 flood.  The purpose of the in-depth interviews was to 
explore alternative explanations for how internet use may have influenced household decisions 
and actions during various stages of flooding.  During these interviews, respondents described 
what types of information they sought online before, during, and after the flooding event.  
Respondents also discussed whether the information was useful for taking preventative 
measures, coping with the flood, or post-flood recovery and repairs.  Interviews were semi-
structured, with several open-ended questions designed to guide discussion.   
 
                                                          
5
The household member interviewed may or may not have been an internet user.  Detailed questions were asked 
about all internet users in the household, including the user’s age and typical time spent online.  If a household had 
at least one internet user over the age of 15 years, but this was not the respondent, the household was categorized as 
having at least one internet user.  During a flooding event, it is conceivable that actions are decided with input from 
multiple household members since preparation, coping, and recovery actions would affect the entire household.  
Therefore, responses discussed in this study describe household information seeking behavior during the course of 
the 2011 flood.   
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Figure 2.2 Summary of Study Design 
 
 
 
 
2.4  Analysis and Modeling Strategy 
 A mixed methods approach is used to assess the role of online information in mitigation 
of flood loss.  Both quantitative (propensity score matching and multivariate regression analysis) 
and qualitative (in-depth interviews) techniques are employed.  These analyses test the 
hypothesis that online activity allowed households to reduce flood losses by informing mitigation 
decisions before the flood. 
Regression analysis of household survey data can indicate if a statistically significant 
association exists between flood losses and social media and/or conventional internet use.  
Regressions are also used to assess possible associations between online activity and the 
likelihood of taking mitigation actions before the flood.  Both the regression analysis and PSM 
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focus on online information sought before flooding occurred.  This allows temporal precedence 
of online information to be established.  If the analyses included losses during and after flooding, 
then endogeneity concerns would arise.  In this case, it could be conceivable that online activity 
was influenced by the extent to which a household was affected by flooding.  Households who 
are less affected by the flood could conceivably be more likely to have stable internet access or 
have more time to seek online information during and after the flood.  This study also address 
endogeneity by focusing on online activity specifically related to the 2011 flood.  The analysis 
does not simply relate general online activity to flood losses. 
 Propensity score matching is used to test whether the relationship between online activity 
and flood losses is causal.  PSM assesses the influence of social media on flood losses.  PSM 
allows households that followed flood information on social media to be matched with 
households without flood-related social media use.  This matching is done in such in a way that 
balances observable characteristics between these two groups.  Differences in flood losses 
between households with social media use and the matched comparison group will represent the 
effect of social media use. 
 In-depth interviews complement the quantitative analysis.  Responses from internet users 
allow possible explanations to be identified for any statistically significant associations found in 
the regression analysis and any significant treatment effects found with PSM techniques.  
2.4.1 Definitions of Flood Information Sources 
Before floodwaters entered the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, households sought 
information from a variety of sources.  This study focuses on two sources of information – social 
media and other types of online information.  Households that followed flood information on 
social media are referred to as social media households.  Meanwhile, those who found online 
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information on sites other than social media are referred to as conventional internet households.  
These categories are based on the characteristics of the household and not the individual 
respondent.  For example, if a household member (not necessarily the respondent) followed 
flood information on social media, such a household would be categorized as a social media 
household.  About 12% of the sample (55 households) followed flood-related information on 
social media such as Facebook and Twitter.  Meanwhile, 21% of surveyed households found 
information from conventional internet sources, as presented in Table 2.1.  Internet use was quite 
prevalent among sample households – about 55% had at least one internet user.  Households 
without an internet user are categorized as a sub-category of offline information, no internet 
users in household. 
 The vast majority of households in this study (67%) relied on offline sources of 
information before the flood, such as television, government announcements, and neighborhood 
committees.  Households relying on offline sources of information were not necessary unfamiliar 
with the internet.  Nearly one-third of households relying on offline information sources before 
the flood had at least one internet user.  However, since there was a lapse in internet use and no 
online flood information was sought before the flood, these households are categorized as relying 
on offline sources. 
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Table 2.1 Categories of Flood Information Source (Before flood) 
       
 
2.4.2 Definitions of Flood Losses 
 In this study, the term ‘losses’ includes all economic costs incurred during the flooding 
event and after floodwaters recede.  During a flood, households incur a variety of losses related 
to emergency supplies, evacuation, travel, foregone income, and health.  In order to cope with 
the flood situation and continue living in a house that is partially flooded, a household can make 
expenditures on emergency supplies such as water storage, food preparation, boats, and plastic 
boots.  A household may choose to evacuate and thus incur the cost of alternate accommodation.  
In order to travel within a flooded city, households incur additional travel expenditures and time, 
particularly where inundated streets require boat transport.  During exposure to floodwaters, 
flood-related illness could cause some household members to seek medical care and/or require 
time away from work for care takers.  Households could also lose income if flooding prevents 
them from working. 
After flood waters recede, households bear losses as they clean, repair, and replace 
property.  These ex post losses are incurred in the form of expenditures and time.  Motor vehicles 
damaged by flooding may need to be repaired or scrapped.  In addition, housing structure (e.g. 
# of 
households
% of 
sample
Social media 55 12%
Conventional internet (no social media) 98 21%
Offline information only 316 67%
      Internet users in household                       
(lapse in internet use before flood) 105 22%
      No internet users in household 211 45%
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house exterior and interior, utilities) and contents (e.g. furniture and appliances) may require 
cleaning, repair, or replacement.  In this study, the loss categories of particular interest are (i) 
total flood loss, (ii) during flood loss, and (iii) ex post flood loss.  The analysis does not focus on 
costs of preventative actions.  Excluding preventative costs allows the analysis to establish the 
online information was sought before the household incurred flood-related costs (i.e. temporal 
precedence).
6
  
2.4.3 Propensity Score Matching 
 Propensity score matching is used to determine if a causal relationship exists between 
social media and flood loss reduction.  PSM addresses the issue of non-random assignment by 
identifying a suitable subset of untreated households to be compared with those who received 
treatment.  PSM provides a useful alternative to an experimental research design, particularly for 
settings such as a post-disaster situation where experiments would be not be feasible and/or 
ethical to implement. 
 With estimated propensity score values, a comparison group is selected among 
households that did not use social media to follow flood-related information (n=414).  A key 
assumption of PSM is selection on observables (i.e. outcomes are independent of treatment 
conditional on a set of observable characteristics).  Therefore, from the possible pool of 414 
households that did not use social media prior to the flood, PSM will be used to select a 
comparison group that has a similar distribution of observed variables as the distribution in the 
                                                          
6
If preventative costs were to be included, it would be unclear which event occurred first – online information 
seeking or preventative actions.  The survey inquired about household actions during three broad phases of the flood 
event – before, during, and after flooding.  Information on exact calendar dates of specific preventative actions and 
online activity was not collected. 
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treated group.
7
  With an appropriate matched comparison group, an average treatment effect can 
be estimated. 
 One limitation of the PSM methodology in this study is that a binary indicator is used for 
treatment.  Households are either defined as using social media before the flood or not.  
Characteristics of use are not accounted for, such as time spent on social media, specific sites 
used, and number of contacts.  Usefulness may vary across sites, although nearly all social media 
users in this study relied on Facebook.  Overall, the treatment likely is not uniform across social 
media households.   
PSM Methodology 
 Estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is done in three steps.  
First, the probability of using social media prior to the flood is estimated, which produces 
balancing scores for each household.  Second, these balancing scores are used to identify a 
suitable comparison group from the 414 households that did not use social media to follow 
flood-related information prior to flooding.  The mean differences in flood losses are compared 
between social media households and the comparison group.  Third, regression of flood losses on 
key covariates is done to estimate treatment effects, using the matched sample. 
Estimation of Balancing Score 
 A logit regression model estimates balancing scores that represent the probability of 
using social media prior to flooding.   Balancing scores are used to identify a region of common 
support in which score values overlap between social media and comparison households.  The 
                                                          
7
Possible limitations of the study concern selection bias associated with the decision to use social media.  A strength 
of applying PSM methodology to the context of a natural disaster is that the treatment period is relatively short, 
therefore the concern is relatively low for selection bias attributable to attrition.  In the case of the 2011 Bangkok 
flood, households tended to access online information only days to several weeks before floodwaters inundated their 
communities.   
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model estimates the probability of a household using social media before the flood, P(T), as a 
function of control variables (Xi) that include annual household expenditure, number of cars 
owned, number of household members, size of property, indicator for one-story building, 
indicator for low-income neighborhood, and characteristics of survey respondent (age, education 
level, marriage status).  The model is run with standard errors clustered by neighborhood. 
   
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇 = 1|𝑥) =
1
1+ 𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖)
           (2.1)                             
Matching Techniques 
 Matching methods use balancing scores to identify suitable comparison households.  
Once a comparison group is established, mean differences in flood losses are compared between 
treatment and control groups.  The ATT is estimated using the matched sample to run post-PSM 
regression of the outcome on covariates.  In this study, several matching methods are used – 
nearest neighbor and kernel matching.  The nearest neighbor estimator (without replacement) 
matches one comparison household to one treatment household.  If there is no match for a given 
treatment or comparison household, then that household is excluded from the analysis.  The 
kernel method matches treated households to a weighted average of comparison households.  
This study uses a normal kernel weight, so all comparison households with balancing scores 
inside the common support region are used.    
Post-PSM Regression to Estimate Treatment Effect 
 Lastly, the ATT is estimated using the matched sample to run post-PSM regression of the 
outcome on covariates.  This approach further controls for differences in covariates between 
treatment and comparison groups that are associated with flood losses, but not necessarily the 
likelihood of using social media.  The linear regression model is specified as: 
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𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = β0  +  β1 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 +  β2𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ +  γ𝑘X𝑘 + ω𝑚V𝑚 + ε      (2.2)                             
where  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠  = Total flood loss, incurred during and after the flood 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  = dummy variable equal to 1 if household followed flood-related  
information on social media prior to flooding  
depth  = depth of flood water (on street in front of house) 
X𝑘  = household or personal characteristic k (e.g. annual expenditure,  
                            number of cars owned, education, age) 
V𝑚  = neighborhood controls 
 
Probability weights (equal to the inverse of the probability that a household is selected into the 
matched sample) are included in the post-PSM regression with the matched sample identified via 
the kernel estimator.   
2.4.4 Regression Analysis: Flood Losses and Online Information  
Modeling Strategy: Types of online information associated with flood losses 
 Regression analysis is used to estimate the association between flood losses and the 
source of information households relied on before the 2011 flood.  Information sources are 
defined as media, conventional internet sites, and offline.  The full sample of 469 households is 
included and the analysis focuses on two types of flood-related information – social media and 
conventional online information.  In order to assess the association between flood losses and the 
source of flood-related information, the following OLS model was specified: 
 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 = β0  +  β𝑗 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑗 + β2𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ +  γ𝑘X𝑘 + ω𝑚V𝑚 + ε       (2.3)                             
where  𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 = flood loss, category i (e.g.  total loss; house and contents) 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑗 = flood information source j (e.g.  social media, conventional 
                                                    internet, or offline source) 
depth  = depth of flood water (on street in front of house) 
X𝑘  = household or personal characteristic k (e.g. annual expenditure,  
                                cars owned, age composition of household members,  
        education, one-story house) 
                              V𝑚  = neighborhood controls 
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Three models are specified using the above equation.  One model (Model 3a) is used to estimate 
the association between total flood losses and information source (i.e. social media, conventional 
internet, or offline).  By estimating separate associations for social media and conventional 
internet, the analysis can assess whether households benefit from each of these two information 
sources.  The other two (Models 3b,3c) focus on the association of social media and a variety of 
flood loss categories, compared to any other source of information (i.e. conventional internet or 
offline).  The association between flood losses and online activity (both social media and 
conventional internet use) is expected to be negative.  More informed households should be 
better able to prepare and cope with the flood.   
Modeling Strategy: Types of online information associated with mitigation actions  
 Additional regression analysis examines how online flood information may have been 
useful for households.  A binary maximum likelihood estimation model is specified in order to 
determine if online information is associated with a greater likelihood of moving belongings to 
upper floors.  The model is limited to the 317 households that had multi-story houses and 
controls for information source and other covariates:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑢𝑝 = 1|𝑥) =
1
1+ 𝑒
−(𝛽0+𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑗+γ𝑘X𝑘+ε)
                           (2.4)              
                
where  𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑢𝑝   = Moved contents to upper floors (dummy) 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑗 = flood information source j (e.g. social media, conventional  
                           internet, or offline source) 
 X𝑘  = household or personal characteristic k (e.g. annual expenditure,  
                           cars owned, age composition of household members, education)  
 
The key independent variable of interest, information source, uses offline information as the 
referent category.  It is anticipated that both social media and conventional internet will be 
associated with a greater likelihood of taking action (compared to offline information). 
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2.4.5 In-depth Interviews 
 In-depth interviews with social media and conventional internet households complement 
the quantitative analysis.  This mixed methods approach allows the experiences of flood-affected 
households to be examined in greater detail by exploring underlying processes through which 
internet use and flood losses are related.   Interviews are analyzed with an explanation building 
approach, which relies on establishing initial propositions and then testing these propositions 
against evidence obtained from interview discussions.  The initial proposition is that a 
relationship existed between internet use and flood losses, and that online information may have 
informed households regarding mitigation decisions.  Evidence for and against rival explanations 
is compiled using summary statistics as well as tabulation of qualitative responses (both for the 
sample of 23 households and by type of online information source).   
In this way, the qualitative analysis can determine the types of online information found, 
which loss-mitigating actions were informed by online information, and which mitigation actions 
were effective in reducing cost (as perceived by the respondent).  The role that social media 
played in providing flood-related information to households is also examined.  Detailed 
interview responses include the types of information that households searched for online before, 
during, and after the flooding event.  In addition, responses contained considerable information 
regarding how online content was useful for taking preventative measures, coping with the flood, 
or post-flood recovery and repairs. 
 In order to ensure the validity of responses, in-depth interview responses were cross-
checked against survey answers (each household that participated in the in-depth interview was 
also a respondent in the larger household survey).  For example, if an in-depth interview 
respondent indicated that they took a mitigation action, this was checked against the recorded 
answer in the household survey.  Overall, these interviews allow for a deeper understanding of 
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the types of information that internet users found as well as household perception of the 
usefulness of online information. 
2.5  Results 
2.5.1 Summary Statistics  
Socioeconomic profile of households  
 Household annual expenditures varied widely across households, ranging from the 
equivalent of US$ 990 to US$ 38,835, with a mean of US$ 8,459, as shown in Table 2.2.  Social 
media households had significantly higher annual spending (mean: US$ 14,214) compared to 
both conventional internet households (mean: US$ 11,777) and offline households (mean: US$ 
6,428), as shown in Table 2.3.  The number of cars owned by a household is an additional 
measure of wealth.  Both social media and conventional internet households owned more cars, 
on average, than offline households.   
 Respondents (the household member that provided survey responses) tended to be well-
educated, with 33% completing either vocational or high school and 29% holding a university 
degree or higher.  Respondents from social media and conventional internet households were 
considerably more educated than respondents from offline households.  The difference in 
respondents with a university education is not statistically significant between social media 
(64%) and conventional internet households (56%).   Yet, respondents from these households are 
much more highly educated than respondents from offline households, 14% of whom have a 
bachelor’s degree or greater.   
 While wealth and education differed considerably between offline households and those 
who relied on online flood information (social media and conventional internet), the age 
distribution of household members did not.  The age distribution of a household is estimated by 
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estimating the percentage of household members that are within specified age brackets.  Within 
the full sample, on average, 18% of household members were under the age of 18 years.
8
   
                                                          
8
This proportion did not differ significantly across flood information sources. The only age category to slightly 
differ between sources was the bracket representing members 55 years or older.  Offline households had a greater 
proportion of members 55 years or older (23%) than households relying on online information (18%).  Yet, offline 
households did not have a greater proportion of members in this age bracket when compared to social media or 
conventional internet households separately. 
  
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of Regression Variables, Full Sample (n=469) 
Variable Definition Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
Total Flood Loss: During + Ex Post  Total losses, during and after flood (in US$) 4,903 6,069   13  48,914 
During Loss  Losses incurred during flood (in US$) 1,424 2,352 0 26,470 
Ex Post Loss  Losses incurred after flood (in US$) 3,479 4,911 0 34,016 
     Ex Post: House + Contents  House and contents losses (in US$) 3,148 4,635 0 34,016 
Flood Information Source, before flood       
Social media Dummy variable=1, if household relied on social media for flood information 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Conventional internet (No Social Media) 
Dummy variable=1, if household relied on online information, but not social 
media 
0.21 0.41 0 1 
Offline information only Dummy variable=1, if household relied on offline flood information 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Household Characteristics 
     Annual household expenditures Total household expenditures per year (in US$) 8,459 6,214 990 38,835 
Cars owned  Number of cars owned 0.9 1.0 0 5 
Age distribution of household members 
     
     <18 years Percentage of household members less than 18 years old 0.18 0.18 0 0.67 
     18-34 years Percentage of household members 18-34 years old 0.23 0.22 0 1 
     35-54 years (Middle age) Percentage of household members 35-54 years old 0.37 0.27 0 1 
     55+ years Percentage of household members 55+ years old 0.21 0.25 0 1 
Education  Level of Respondent 
          Elementary or less Dummy variable=1, if respondent had elementary school education or less 0.38 0.49 0 1 
     High School or Vocational Dummy variable=1, if respondent had high school or vocational education 0.33 0.47 0 1 
     College or more Dummy variable=1, if respondent had college education or more 0.29 0.45 0 1 
One-story house Dummy variable=1, if house consists of one story 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Flood depth  Maximum flood depth on street in front of house (meters) 1.5 0.4 0 3.0 
Flood Loss Mitigation   
    
Moved contents to higher location Dummy variable=1, if household moved contents higher 0.87 0.34 0 1 
     Moved contents to upper floors Dummy variable=1, if household moved contents to upper floors or roof 0.55 0.50 0 1 
     Moved contents on top of furniture Dummy variable=1, if household moved contents on top of furniture 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Built barrier Dummy variable=1, if household built a flood barrier 0.43 0.50 0 1 
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Table 2.3 Summary Statistics of Regression Variables, by information source category 
 
Social Media (n=55) 
 
Conventional Internet Use 
(n=98)   
Offline Information (n=316) 
   
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
  
Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
    
Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
      
Total Flood Loss: During + Ex 
Post  
6,665 6,244 780 29,180 
† 
8,770 9,063 413 48,419 
† 
3,397 3,909 13 29,463 
† * ˆ 
During Loss  1,593 3,071 16 17,240   2,270 3,768 0 26,470 
† 1,132 1,385 0 12,001 † ˆ 
Ex Post Loss  5,073 4,890 285 27,197 † 6,500 7,097 190 34,016 † 2,265 3,385 0 25,916 † * ˆ 
     Ex Post: House + Contents  4,502 3,872 0 14,576 † 5,927 6,897 60 34,016 † 2,051 3,282 0 25,916 † * ˆ 
Household Characteristics 
    
  
    
   
    
   
Annual household expenditures 14,214 8,073 2,990 38,835 † 11,777 6,246 3,068 30,126 † * 6,428 4,564 990 36,112 † * ˆ 
Cars owned  1.5 1.1 0 5 † 1.4 0.9 0 4 † 0.6 0.9 0 5 † * ˆ 
Age distribution of household    
 members           
   
    
   
     <18 years 0.17 0.18 0 0.67   0.19 0.20 0 0.60 
   0.18 0.18 0 0.67    
     18-34 years 0.22 0.23 0 0.67   0.23 0.21 0 1 
   0.24 0.22 0 1    
     35-54 years (Middle age) 0.42 0.30 0 1   0.39 0.25 0 1 
   0.36 0.27 0 1    
     55+ years 0.18 0.23 0 1   0.18 0.22 0 1 
   0.23 0.26 0 1 †  
Education  Level of Respondent 
    
  
    
   
    
   
     Elementary or less 0.16 0.37 0 1 † 0.16 0.37 0 1 † 0.49 0.50 0 1 † * ˆ 
     High School or Vocational 0.20 0.40 0 1 † 0.28 0.45 0 1    0.37 0.48 0 1 † *  
     College or more 0.64 0.49 0 1 † 0.56 0.50 0 1 † 0.14 0.35 0 1 † * ˆ 
One-story house 0.07 0.26 0 1 † 0.16 0.37 0 1 † 0.42 0.49 0 1 † * ˆ 
Flood depth  1.4 0.2 0.9 2.0   1.5 0.3 0.9 2.0 
   1.6 0.5 0 3.0 †  
Flood Loss Mitigation 
          
   
    
   
Moved contents: 
     to higher location 
0.91 0.29 0 1 
  
0.87 0.34 0 1 
   
0.86 0.35 0 1 
   
     to upper floors 0.82 0.39 0 1 † 0.63 0.48 0 1 
 
* 0.47 0.50 0 1 † * ˆ 
     on top of  furniture 0.09 0.29 0 1 † 0.23 0.43 0 1 † * 0.39 0.49 0 1 † * ˆ 
Built barrier 0.56 0.50 0 1 † 0.59 0.49 0 1 † 0.36 0.48 0 1 † * ˆ 
Significant difference (at 5% level) between selected information category and:  
†
 full sample; 
*
 social media sample; ˆ conventional internet sample
8
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Household flood experience in 2011 
 Mean total flood losses amounted to THB 151,499 (US$ 4,903) for all 469 households in 
the survey sample.
9
  Losses varied considerably across households – ranging from US$ 13 to 
more than US$ 48,900. Ex post losses (mean of US$ 3,479) tended to be greater than losses 
incurred during the three month duration of the flood (mean of US$ 1,424).  Ex post losses 
include expenditures and value of time to clean, repair, and replace housing structure, contents, 
and vehicles.  For the average household, ex post losses accounted for 71% of total losses, while 
during flood loses account for 29%.   
 Social media and conventional internet households experienced higher flood losses than 
those relying on offline sources of information.  This is largely attributable to wealth – 
households that relied on online information had more property at risk.  Conventional internet 
households have significantly higher losses for every loss category, compared to the full sample.  
Social media households have significantly higher losses compared to the full sample, with the 
exception of during flood losses and ex post vehicle losses.  When comparing social media and 
conventional internet households, none of the loss categories differ significantly.  Depth of 
floodwater on the street in front of a household’s residence ranged from 0 to 3 meters, with a 
mean of 1.5 m.  Neither social media nor conventional internet households experienced flood 
depths that significantly differed from the full sample.   
Mitigation actions 
 The majority of households took some type of mitigation action before floodwater 
entered their neighborhood.  Moving contents to higher ground was a particularly common 
action, with 87% of households moving belongings to upper floors.  In addition, about 50% of 
                                                          
9
In October, 2012, US$ 1 = 30.9 Thai baht. 
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households with a car or motorcycle moved these vehicles to higher locations.
10
  Constructing 
barriers to prevent floodwater from entering the home was a less prevalent action, with 43% of 
households undertaking this mitigation measure.  The most common flood barrier action was 
sandbagging (35% of households), follow by constructing a concrete block wall (22%).  Very 
few households (14%) believed that they built a successful barrier.  A successful action is 
identified based on a household’s survey response regarding perceived success 
 The types of moving contents actions that households undertook differed drastically 
across information sources, as shown in Figure 2.3, Panel A.  Moving contents to upper floors 
was significantly more prevalent among social media households.  Nearly 82% of social media 
households moved belongings to upper floors, compared to 63% of conventional internet 
households and 47% of offline households.  Moving contents was perceived to be a more 
effective mitigation strategy by Bangkok households than building flood barriers.  This seems 
conceivable in the case of the 2011 flood since flood barriers can fail if not properly constructed 
or flood depth accurately anticipated.   
 
  
                                                          
10
Social media households were more likely to state that their efforts to move vehicles were successful than all other 
households.  However, the proportion of social media households that incurred any vehicle loss (33% of the 54 
vehicle-owning social media households) is not significantly different than the proportion of other households 
(40%).  The magnitude of vehicle losses also is not significantly lower for social media households.  Therefore, this 
study does not find evidence that social media use reduced vehicle losses. 
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Figure 2.3 Types of Moving Contents Actions, by information source 
 
A. Full Sample  
    
 
 
B. Households with Multi-Story Houses 
 
 
 
Dwelling characteristics largely determined the type of moving actions that were available to 
households.  For example, moving contents to upper floors was only possible for those with 
multi-story houses.  The number of floors within a house varies considerably across information 
source and wealth level.  The proportion of one-story houses among social media households 
(7%) and conventional internet households (16%) is not statistically significant.  However, the 
proportion of offline households with one-story houses (42%) is much greater (Figure 2.3, Panel 
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B).  When comparing moving contents actions among households with multi-story houses, it 
appears that social media offered a possible advantage over offline information, while 
conventional internet did not.  Moving contents to upper floors (given that a household had a 
multi-story house) was significantly more prevalent among social media households (88%) than 
of offline households (73%).  No significant difference exists for between conventional internet 
(76%) and offline households (73%).
11
   
 Since dwelling characteristics are associated with household wealth, the types of moving 
actions available to households will also be partly influenced by annual expenditure.  Figure 2.4 
presents the proportion of households with one-story and multi-story houses by quartile of 
annual expenditure.  As expenditure increases, so does the proportion of households with a 
multi-story dwelling.  This suggests that wealthier households have a greater ability to mitigate 
flood losses by moving contents to upper floors.  Therefore, if evidence is found that social 
media informed decisions regarding moving contents, then this result would be most relevant for 
wealthier households.  
  
                                                          
11
Furthermore, only a weakly significant difference (10% confidence level) exists between social media with multi-
story houses that moved contents to upper floors (88%) and conventional internet (76%). 
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Figure 2.4 Number of stories in dwelling, by expenditure quartile 
 
 
 
Internet users in household  
 Internet use is more prevalent among sample households than in Thailand as a whole.  
About 55% of sample households (257 out of 469 total households) had at least one internet user, 
compared to about 30% of the total Thai population (WebCertain, 2012).  Many households had 
multiple internet users and overall, there were 499 internet users in the sample over the age of 15 
years.   Before the 2011 flood, 33% of survey households found flood-related information online 
(12% of survey households used social media, while 21% relied on conventional internet 
sources).  Online flood information was considered useful by many households.  About 24% of 
households considered online flood information to be useful.  This means that 74% of 
households that sought online flood information considered it to be useful.  A significantly 
greater proportion of social media households (87%) considered online information to be useful, 
compared to conventional internet households (66%).  This suggests that social media sites many 
have offered actionable information not available on conventional internet sites, which is 
examined in the quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
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2.5.2 Results of Propensity Score Matching 
Mean Characteristics of Sample 
Summary statistics of the covariates used in the logit regression to estimate balancing 
scores are presented in Appendix A (Table A1).  Covariates are summarized for the full sample 
(n=469), treatment households (n=55), and all potential comparison households (n=414).  
Treatment households and all potential comparison households are unbalanced in every 
covariate.  Yet, all covariates are balanced between treatment groups in the nearest neighbor 
matched sample (Table 2.4). Households in the matched sample have significantly higher flood 
losses, household expenditure, car ownership, and education than the full sample.  This is to be 
expected since social media households have higher values of all these variables compared to the 
full sample.  Thus, in order to match social media households with comparable control 
households, the matched sample will have higher values of these covariates.  Table 2.4 indicates 
that social media households incurred significantly lower mean flood losses (US$ 6,594) than 
comparison households identified using the nearest neighbor estimator (US$ 9,961).   
Key differences in household characteristics between the matched and full samples have 
implications for the generalizability of results.  For example, one-story houses were more 
prevalent among the full sample (32%) than the matched sample (7%).  Households in one-story 
dwellings were unable to move belongings to upper floors.  Therefore, if social media informed 
actions to move contents to upper floors, then this finding would only be relevant for those with 
multi-story dwellings.  Since one-story houses are most prevalent among households at lower 
quartiles of annual expenditure (Figure 2.4), this suggests that social media would not be as 
useful for poor households. 
 
 
Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics for Propensity Score Matching, Matched Sample 
 
  
Matched sample  
(N=96)   
Social Media Households 
(N=48)   
Households without social media 
(N=48)   
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max   Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max   Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max   
                                
Outcome Variable                               
Total Flood Losses (US$) 8,278 8,066 413 40,330   6,594 6,591 780 29,180   9,961 9,071 413 40,330 
†
 
                                
Household Characteristics                               
Annual Household Expenditure 
(US$) 13,122 7,471 2,990 36,112   12,976 7,245 2,990 33,126   13,269 7,765 3,305 36,112 
 
 
Cars owned (number) 1.3 1.0 0 5   1.3 1.0 0 5   1.3 1.0 0 4 
 
 
Household members (number) 3.9 1.7 1 9   3.9 1.7 1 9   4.0 1.8 1 8 
 
 
Size of property (sq. m) 327 177 40 880 
 
332 190 120 880   323 165 40 800   
One-story building 0.1 0.3 0 1   0.1 0.3 0 1   0.1 0.2 0 1 
 
 
Low-income neighborhood 0.2 0.4 0 1   0.1 0.4 0 1   0.2 0.4 0 1 
 
 
                                
Survey Respondent 
Characteristics                               
Age of Respondent 42.5 9.8 19 70   43.2 10.0 19 70   41.8 9.8 24 69 
 
 
Married 0.8 0.4 0 1   0.8 0.4 0 1   0.8 0.4 0 1 
 
 
Education level                               
     High School or Vocational 0.28 0.45 0 1   0.23 0.42 0 1   0.33 0.48 0 1 
 
 
     College or higher 0.54 0.50 0 1   0.60 0.49 0 1   0.48 0.50 0 1 
 
 
 
†
 denotes significant difference at the 5% level between households with and without social media use 
  Matched sample is created using nearest neighbor without replacement and common support. 
9
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Balancing Score 
 Results of the logit model to estimate the probability of using social media before the 
flood are reported in Appendix A (Table A2).  Covariates that are significant at the 5% 
confidence level are household expenditure, number of cars owned, number of household 
members, respondent age, and marriage status.  Each coefficient has the anticipated sign.  
Household expenditure and number of cars owned are positively associated with using social 
media, while age and number of household members have a negative association.  
 The balancing score (the log odds ratio) is estimated from the predicted values of the 
logit model.  Summary statistics of the balancing score are presented in Appendix A (Table A3).  
The area of common support is defined as below the maximum of minimum values (-4.99) and 
above the minimum of the maximum values (0.65) of the balancing score.  Households with 
balancing scores outside the region of common support are not included in the matching 
analysis.  Seven social media households are outside the region of common support, while 69 
potential comparison households are outside.  Therefore, 87% of the treatment group and 83% of 
the comparison group satisfy the comment support criteria. 
Matched Samples and Post-Matching Regression 
Each matching method used in this study allows suitable comparison households to be 
identified, based on the balancing scores.  The two matching methods – nearest neighbor and 
kernel matching – select different comparison groups and result in different ATT estimates.   
Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Average characteristics for the sample of households matched on the balancing score 
estimated with nearest-neighbor matching are summarized in Table 2.4. Compared to the full 
sample of 469 households, the matched sample (48 social media, 48 comparison) has 
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significantly higher flood losses, household expenditure, car ownership, and education.  In 
addition, the mean age of the survey respondent in the matched sample is significantly lower 
than in the full sample.  The mean difference in total flood losses between the 48 social media 
households and 48 comparison households is US$ 3,367.  Mean total losses for social media 
households are US$ 6,594 compared to US$ 9,961 for comparison households (Table 2.5).  The 
bootstrapped standard error indicates that this mean difference is significant at the 5% level.  
This mean difference is large, considering that total losses for the overall matched sample (n=96) 
have a mean of US$ 8,278.  
 A regression of total flood losses on a social media dummy and other covariates is used 
to estimate the ATT of social media use.  This regression is restricted to the matched sample of 
96 households.  The ATT estimated using regression analysis is less than the mean difference 
calculated in the PSM analysis.  This difference is attributable to the regression controlling for 
additional covariates, such as flood depth and neighborhood controls, which influence flood 
losses but not the probability of using social media. The ATT of social media use is estimated to 
be US$ 3,708 in the matched sample identified with the nearest-neighbor estimator.  Post-PSM 
regression results are presented in Table 2.6. 
Kernel Matching 
Kernel matching produces a larger matched sample (48 social media, 345 comparison) 
than the nearest neighbor estimator.  This is to be expected since the kernel matching estimator 
makes use of all comparison households with balancing scores inside the common support 
region.  Treated households are matched to a weighted average of comparison households.  The 
weighted average mean difference in total flood losses between the 48 social media households 
and 345 comparison households is US$ 4,501.  This is comparable to the mean difference found 
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with the nearest-neighbor estimator and is significant at the 5% level (p-value=0.031).  Post-
PSM regression analysis indicates that the ATT of social media is US$ 4,886 in the matched 
sample identified with the kernel estimator.   
 This estimate of ATT is lower than the estimate obtained using the nearest-neighbor 
matched sample.  The kernel matched sample is much larger (n=393) since it includes all 
households that meet the common support criteria.  This means that a greater variety of 
comparison households are included in the sample that might have lower annual expenditures, 
wealth, and education.  Although such comparison households would receive lower weights, 
they are present in the matched sample. 
 
Table 2.5 Mean Differences in Total Flood Loss (in US$), Matched Samples 
 
    Nearest-Neighbor   Kernel Matching 
    N Mean 
Bootstrapped 
Std Error   N Mean 
Bootstrapped 
Std Error 
Treatment 48 6,594 
 
  48 6,594 
 Comparison 48 9,961 
 
  345 11,095 
 Difference   -3,367 1,626     -4,501 2,074 
    Significance level   5% 
 
    5%   
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Table 2.6 Estimation of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT): Using regression 
analysis and PSM Matched Samples 
 
  Nearest-Neighbor   Kernel Matching 
  Coeff.   
Robust 
Std Error   Coeff.   
Robust 
Std Error 
Social media (dummy) -114,589 ** 50,242   -150,966 ** 58,886 
Annual Household Expenditure (Thai baht) -0.03   0.11   -0.06   0.11 
Cars owned (number) 65,860 *** 20,500   93,645 *** 22,688 
Household members (number) 56,626   60,516   88,952 * 47,492 
Household members, squared -3,288   6,377   -6,201   3,877 
Size of property (sq. wah) 254   536   286   441 
One-story building 91,367   101,184   154,632 ** 72,066 
Low-income neighborhood -148,681   115,805   -139,027   89,521 
Age of Respondent -399   2,737   -2,880   3,116 
Married 25,203   72,311   79,678   65,783 
Education  Level of Respondent               
     High School or Vocational 27,196   59,462   -22,043   60,388 
     College or more 122,110 * 67,806   93,561   74,386 
Flood depth (on street in front of house) 2,998 *** 739   1,922 *** 667 
Constant -443,784   181,357   -320,226 ** 159,239 
Neighborhood controls (Vm) yes   yes 
R
2
 0.474   0.508 
Obs 96   393 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
Causal Relationship between Social Media and Flood Losses 
 The significant ATT values estimated in the PSM analysis suggest a causal relationship 
between social media use and reduced flood losses.  Flood-related social media use enabled 
households to reduce flood loss by an average of US$ 3,708 (as indicated by the nearest neighbor 
estimator) or US$ 4,886 (kernel estimator).  It should be noted that these reductions are in 
relation to comparable households (i.e. those who are well-educated, higher-income, and have 
multi-story houses), rather than the general population.  In particular, findings are likely not 
generalizable to the many low-income households that have one-story houses.  Since households 
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residing in one-story dwellings are unable to move belongings to upper floors, this suggests that 
social media would not be as useful for poor households.   
 Balancing tests indicate that all covariates in the nearest neighbor matched sample are 
similar between social media and comparison households.  The balancing tests include all 
variables used to estimate propensity scores (e.g. household expenditure, cars owned, respondent 
age and education) as well as additional observed characteristics (e.g. depth of floodwater, age 
distribution of household members).  Balance is achieved both in the overall matched sample and 
within each quintile of the balancing score.  Therefore, the selected comparison groups appear to 
be suitable. This suggests that the ATT estimates provide a credible measure of the causal effect 
that social media use had on flood losses. 
 A possible alternative explanation for social media being associated with reduced flood 
losses is that social media household may have been younger and thus had fewer assets at risk.  
Several pieces of evidence suggest that this alternative explanation does not hold.  First, the 
matched sample in the PSM analysis was balanced both on respondent age and household 
wealth.  Second, the age distribution of household members does not differ between those who 
did and did not rely on social media.  Third, within the full sample (n=469), social media 
households tend to own assets of greater value than other households.
12
   
 
  
                                                          
12
Social media households tend to own homes of higher value and a greater number of cars than other households.  
Reported home values of social media households (mean: US$ 96,173) were much higher than all other households 
(mean: US$ 49,673).  Yet, when only compared with conventional internet households, there is no significant 
difference in home value.   
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2.5.3 Results of Regression Models 
Flood Loss Model Results 
 The regression model used to assess the association between flood losses and online 
information use (Model 3a) explains much of the variation in flood losses (Table 2.7).  Social 
media use is significantly associated with lower flood losses, while conventional internet is not.  
This suggests that social media offered households information that was not available to either 
households relying on conventional internet or offline sources.  This association might be 
attributable to social media offering the ability to communicate and share information with one’s 
extended social circle (i.e. connections that are secondary, tertiary, and beyond).  This 
information could have allowed households to better understand the progression of the flood 
through the Bangkok Metropolitan Area.   
 Two additional models (Model 3b and 3c) examine the association between losses and 
social media, relative to any other information source (i.e. conventional internet or offline 
source).  In Model 3b, using social media is associated with a THB 84,772 (US$ 2,743) 
reduction in total losses compared to relying on information from any other source.  Model 3c 
focuses on the flood loss category of house and contents loss.  There is a particularly significant 
association between house and contents loss and social media.  Households that used social 
media had an average reduction in house and content loss of THB 58,271 (US$ 1,886).
13
  This 
suggests that if social media were to be causally-related to flood loss, then this might be due to 
social media providing information that allowed households either to prevent loss or reduce 
recovery costs.  Before the flood, losses could be prevented via effective mitigation actions.  
                                                          
13
The additional analysis not presented in this paper, significant relationships (at the 5% level) could not be found 
between online information and either vehicle or during flood losses.   
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Social media may have allowed households to make more informed mitigation decisions, 
especially regarding when and how to act.   
Mitigation Action Model Results 
 The vast majority of households took mitigation actions prior to the 2011 flood.  Moving 
house contents to higher locations was by far the most prevalent.  When moving contents located 
on the flood-prone ground floor, households could either move items to upper floors or place 
them on top of furniture or scaffolding.  Moving contents to upper floors would be expected to 
be more effective in preventing losses than keeping items on the ground floor on top of furniture.  
Floodwaters were quite high (mean of 1.5 meters), which could inundate the tops of tables and 
counters.  Upper floors would be expected to provide a more secure location for contents 
compared to the tops of furniture located on the ground floor.    
 Model 4 investigates the association between moving contents to upper floors and flood 
information source (Table 2.7).  Results indicate that while social media use is significantly 
associated with a greater likelihood of moving contents (compared to offline information), 
conventional internet is not.  Social media households were 19 percentage points more likely to 
move contents to upper floors, compared to offline households.  This suggests that information 
on social media may have led to households deciding to move items to upper floors, if they had a 
second floor. 
  
Table 2.7 Regression results for flood losses – sources of flood information 
 
 
  3a 3b 3c 4 
(Dependent variable) (Total Losses, Thai baht) (Total Losses, Thai baht) 
(House +Content Losses, 
Thai baht) 
(Moved contents to 
upper floors):  
Exclude One-Story 
Houses  
  Coeff.   
Robust 
Std 
Error Coeff.   
Robust 
Std 
Error Coeff.   
Robust 
Std 
Error ME   
Delta 
Std 
Err. 
Flood Information Source 
a
                         
     Social Media -66,298 ** 28,698 -84,772 *** 29,836 -58,271 *** 20,548 0.19 ** 0.09 
     Conventional Internet (No Social Media) 38,250 * 22,885             0.03   0.05 
Moved contents to upper floors                         
Annual Household Expenditure (Thai baht) 0.24 *** 0.07 0.25 *** 0.07 0.11 ** 0.06 9.1E-8   1.2E-7 
Cars owned 46,364 *** 11,616 47,241 *** 11,814 27,631 *** 8,374 -0.03   0.02 
Middle age (% of household members 35-
55 years old) 12,957   26,845 13,366   26,438 13,480   20,465 0.03   0.06 
Education  Level of Respondent                         
     High School or Vocational -10,946   12,984 -9,298   12,770 1,791   7,766 0.05   0.05 
     College or more 49,321   31,135 56,256 * 30,516 49,495 ** 20,820 0.02   0.06 
Flood depth (on street in front of house) 192   140 171   137 252 * 139       
One-story house 22,223 * 12,052 20,783 * 11,923 16,771   11,314       
Constant -50,843 * 28,194 -42,562   27,587 -58,355 * 27,180 0.76 *** 0.05 
Neighborhood controls (Vm) yes yes yes no 
R
2
 or psuedo R
2
 0.457 0.453 0.458 0.024 
Obs 469 469 469 317 
 
a
 Comparison group for model 3a and model 4 is offline information. The comparison group for models 3b and 3c is an information source other than social 
media (e.g. internet without social media, television, government announcements, neighborhood committee). 
Notes:  In model 4, marginal effects (ME) reported and standard errors clustered by neighborhood. 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
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2. 5.4 Results of In-Depth Interviews 
Description of Respondents and Online Activity during 2011 Flood 
 The twenty-three households that participated in the in-depth interviews were social 
media households (12 respondents) and conventional internet households (11 respondents).  As 
expected, these households were more highly educated and wealthier than the full sample of 469 
households.  About 78% of the 23 in-depth interview respondents had a university degree or 
higher (Appendix B), compared to 29% in the full sample.  In addition, average annual 
household expenditures for in-depth interview respondents (US$ 12,663) were nearly 50% larger 
than expenditures of the full sample (US$ 8,459). 
 During the in-depth interviews, the vast majority of respondents reported that that online 
information helped them to reduce flood losses (70%).  Among social media households, 75% 
reported that the internet helped them to reduce losses, while 64% of conventional internet 
households stated this.  Respondents who stated that information on the internet allowed them to 
reduce their losses appear to have found information that was relevant for their household and 
thus allowed them to prepare, cope, or recover from the flood.  The most important types of 
online information that allowed households to reduce flood losses were information regarding 
flood progression (65% of respondents stated that this was useful in reducing losses), mitigation 
actions (39%), and transportation during the flood such as options for boat transport and road 
closures (22%).  Other helpful information included repair or cleaning (13%) as well as housing 
and transport for evacuation (9%).   
 Households that sought flood information online were able to find content that was more 
relevant to them.  During the 2011 Bangkok flood, many of the 469 households in the full survey 
sample spent considerable time watching television, waiting to catch the information that was 
relevant to their area.  The internet offered the ability to search for any type of information 
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desired by the household.  The vast majority of in-depth interview respondents (70%) relied on a 
mix of television and internet.  Some first found information online and then confirmed its 
credibility via television or direct observation, particularly concerning updates of water levels. 
Others first watched television before using the internet to search for further information.  While 
online information did not allow every household to make more effective decisions, a majority of 
in-depth interview respondents perceived that the information was useful and may have allowed 
flood losses to be reduced. 
Online information: Before the flood 
 Respondents tended to feel that internet use was most useful before the flood.  Before 
flood waters arrived, internet users could follow the flood situation and locate information on 
mitigation actions.  Social media in particular appears to have been a useful source for flood 
progression information.  About half of in-depth interview respondents stated that they used 
social media to seek flood-related information.  In-depth interview respondents stated that flood 
progression information included first-hand reports from their extended social network of where 
floodwaters were moving.  These first-hand reports represent information that social media users 
had access to that other households did not.  If a friend’s home was flooded, social media users 
could be updated on the location, timing, and flood depth as floodwaters flowed through the 
metropolitan area.  They could also determine if and to what extent flooding would occur in their 
neighborhood. 
 Respondents emphasized that information on social media was useful for knowing when 
and how they should prepare for the flood.  Official government predictions of flood path and 
timing were not accurate for several areas in Greater Bangkok.  For example, in study areas near 
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Bangkok’s domestic airport, respondents mentioned that official predictions indicated that their 
neighborhoods would not flood, yet they eventually were inundated. 
 As a result of social media updates, households were able to successfully move their 
belongings in time.  Furthermore, social media respondents had a better sense of how deep 
floodwaters would be.  While many other households used the depth of the previous 1995 flood 
as a reference, social media households tended to know that the 2011 would be more severe.  
Two social media respondents explicitly stated that knowledge of deeper floodwater led to their 
decision to move contents to upper floors.  An additional social media respondent stated that they 
were prompted to move belongings to the second floor based on recommendations on a 
community Facebook group. 
 In addition to flood progression information, both social media and conventional internet 
respondents found advice regarding which flood mitigation actions to take and how to carry out 
those actions.  Some respondents found advice for moving belongings to upper floors of their 
home, while others learned how to protect large, heavy items that are difficult to move (e.g. 
refrigerator, other major appliances).  In addition, households found online information regarding 
how to construct sandbag and concrete block barriers as well as where to buy materials for these 
barriers. 
Online information: During and After the Flood 
 While in-depth interview respondents tended to think that online information was most 
useful before the flood, several found useful information during and after the flood.  During the 
flood, the internet allowed 22% of the in-depth interview respondents to be aware of 
transportation options, both for work commutes and daily activities.  Households also searched 
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for evacuation transport and housing options.  For example, several respondents browsed for 
condo rental availability and prices.   
 A useful feature of social media during the flood was neighborhood Facebook groups. 
Several neighborhoods included in the study established Facebook groups to suggest mitigation 
actions and to update evacuated households about the condition of their house.  One respondent 
stated that because the neighborhood Facebook group provided updates on the condition of her 
home while evacuated, she did not need to make visits to check-up on the house.  Conceivably, 
Facebook groups could help households prepare for flooding and reduce travel costs during the 
flood.   
 After the flood, online information aided 13% of the in-depth interview respondents.  
Three respondents found information that was useful for repair and recovery efforts including 
how to fix damaged belongings, when and how to turn the electricity safely back on, and how to 
cope with mold.  In addition, cleaning advice and comparing the services and prices of 
professional cleaners was also useful for several respondents. 
 
2.6  Discussion 
 Social media use allowed households to reduce losses during the 2011 flood in Bangkok.  
Propensity score matching indicates that social media enabled households to reduce flood loss by 
an average of US$ 3,708 (as indicated by the nearest neighbor estimator) or US$ 4,886 (kernel 
estimator).  This reduction is massive when considering that total flood losses for the full sample 
averaged US$ 4,903.  Social media use appears to be associated with a 37% reduction in mean 
flood losses, when social media households compared to similar households using nearest 
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neighbor matching.
14
  These reductions are in relation to comparable households (i.e. those who 
are well-educated, higher-income, and have multi-story houses), rather than the general 
population.  In addition, regression analysis suggests that social media use is associated with 
lower total flood losses (an average of US$ 2,743).   
Social media likely offered information that was not available from traditional media to 
the 12% of the study sample that used online social networks.  Social media offered information 
that was not available from other sources, such as updates on the location, timing, and depth of 
floodwater at the homes of those in their social network.  Such a dynamic view of localized 
conditions was not available from other sources.  The vast majority of social media households 
(80%) stated that they followed flood progression information.  User updates may have been 
more useful than government flood predictions in some areas.  Government predictions were 
inaccurate in some neighborhoods and only reported expected volume of water, which did not 
clearly convey how severe the flooding would be.  Flood depth would have been a more 
understandable indicator and social media users had access to this information. 
 With knowledge of current flood conditions, social media households could prepare 
effectively for the flood.  In particular, in-depth interview responses suggest that social media 
users were able to successfully move belongings in time and thus reduce ex post losses.  
Furthermore, social media respondents had a better sense of the depth of floodwater to expect.  
While many other households used the depth of the previous 1995 flood as a reference, social 
media households tended to know that the 2011 event would be more severe.  In-depth 
interviews indicate that reductions in flood loss were driven by the greater likelihood of social 
                                                          
14
Nearest neighbor matching finds that the ATT of social media on flood losses is US$ 3,708.  Mean losses among 
the 48 matched households were US$ 9,961.  This suggests an average reduction of 37% is attributable to social 
media use.  In the nearest neighbor matched sample, the 48 social media households had mean total losses of US$ 
6,594 and median losses of US$ 4,261 compared to the 48 matched households with mean and median losses of US$ 
9,961 and 6,229 respectively. 
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media households to move contents to upper floors.  High prevalence of moving contents to 
upper floors among social media households could be due to greater expected flood depth or 
mitigation advice found on social media.
15
  It appears that social media households focused their 
ex ante mitigation efforts on moving belongings as high as possible. 
 Social media appears to have offered advantages over conventional internet sites as well 
as offline sources, particularly in terms of mitigation actions before flooding.  However, the 
benefits of social media during the 2011 Thailand flood largely did not reach lower-income 
households since these households are less likely to access the internet.  Only 15% of social 
media households resided in low-income neighborhoods compared to 58% of all other 
households.
16
  Whether social media could help poor households as much as it helped wealthier 
households is an open question.  Findings of this study cannot be generalized to lower-income 
households due to key differences in household characteristics between the matched and full 
samples.  In particular, poor households in Bangkok are much more likely to live in a one-story 
dwelling and therefore are unable to move contents to upper floors.  Yet, social media could 
offer possible benefits to the 42% of households in the lowest quartile of annual expenditures 
and 56% of households in the second-lowest quartile.  Possible benefits could be achieved as 
disparities in social media use are likely to decrease in the near future due to rapid uptake of 
smartphones.  During the 2011 flood, less than one million smartphone subscriptions existed in 
Thailand.  Subscriptions dramatically rose to 35 million in 2013, covering over half the country’s 
                                                          
15
Among the 317 households with multi-story houses, social media households had the highest prevalence of 
moving contents to upper floors (88%), compared to conventional internet (76%) and offline households (73%). 
  
16
In addition, social media households have much greater annual spending and income than all other households 
(Table 2.3).  Only 3% of social media households are in the lowest quartile of annual expenditure, while 60% are in 
the highest quartile. 
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population (Webcertain, 2014).  Government interventions could hasten expansion of internet 
access and ensure that low-income populations are served. 
 These findings have three major implications for future policies designed to reduce 
household flood losses. One is that flood disaster communication should emphasize the urgency 
and effectiveness of moving belongings to higher locations.  In the case of the 2011 flood in 
Bangkok, moving contents appears to have been a more effective strategy than attempting to 
build flood barriers that can be overtopped.  Yet, households might delay or fail to move 
belongings high enough if they do not have accurate information regarding flood depth and 
timing.  Households must devote time and effort to moving contents and therefore might not take 
action until it is perceived to be absolutely necessary.  Furthermore, households would either 
need live in a multi-story house or construct scaffolding to move their contents beyond the level 
of floodwaters. 
 Second, social media could be a useful technology for natural disaster management.  
There is an enormous opportunity for government disaster communication to move online.  
Social media could be a highly effective means of disseminating crucial information related to 
flood conditions, evacuation warnings, and mitigation actions.  In the U.S., the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency is testing the use of distributing disaster information on social 
media.  In developing countries, expanded access to broadband and mobile networks could be 
justified on the grounds of a better prepared populous. 
 Third, in locations that lack sufficient monitoring networks, social media provides an 
inexpensive way to track flood progression and map affected areas.  Using people as sensors 
offers immense possibilities for improved early warning and flooding predictions, particularly in 
developing countries, ungauged basins, and highly complex urban environments.  User updates 
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could be more reliable and useful if cross-checked and then aggregated into user-generated flood 
maps.  User reporting could also revolutionize flood response and recovery efforts.  Social media 
offers an opportunity for disaster response agencies to quickly obtain a first-cut overview of 
damage and what assistance is needed and where, although on-the-ground reconnaissance would 
remain crucial.  Efforts by the private and public sectors to develop web-based applications that 
can aggregate user updates posted on social media sites could be immensely useful for disaster 
preparedness, response, and recovery. 
 Overall, this study demonstrates the potential of social media for effective flood 
preparation.  Disaster preparedness requires accurate, timely, and readily accessible information 
to guide household decisions.  Social media sites have the potential to provide crucial 
information that could reduce loss of life and property damage, particularly for slow-onset events 
such as the 2011 Bangkok flood.  In developing urban areas with rapidly growing internet user 
bases, social media could offer the opportunity to ensure that residents receive timely disaster 
information.  Expanding the reach and functionality of Web 2.0 applications can offer promising 
opportunities to save lives and reduce impacts of future disasters. 
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CHAPTER 3: USING INFORMATION TO INFLUENCE FLOOD MITIGATION 
BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT 
17
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
3.1.1 Overview 
As the prospect for more frequent and severe extreme weather events gains scientific 
support, many nations are evaluating mitigation options.  Insurance and home retrofits could play 
a prominent role in reducing household welfare losses due to flood events.  Yet, even after 
disasters, households often fail to take risk mitigation actions.  This paper presents results of the 
first field experiment that tests the effect of information provision on household uptake of flood 
insurance and home retrofits.   
A sample of 364 flood-prone households in Bangkok was randomly split into treatment 
and control groups.  The treatment group received practical details on home retrofits and 
subsidized flood insurance as well as social information regarding insurance purchase decisions 
of peers.  Results indicate that the information intervention increased insurance purchases by 
about four percent, while no effect was detected for home retrofits.  If scaled up to include all 
uninsured, flood-prone households in Bangkok, nearly 60,000 additional households could be 
insured. The results suggest that well-designed information interventions could increase 
household uptake of flood insurance, without additional premium subsidies or mandates.
                                                          
17
Many thanks to Panitan Jutaporn, Orapan Nabangchang, Benjamas Suksatit, Chris Wiessen, Hermina Francisco, 
the Environmental Economics Program of Southeast Asia (EEPSEA), staff of the National Catastrophe Insurance 
Program, field team members, and participating households for their assistance with this research. This work was 
supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE-1144081. 
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3.1.2 Motivation 
 Increasingly, information interventions seek to promote climate mitigation by influencing 
individual behavior (e.g. Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al., 2013; Costa and Kahn, 2013).  Such 
persuasive appeals could also be used to encourage adaptation and risk mitigation behavior 
related to extreme events. This study is the first randomized experiment to address flood loss 
mitigation decisions.  Experimental evaluation designs are rare in the environmental policy field 
(Ferraro and Hanauer, 2014).  Yet, such designs are important since they are less prone to bias 
than observational designs.  This study tested the effect of practical and social information on the 
uptake of flood insurance and home retrofits.
18
  Results indicate that the information intervention 
increased insurance purchases about four percent, while no effect was detected for home 
retrofits.  This effect is nearly equal to the increase in uptake that the national insurance program 
in Thailand has achieved through all other means since its establishment in 2012.  Overall, this 
study demonstrates that information can promote voluntary flood insurance purchases and thus 
play a role in reducing flood losses for households. 
 Coastal cities around the world face rising flood exposure due to growing population, 
greater asset values, land subsidence, sea-level rise, and other climate change impacts (Dixon et 
al., 2006; De Sherbinin et al., 2007; Hanson et al., 2011).  The costs of weather-related disasters 
have increased dramatically in recent decades (Munich Re Group, 2005; Miller et al., 2008; 
IPCC, 2012).  This increase is largely driven by greater concentrations of people and assets in 
disaster-prone areas.  In particular, the world’s population is urbanizing and moving to 
vulnerable coastal cities (United Nations, 2015).  At the same time, climate change and other 
factors could further increase flood frequency and intensity (World Bank, 2010).   
                                                          
18
Social information conveys description of the behavior, attitudes, and beliefs of a particular group. 
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 Many nations are assessing options for mitigation of damage and adaptation to extreme 
events.  Household mitigation actions could play a prominent role in reducing flood impacts.  
However, even after disasters, households often do not take risk mitigation actions and therefore 
remain vulnerable to future events (Burby et al., 1988; Kunreuther et al., 2009).  Furthermore, 
little is known about how households prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters (e.g. 
Bruneau et al., 2003; de Bruijn, 2004; Zhou et al., 2010).  Information provision could improve 
household decisions related to flood risk mitigation.  Households often lack accurate information 
regarding flood risk and the costs and benefits associated with insurance and home retrofits to 
reduce flood losses.  This study presents a field experiment that tests the effect of information 
provision on household uptake of flood insurance and home retrofits.  The central hypothesis is 
that household inaction is in part due to incomplete and insufficient information.   
3.2  Background 
Low Uptake of Flood Insurance and Home Retrofits 
 Household flood risk mitigation decisions tend not to be privately, let alone socially, 
optimal.  For example, despite mandates and possible benefits, uptake of insurance against floods 
and other disasters tends to be low globally (Dixon et al., 2006).  The failure to take mitigation 
actions is partly due to the fact that individuals rely on heuristics to assess hazards with low 
probability and can treat low-probability events as having zero probability (Kunreuther et al., 
2002).   It is challenging for individuals to assess the probability and losses associated with low-
frequency, high-loss events, such as large floods.  Other reasons for household inaction include 
(i) lack of awareness of cost-effective mitigation actions, (ii) financial cost as well as time and 
inconvenience costs, and (iii) reliance on government disaster compensation.   
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 Understanding adaptation barriers is crucial for managing the economic cost of disasters.  
Household inaction creates a burden on taxpayers who bear the cost of disaster response and 
recovery.  The Thai government spent nearly US$ 757 million for disaster response due to the 
2011 flood, of which US$ 97 million was cash transfers to compensate flood-affected households 
(DDPM, 2013).  As assets become more concentrated in coastal cities, both flood-affected 
households and taxpayers bear costs. 
Benefits of Flood Insurance and Home Retrofits 
Flood insurance and home retrofits could reduce the cost of flooding events for 
households.  Home retrofits can decrease expected property damage, while insurance reduces the 
variance in household wealth between periods with and without flooding.  Home retrofit 
investments can either prevent a property from being flooded or reduce magnitude of loss if a 
property floods (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972; Shogren and Crocker, 1991).  Retrofits to reduce the 
probability of floodwater entering property include flood barriers, lifting the house, and sealing 
cracks in structure.  Meanwhile, should a property flood, loss reductions can be achieved through 
flood adapted use (e.g. locating difficult to move and costly items on higher floors; avoiding 
built-in furniture on lower floors, and flood resistant materials). 
Home retrofits by urban residents have been found to reduce flood damage by 50 to 80% 
(ICPR, 2002; Kreibich et al., 2005; Bubeck et al., 2012).  Insurance reduces variance in 
household wealth and could decrease the amount of government funds allocated for post-disaster 
compensation programs.
19
  In the U.S., the National Flood Insurance Program estimates that 
every US$3 paid in flood insurance claims decreases federal flood assistance by US$1 (Kousky, 
2011). 
                                                          
19
The ability of insurance to reduce government disaster spending will depend on the size of the premium subsidies 
and level of insurance uptake. 
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Information Interventions to Influence Household Behavior 
Providing information to households could increase demand for flood insurance and 
home retrofits.  Increasingly, practical and social messages are used in policy interventions to 
influence individual decisions.  Experimental research has begun to investigate the effects of 
information on household behavior.  The effectiveness of practical information has been 
demonstrated in research on environmental hazards (e.g. Smith et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2007; 
Madajewicz et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2007; Jalan and Somanathan, 2008; Poulos et al., 2009; 
Somanathan, 2010; Davis et al., 2011; Hamoudi et al., 2012; Bennear et al., 2013).  These 
experimental studies typically provide participants with information regarding their risk level 
and recommended actions.  Treatment effects in environmental hazard studies have varied 
widely.  For example, Hamoudi et al. (2012) finds a 5.3% effect for treatment households 
purchasing water from private providers.  A large average treatment effect of 21% was found for 
latrine construction due to a total sanitation program in India (Pattanayak et al., 2009).   
The effects on household behavior of providing information about social norms has been 
investigated in the electricity and water sectors (e.g. Allcott, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011; Ayres et 
al., 2013; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Ferraro and Price, 2013).   Social norms are behaviors, 
attitudes, and beliefs that are considered appropriate within a particular group.  In these utility 
conservation studies, households are informed of peer use of services and how their behavior 
compares.  There is evidence that information on social norms might be able to produce similar 
size effects on amount of services used as price incentives and conventional utility-run 
conservation programs (Allcott and Mullainathan, 2010; Allcott, 2011).
20
  Non-monetary 
                                                          
20
In Allcott (2011), average electricity consumption decreased by 2%, which is equivalent to a short-run price 
increase of 11 -20%.  Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) find that providing social information can be comparable or 
less costly from the perspective of utility providers (2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour saved) than the average cost of other 
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incentives to alter household behavior are attractive due to their low cost and greater political 
feasibility in comparison to increased utility rates.
 21
   
 No experimental studies have been published regarding flood insurance or home retrofits 
to reduce flood losses.  Some parallels could be drawn between information interventions for 
flood insurance and rainfall index insurance.  Several rainfall index insurance experiments have 
been conducted in developing countries (e.g. Cole et al., 2013; Hill et al., 2013; Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig, 2013; Berhane et al., 2014; Gunnsteinsson, 2014; Karlan et al., 2014).  Gaurav et 
al. (2011) assessed the effect of financial education courses on uptake of rainfall insurance in 
rural India.  While treatment effects were quite large, 8% to 16% increase in insurance uptake, 
the intervention involved a relatively large cost of $63 per policy sold.  This current study on 
flood insurance seeks to evaluate a much lower cost information treatment (US$ 1 per treated 
household and about US$25 per policy sold).  Furthermore, this study makes a contribution to 
understanding flood insurance demand.  Little empirical work has been done on household 
demand for flood insurance, especially in developing countries (Akter et al., 2011; Landry and 
Jahan‐Parvar, 2011; Kunreuther et al., 2013). 
Household Uptake of Flood Insurance and Home Retrofits in Bangkok 
 Bangkok is a highly relevant field site for an experiment focused on flood insurance and 
home retrofits.  Prior to the study, the city was struck by a devastating flood in 2011, which 
ranks as the world’s most costly flooding disaster in the past 30 years (A.M. Best, 2012; Orie and 
Stahel, 2013).  The Bangkok Metropolitan Area is susceptible to flooding due to its location on a 
river delta, flat topography, and subsiding land surface.  In the future, flood risk is expected to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
utility energy efficiency programs.  These traditional programs range in cost from 1.6 to 3.3 (Friedrich et al., 2009) 
and 5.5 to 6.4 cents per kilowatt-hour (Arimura et al., 2012). 
 
21
Changes in net welfare due to these policy interventions would need to be carefully estimated.   
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rise due to land subsidence and increased precipitation resulting from climate change (Shah, 
2011). 
  In the aftermath of the 2011 flood, few Bangkok households have taken mitigation 
actions to prepare for future floods (Nabangchang et al., 2015).  In addition, uptake of flood 
insurance remains low.  Prior to the 2011 flood, less than 1% of households in Thailand had 
flood insurance (Orie and Stahel, 2013).  After 2011, the national insurance market was severely 
disrupted as Thailand’s flood risk was re-assessed.  Premiums soared and coverage levels were 
capped.   
 The National Catastrophe Insurance Fund (NCIF) was created in January 2012 to 
stabilize insurance markets and make affordable policies available to households.  Under the 
NCIF, households can purchase policies to cover losses from natural hazards, including floods, 
through private companies at subsidized premiums.  The Thai Government serves as the insurer 
of last resort for these policies.  Coverage levels up to US$ 3,247 receive subsidized annual 
premiums of 0.5% of total coverage.  In locations highly prone to flooding, such as much of 
Greater Bangkok Area, NCIF premiums are likely lower than market-based premiums and, in 
some areas, below actuarially-fair rates (Threemingmid, 2013).  In order for households to file 
claims, a catastrophe must be declared by the Thai Government and claims are determined by the 
maximum level of flood water.
22
  To encourage uptake of flood insurance, the NCIF created a 
mandatory purchase requirement for households with active mortgages from a bank.  Yet, 
insurance coverage by 2013 amounted to only 6% of households countrywide, or 1.3 million 
households (Prayoonsin, 2013).
23
   
                                                          
22
The flood levels in house and maximum payouts are the following: (i) water reaches ground floor of house: up to 
30% of coverage, (ii) 50 cm: 50%, (iii) 75cm: 75%, (iv) 100 cm: 100%  
 
23
In the Greater Bangkok Area, about 15% of households have flood insurance, based on data from NCIF (2013). 
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Expected Effects of Information Treatment 
 The information treatment used in this study was expected to address the information 
failure regarding flood risk mitigation strategies and influence households in three ways.  First, it 
raises awareness of flood insurance and home retrofit options.  Raising awareness of the 
existence of the subsidized flood insurance program might be an effective strategy in 
encouraging action, given that only 60% of study participants at baseline were aware of it.  
Second, the information provides useful inputs into a household risk mitigation decision such as 
the flood risk faced by households in Bangkok, costs of possible actions, and how to undertake 
actions.  Last, the social information can enable social learning regarding optimal level of 
insurance coverage.  Households are often influenced by actions of their neighbors, even when 
they are not aware of the motivations underlying those actions (Somanathan, 2010).  Through the 
provision of social information, households may update their perceptions of flood risk and the 
welfare gain from mitigation actions.  The conceptual framework that underlies these expected 
effects is presented in Appendix B. 
3.3  Research Design, Hypotheses, & Modeling Strategy 
Experimental design 
 A sample of 364 flood-prone households in Bangkok was randomly split into treatment 
and control groups.  All participants were homeowners who did not have flood insurance at the 
time of the baseline interview. The treatment group (n=185) received practical details on home 
retrofits and subsidized flood insurance as well as social information regarding insurance 
purchase decisions of households in their district.  The control group (n=179) received no 
information.  Power calculations suggested that a sample of this size (n=364) would be sufficient 
to detect treatment effects of 4% or greater, while achieving at least 80% Power for a 1-tailed 
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test.
24
  Informed consent was obtained from all respondents and survey protocols were approved 
by the institutional review board of the University of North Carolina. 
 The information intervention included both practical and social information.  A summary 
of the experimental design and timeline of activities is provided in Figure 3.1.  The practical 
information was delivered during the baseline interview in October and November, 2013.  
Treatment households were presented with an informational pamphlet that enumerators read and 
a short video (2 minutes) about flood risk in Bangkok and how to purchase insurance and 
undertake home retrofits.  The pamphlet also provided a contact list of insurance companies and 
compared damage costs that a household might face with and without insurance.  An excerpt 
from the practical information pamphlet is presented in Figure 3.2.   
 Two weeks after the baseline interview and the delivery of the practical information, 
treatment households were provided with social information, which was delivered as a brochure 
hung on the front gate of their house. The social information conveyed a description of average 
household losses from the 2011 Bangkok flood and prevalence of flood insurance uptake by 
households within a respondent’s district.25  The social information was intended to have 
households perceive that flood insurance is not a rarity in Bangkok.  Information spillovers 
between treatment and control households were accounted for in the follow-up survey, as 
described in Appendix C. 
 An in-person, baseline survey collected background characteristics of participating 
households.  Six months later, a follow-up survey recorded experiment outcomes, including 
insurance purchases, home retrofits, information gathering, and risk perceptions.  This follow-up 
                                                          
24
Power calculations were estimated with a Chi-squared test on proportions (2x2 test for independent samples) using 
the statistical software Power and Precision. 
 
25
A district in Thailand is a local government unit that is below a province.  Districts are analogous to a county in the 
United States.  
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survey was administered in May 2014 by enumerators who used Skype to call respondents’ 
telephones.
26
   
Figure 3.1 Summary of Experimental Design 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
The follow-up survey utilized several types of telephonic devices.  Enumerators used laptops equipped with Skype 
(an online telecommunications application) to call respondents’ mobile phones and landline telephones.  Skype 
accounts were configured with Bangkok-area cell phone numbers so that calls to respondents would appear as local 
numbers. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Excerpt from Practical Information Brochure, English Translation 
 
 
1
2
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Modeling Strategy 
First, a difference in proportions between treatment and control groups is used to estimate 
the effect of the information intervention on three outcomes – 1) insurance purchase, 2) decision 
progress regarding insurance purchase, and 3) household information seeking regarding flood 
risk, protection against flood damage, and insurance. 
 Next, a difference in differences (DiD) estimator is used to measure the effect of the 
information intervention on outcome variables collected at both baseline and follow-up.   The 
DiD estimator is estimated using the following linear regression: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑇𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑖𝑡          (3.1) 
 
where y is the outcome variable, T is the treatment assignment, and P is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 for the follow-up survey and 0 for the baseline.  Ordinary least squares is used to 
estimate Equation 1 for perceived probability of future flooding, a continuous variable.  Linear 
probability regression models are applied for three binary outcome variables, which include 1) 
insurance awareness, 2) awareness that Bangkok is generally a flood prone area, and 3) 
completion of any of nine home retrofits.   
Description of Study Site  
 This study was conducted in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, within two purposively 
selected districts (Don Mueang and Bang Bua Thong) that were among the most severely 
affected areas during the 2011 flood.  Within these two districts, a total of fourteen 
neighborhoods (7 low-income and 7 middle-income) were randomly selected.  Middle-income 
neighborhoods tend to be gated communities with neighbors of similar socioeconomic class and 
housing characteristics.  Low-income neighborhoods include both slums and low-income 
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townhouse communities.  The poorest communities are often located on marginal land along 
canals and many homes in these areas are constructed on stilts due to frequent, minor floods. 
 
Sampling procedure 
 Participant households were selected using a multistage cluster sampling procedure, 
which included three stages – (1) sub-district, (2) community, and (3) household.  Sub-districts 
and communities were randomly sampled with probability proportional to size, while households 
within a community were sampled via a ‘random walk’.  Each community was visited twice and 
households that were not at home during the first visit were re-visited.  Full details on the 
sampling procedure and other methods are provided in Appendix C. 
3.4  Results 
Baseline Household Characteristics 
 The quality of randomization process is assessed by comparing key household 
characteristics between treatment and control groups.  A total of 37 baseline characteristics were 
examined for statistically significant differences, using t-tests for continuous variables and χ2 
tests for categorical variables.  Most household characteristics prior to the interventions are 
balanced between the treatment and control groups (Tables 3.1 and 3.2).  This suggests that the 
randomization procedure resulted in comparable groups.  Treatment and control households were 
not statistically different in 35 of 37 characteristics, at the 5% confidence level. Respondents in 
the treatment group were slightly more likely to be married. In addition, the control group 
received slightly higher ex post compensation for flood losses from government after the 2011 
flood. However, this difference is largely driven by five extreme values in the control group.  
When these extreme observations are dropped, the difference is no longer significant.   
 
 
Table 3.1 Household characteristics in the baseline 
 
Household Characteristic Definition Control Treatment Difference (95% CI) p value 
Monthly household income Total household income per month (in US$) 1,346 1,367 -21       (-247, 205) 0.86 
Age Age of respondent 54.2 55 -0.802   (–3.48, 1.88)  0.56 
Male Dummy variable=1, if respondent is male 0.39 0.43 -0.038   (–0.141, 0.064)  0.46  
Marriage status 
 
  
χ2 test, p= 0.03 
         Single Dummy variable=1, if respondent is single 0.11 0.12 -0.013      (-0.079, 0.052)  0.69 
         Married Dummy variable=1, if respondent is married 0.75 0.82 -0.072    (-0.158, 0.013)  0.09 
         Divorced, separated, or 
widowed 
Dummy variable=1, if respondent is divorced, 
separated, or widowed 
0.15 0.06 0.086** (0.024, 0.148)  0.01 
Awareness of Catastrophe Insurance  
Dummy variable=1, if respondent is aware of 
catastrophe insurance 
0.61 0.59 0.020 (–0.081, 0.121)  0.70 
Perceived probability of future 
flooding 
Perceived probability of a flood similar in 
magnitude as 2011 event within the next five 
years. Scale of 0 (will not occur) to 10 (will 
certainly occur).   
4.8 5.1 -0.289 (–0.842, 0.265)  0.31 
House loss in 2011 flood House and contents losses (in US$) 2,107 1,574 534 (-999, 2066)  0.49 
Compensation received after flood 
a
 Compensation received after 2011 flood (in US$) 693 642 51* (4, 97)  0.03 
N   179 185     
 
Rows with values greater than 1 represent mean values in treatment and control households.  All other rows represent a binary variable and therefore values are the percentage 
of households who have that particular characteristic.   
Significant at the *p < 0.05 level and **p < 0.01 level. 
a 
Compensation is significantly higher in control group due to five outliers. When these outliers are dropped, the difference is no longer significant (p=0.15)
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Table 3.2 Household retrofit behavior in the baseline 
 
Household Characteristic Definition Control Treatment Difference (95% CI) p value 
Home Retrofits 
b
 
 
    
     Avoiding built-in furniture 
Dummy variable=1, if built-in furniture (i.e. custom 
shelves and counters attached to interior walls) on the 
ground flood was avoided. 
0.11 0.12 -0.013 (–0.079, -0.053)  0.70 
     Use of flood-resistant materials 
Dummy variable=1, if flood-resistant materials used 
(e.g. tile, cement) 
0.14 0.23 -0.093* (–0.174, -0.013)  0.02 
     Move heavy items to upper floors 
Dummy variable=1, if heavy items moved to upper 
floors 
0.42 0.48 -0.062 (–0.165, 0.041)  0.23 
     Move utilities higher 
Dummy variable=1, if utilities, such as AC 
compressor, moved higher 
0.12 0.2 -0.072 (–0.148, 0.0036)  0.06 
     Permanent flood barrier 
Dummy variable=1, if permanent flood barrier 
constructed 
0.11 0.14 -0.029 (–0.098, 0.040)  0.41 
     Lifting house Dummy variable=1, if house structure was lifted 0.06 0.06 -0.004 (–0.052, 0.045)  0.88 
     Sealing cracks in structure 
Dummy variable=1, if cracks in housing structure were 
sealed 
0.16 0.17 -0.011 (–0.089, 0.067)  0.78 
     Build shelving for storage 
Dummy variable=1, if shelving built for additional 
storage during flood 
0.15 0.21 -0.060 (–0.139, 0.018)  0.13 
     Create additional living space 
Dummy variable=1, if additional space created for 
living on upper floors during flood (e.g. lifted roof 
tiles) 
0.07 0.04 0.029 (–0.017, 0.076)  0.21 
N   179 185     
 
Rows with values greater than 1 represent mean values in treatment and control households.  All other rows represent a binary variable and therefore values are 
the percentage of households who have that particular characteristic.   
Significant at the *p < 0.05 level and **p < 0.01 level. 
b 
Home retrofits at baseline are those that household made before the baseline survey 
1
2
8
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Outcome Variables 
 Estimated impacts represent an average treatment effect (ATE).  Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
summarize the impact of the information intervention on insurance purchase, home retrofits, 
information seeking, and risk perceptions.  For flood insurance purchase, a 4.3% average 
treatment effect was found, p<0.05.  Less than 1% of control households purchased insurance, 
compared to nearly 5% of treatment households.  Thus, the provided information appears to have 
persuaded some treatment households to purchase insurance.  The magnitude of this treatment 
effect is similar to those in information experiments related to water and electricity use (e.g. 
Allcott, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2011; Ayers et al., 2013) and rainfall index insurance (e.g. Costa 
and Kahn, 2013; Hill et al., 2013).    
 In addition, several households indicated that they had decided to purchase insurance but 
had not purchased a policy as of May 2014.  If this group of households is combined with the 
households that purchased insurance, the treatment effect of information reaches 7.5%.
27
   
 A significant treatment effect for insurance uptake was found despite the risk of 
information spillover from treatment to control households within neighborhoods.  Only 6% of 
control households reported that they received insurance information from neighbors so the risk 
of information spillover is low. Moreover, it is not known whether the information received by 
these control households was (i) from treatment households,
28
 or (ii) derived from the 
information intervention materials.  If the information that some control households received was 
derived from materials provided to the treatment group, then this would lead to downward bias 
of the treatment effect.  Alternatively, if the information received by controls was not from 
                                                          
27
Two control and eight treatment households indicated that they had decided to purchase insurance but had not 
purchased a policy as of May 2014.  When re-calculating the average treatment effect, both these households and the 
ten that actually purchased insurance are included.  
  
28
In order to confirm if information was received from treatment households, the names of neighbors that provided 
the information would need to be stated, raising privacy concerns.   
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treatment materials, then this represents a confounding factor, which is controlled through 
randomization.   
 The most commonly stated reason for purchasing insurance was to receive compensation 
in the event of a future flood. Two newly insured treatment households also stated that the price 
was lower than they had originally thought, prior to the baseline interview.  Households were 
also asked about the usefulness of the provided information in assisting their purchase decision.  
Overwhelmingly, treatment households indicated that the information was useful because they 
learned that flood insurance was available (6 households) and how to purchase it (5 households).  
Thus, households acknowledge that the provided information was part of their decision to 
purchase insurance. 
 For households that did not purchase insurance, the most common reason was that the 
respondent did not believe that a flood would occur again (88 households).  Others stated that 
policies were too expensive (57 households), lack of sufficient information about insurance (57 
households), and had confidence in their ability to self-protect (43 households).  The only reason 
that had a statistical difference between control and treatment groups was perceived eligibility, 
p<0.05.  More control households (11) than treatment households (3) incorrectly believed that 
they were ineligible for flood insurance.  This difference in perceived eligibility suggests that the 
information treatment increased familiarity about insurance policy terms and eligibility criteria.  
Expectation of disaster compensation may have also dissuaded some households from 
purchasing insurance.  About 60% of households expect to receive some level of compensation 
after a future flood.  However, expected compensation levels are a relatively small portion of 
expected losses.
29,30
   
                                                          
29
About 82% of the 202 households that expect compensation believe that it will cover less than half of their losses. 
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 For home retrofits, the information intervention does not appear to have motivated 
households to take action.  The only significant treatment effect appears to be for creating 
additional living space.  Additional space on upper floors was created to serve as additional 
living quarters during a future flood.  However, only one treatment household took this action 
after the information treatment.  The significant DiD estimate is driven by the fact that no control 
households undertook this home retrofit after the information intervention.  The DiD estimator 
indicates that this action was more prevalent among treatment households, p<0.01.  The DiD 
estimates also suggest that control households were more likely to have used flood-resistant 
materials.  However, this estimate is driven by treatment households undertaking this retrofit 
before, rather than after, the baseline interview.  Therefore, there is no evidence that the 
information treatment motivated households to undertake home retrofits, with the possible 
exception of creating additional upstairs living space.   
 Possible reasons that a significant treatment effort was not be found for retrofits include 
(i) the information provided did not motivate households to take action, and (ii) awareness of 
insurance might led treatment households to forego retrofits.  Among the ten households that 
purchased insurance, it does not appear that insurance decreased the likelihood of undertaking 
home retrofits.  In fact, insurance buyers were more likely to undertake new mitigation actions.  
While 30% (3 out of 10 households) of insurance purchasers undertook a home retrofit action 
after the baseline interview, less than 6% of non-buyers did (20 out of 354), p<0.01. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
30
Households that purchase flood insurance in Thailand are only eligible for automatic flood aid, which amounted to 
US$ 160 in 2012 (Threemingmid, 2015).  However, insured households are not able to apply for additional aid (up 
to US$ 960 in 2012) that might become available. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Difference in insurance purchase and information seeking between control and treatment households at follow-up 
 
  Control Treatment Difference (95% CI) p value Obs 
Purchased insurance  0.01 0.05 0.043*  (0.010, 0.077)  0.01 364 
     Purchased or Decided to buy but have not yet 0.02 0.09 0.075** (0.029, 0.12)  0.00 364 
Decision progress for insurance purchase 
  
χ2 test, p= 0.01 364 
     Have not thought about it 0.50 0.38 -0.11*   (-0.22, -0.011)  0.03 
      Decided not to purchase 0.34 0.31 -0.027   (-0.12, 0.069)  0.58 
      Have not decided yet 0.15 0.22 0.065    (-0.014, 0.15)  0.11 
      Decided to buy but have not yet 0.01 0.04 0.032
†
   (0.002, 0.066)  0.06 
      Purchased 0.01 0.05 0.043*   (0.010, 0.077)  0.01 
 Information seeking 
a
 
          Flood risk in local area 0.24 0.28 0.043   (-0.049, 0.13)  0.36 361 
     How to protect property from floods 0.21 0.23 0.020   (-0.066, 0.11)  0.65 362 
     Catastrophe insurance 0.03 0.09 0.053* (0.004, 0.10)  0.03 362 
Contacted insurance company (after baseline interview) 0.03 0.06 0.032   (-0.011, 0.074)  0.14 362 
 
All rows represent a binary variable and therefore values are the percentage of households who undertook a given action.   
Significant at the 
† 
p<0.10, *p < 0.05 level and **p < 0.01 level. 
 
a
 Respondent was asked if they attempted to seek information on any of the three listed items, in the period between the baseline and follow-up interview.  For 
example, in the case of catastrophe insurance, both treatment and control households were asked if they sought information regarding catastrophe insurance 
during the period after the baseline interview. 
1
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Table 3.4 Difference in risk perception and home retrofits between control and treatment households at baseline and follow-up 
 
  
Difference between groups  
(% treatment - % control)       
  At baseline At follow-up DiD  
Average at 
baseline 
Obs 
      Awareness of Catastrophe Insurance -0.083 (-0.50, 0.34)   0.48* (0.05, 0.92)  0.57
†
 (-0.04, 1.17) 0.60 364 
Awareness of General Flood Risk in Bangkok   0.12 (-0.41, 0.65)   0.004 (-0.58, 0.59) -0.21 (-0.99, 0.57) 0.80 344 
Perceived probability of future flooding   0.31 (-0.25, 0.86) -0.009 (-0.58, 0.57) -0.30 (-1.09, 0.50) 5 358 
Perceived damages from future flooding 
a
 -0.012 (-0.11, 0.083) -0.035 (-0.11, 0.037) -0.06 (-0.18, 0.06) 2 338 
Home Retrofit 
     
     Avoiding built-in furniture on ground floor   0.19   (-0.47, 0.85)   0.19 (-1.14, 1.53)   0.07  (-1.42, 1.55) 0.11 362 
     Use of flood-resistant materials   0.62* (0.08, 1.17) -1.67 (-3.83, 0.49) -2.29* (-4.52, -0.06) 0.19 362 
     Move heavy items to upper floors   0.23   (-0.19, 0.65) -0.03 (-1.29, 1.22) -0.26   (-1.59, 1.06) 0.45 362 
     Move utilities higher   0.54
†
  (-0.032, 1.12) -0.61 (-1.86, 0.64) -1.16
†
  (-2.53, 0.22) 0.16 362 
     Permanent flood barrier (e.g. cement wall)   0.32   (-0.31, 0.95) -0.03 (-2.01, 1.94) -0.30   (-2.36, 1.77) 0.12 362 
     Lifting house   0.065 (-0.82, 0.95) -0.03 (-2.01, 1.94) -0.10   (-2.26, 2.06) 0.06 362 
     Sealing cracks in structure   0.12   (-0.43, 0.66) -0.03 (-2.81, 2.75) -0.15   (-2.98, 2.69) 0.17 362 
     Protecting against sewerage backflow   0.56   (-0.13, 1.26)   1.08 (-1.20, 3.35)   0.52   (-1.87, 2.89) 0.10 362 
     Build shelving for storage   0.23   (-0.07, 0.54)   0.24  (-0.62, 1.10)   0.01   (-0.91, 0.92) 0.18 362 
     Create additional living space -0.51   (-1.48, 0.46) 
   b
  3.42** (2.60, 4.23)
c
 0.05 362 
 
Each row represents a separate linear probability regression, with the exception of perceived damages from future flooding, which represents a multinomial 
regression.  Coefficients and 95% CI limits (shown in parentheses) represent marginal effects.  Significant at the 
† 
p<0.10, *p < 0.05 level and **p < 0.01 level. 
 
Notes: 
a
 Multinomial model used to estimate DiD for perceived damages from future flooding, which is a categorical variable. 
b
 No control households undertook this home retrofit. 
c
 Only one treatment households created additional living space after the information treatment.
1
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3.5  Discussion 
 As risk mitigation of extreme events becomes a growing policy priority, it is crucial to 
understand how households respond to disasters and how to encourage actions to reduce future 
losses.  This study demonstrates that practical and social information can encourage flood 
insurance purchases and thus reduce costs of flooding for households.  Results indicate that the 
information intervention increased insurance purchases by about four percent, while no effect 
was detected for home retrofits.  Providing information achieves about the same increase in 
uptake as the national insurance program in Thailand has been able to achieve through all other 
means since its establishment in 2012.
31
  If this intervention were scaled up to include all 
uninsured, flood-prone households in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, nearly 60,000 additional 
households could be insured.
32
   
 The findings of this study raise several questions for future research.  The magnitude of 
the treatment effect might depend on socioeconomic and other characteristics of participants.  
Knowing how the effectiveness of information varies across background characteristics could 
lead to improved targeting of the intervention.  Future work could capture longer-term treatment 
effects and insurance policy retention rates.  In addition, testing less costly interventions, such as 
mass media campaigns, could also be useful to determine how the information delivery mode 
affects response to treatment.  More generally, expanding field experiments to other types of 
disaster mitigation and adaptation actions could produce valuable lessons for public policy. 
 Results from this experiment have relevance for flood prone areas around the world.  In 
particular, the study provides insight into how household losses due to floods can be mitigated in 
                                                          
31
Flood insurance uptake in Thailand rose from less than 1% of households before the 2011 flood to 6% by 2013 
(Orie and Stahel, 2013; Prayoonsin, 2013). 
 
32
About 1,686,346 households live in districts flooded in 2011.  Approximately 299,899 households in these districts 
are already insured against floods.  If an information campaign was targeted to all uninsured households 
(1,386,447), then 59,617 households would purchase insurance policies, assuming a treatment effect of 4.3%. 
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the face of urbanization and climate change.  Low-lying megacities, such as Bangkok, present 
new challenges for disaster risk mitigation.  In these productive urban centers, neither massive 
evacuations nor limits on concentrations of people and assets are likely desirable.  Therefore, risk 
mitigation strategies must focus on how to reduced expected losses when people and assets 
remain in place.  Information could play a vital role in motivating households to take voluntary 
actions to reduce the economic impacts of extreme events.   Overall, this study demonstrates 
well-designed information interventions could further increase household uptake of flood 
insurance, without additional mandates or increases in premium subsidies. 
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CHAPTER 4: BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: INFORMATION CAMPAIGN FOR 
FLOOD INSURANCE 
33
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
4.1.1 Overview 
This paper presents a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of an information campaign to 
encourage flood insurance uptake among households in Bangkok. Households in neighborhoods 
severely affected by the 2011 Bangkok flood were provided practical details about a subsidized 
insurance program currently available in Thailand as well as social norms regarding purchase 
decisions of households in their district.  The BCA accounts for the distribution of costs and 
benefits across stakeholders including new policyholders, insurance providers, and the general 
taxpayer.  Transfer payments (premiums, claims) as well as efficiency gains and losses 
(consumer surplus, deadweight loss) are accounted for in the analysis. 
Results suggest that the information campaign does not deliver social benefits relative to 
the status quo flood aid program. Furthermore, the campaign increases taxpayer burden and 
delivers subsidies to higher income households.  Greater benefits are associated with better 
informing households that have high insurance demand, compared to using social pressure to 
persuade those with low demand.  Overall, findings suggest that ex post flood aid could be a 
reasonable policy in cases where the alternative is an information campaign to promote a 
subsidized insurance program.
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4.1.2 Motivation 
The costs of natural disasters have increased dramatically around the world in recent 
decades (Munich Re Group, 2005; Miller et al., 2008; IPCC, 2012).  Multi-billion-dollar 
disasters are becoming common.  Seven of the ten costliest events since 1980 occurred in the 
past ten years (Munich Re Group, 2015).  This increasing cost is largely driven by greater 
concentrations of people and assets in disaster-prone areas, such as floodplains.  At present, 
global flood losses are about US$ 6 billion per year for the 136 largest coastal cities, combined.  
This is expected to rise to US$52 billion by 2050 due to socioeconomic growth alone (Hallegatte 
et al., 2013).  Global flood losses are expected to become increasingly concentrated in 
developing countries, especially Asian megacities.   
 Understanding how households can be encouraged to insure against disasters is of interest 
to scholars and policymakers concerned with reducing the social costs of extreme events.  This 
study assesses the economic benefits and costs of an information campaign to encourage uptake 
of subsidized flood insurance in Bangkok.  Flood insurance can increase private welfare by 
allowing households to smooth consumption.  Yet, uptake of flood insurance remains low 
globally, even in countries where such insurance is mandated and subsidized (Dixon et al., 
2006).  Less than 1% of households were insured during the 2011 Thailand flood, the world’s 
most costly flooding event in the past 30 years (A.M. Best, 2012; Orie and Stahel, 2013; Munich 
Re Group, 2015).   
 This study presents a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of an information intervention designed 
to deliver both practical and social norm information about a subsidized flood insurance 
program.  While past field experiments have assessed the effectiveness of information 
interventions in influencing behavior, none have evaluated the social welfare implications of the 
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intervention.  Without a full accounting of economic costs and benefits across all stakeholders, it 
is unclear if this type of information campaign produces net benefits for society.  Disaster 
management could especially benefit from evaluation of policy alternatives, given the large 
amounts of government resources at stake.   
 A key question that this BCA addresses is whether or not the information campaign is 
preferable to the status quo in which households receive government compensation for flood 
losses.  Ex post flood aid and subsidized insurance are two widely-applied strategies to cope with 
household disaster losses.  In the analysis presented in this paper, the distribution of costs and 
benefits are accounted for across stakeholders including new policyholders, private insurers, and 
taxpayers.  A limitation of the analysis is that no data exists for household demand for subsidized 
flood insurance in Bangkok.  Therefore, the study makes illustrative calculations based on 
assumed demand curves for a typology of households.  Important insights can be drawn from 
applying BCA with these demand assumptions.  For example, interactions between government 
aid programs and insurance can be better understood in terms of benefits to households and costs 
for taxpayers.  In addition, insights can be gained regarding the distribution of costs and benefits 
across taxpayers, insurers, and households of various income levels. 
 Key parameter values for the BCA are derived from two household surveys in Bangkok 
reported elsewhere (Chapter 3; Nabangchang et al., 2015).  I found an average treatment effect of 
the information intervention to be approximately 4%, nearly equal to the increase in uptake that 
the national subsidized insurance program has achieved through all other means since its 
establishment (Chapter 3).  Responses are from 397 uninsured households in severely flood-
affected areas of Bangkok.  The second data source is a household survey of the economic costs 
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incurred by households due to the 2011 flood.  The 469 households in this survey are also 
located in areas of Bangkok severely affected by the 2011 flood (Nabangchang et al., 2015). 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next, second section of the paper provides 
background on flood insurance in Bangkok and the information campaign to be evaluated. The 
third section presents the conceptual framework.  The fourth section describes the study sites and 
fieldwork, while the fifth section discusses results from the benefit-cost analysis of the 
information campaign.  The sixth section offers concluding remarks. 
4.2  Background 
 In 2011, Bangkok experienced the world’s most costly flooding disaster in the past 30 
years (A.M. Best, 2012; Orie and Stahel, 2013).  The Greater Bangkok Metropolitan area is 
susceptible to flooding due to its location on a river delta, flat topography, and subsiding land 
surface.  In the future, flood risk is expected to rise due to continued land subsidence and 
development, as well as increased precipitation and sea-level rise resulting from climate change 
(Shah, 2011).   
4.2.1 Flood compensation 
 In the aftermath of the 2011 flood, the Thai government distributed flood compensation 
to households in order to offset some of the costs of flooding.  Flood compensation in this study 
is defined as reimbursement for losses incurred due to flooding, rather than emergency response.  
As floodwaters receded, all households residing in government-declared flood-affected areas 
received a cash transfer of US$160 (equivalent to 11% of median insurable losses and 5% of 
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median total flood costs).
34
  Many flood-affected households were not satisfied with the US$160 
transfer and applied pressure on their municipal and national representatives in order to obtain 
greater ex post compensation.  As a result, a second round of cash transfers was made available.  
During the second round, households had to submit an application that documented flood 
damage in order to receive compensation up to US$ 960, depending on the estimated value of 
damage.   
Flood compensation programs shift the burden of disaster losses from households in 
flood-prone areas to taxpayers.  After disasters, there is typically an outpouring of assistance for 
affected households. Yet, the availability of flood aid can reduce the incentive for homeowners 
to take risk mitigation actions or insure against flooding.   
 If households treat government compensation as a substitute for insurance, then ex post 
flood compensation might lead households to underinsure or to forgo insurance altogether (Kelly 
and Kleffner, 2003).
35
  In Thailand, ex post aid and insurance appear to be good substitutes since 
the conditions that trigger payments are similar. Therefore, ex post flood aid may hinder 
households’ uptake of flood insurance, since aid functions as zero-premium insurance policy.  In 
order to reduce the incentive for households’ to under-protect and underinsure, some suggest that 
flood aid either be limited to low levels or be provided in the form of loans (Michel-Kerjan and 
Kunreuther, 2011). 
 Yet denying disaster compensation to households or communities that do not take 
adequate mitigation action or fail to insure is generally viewed as politically infeasible. Thus, 
                                                          
34
Insurable losses are out-of-pocket expenses to repair and replace house structure, contents, and motor vehicles.  
These losses do not include foregone income or the value of household time devoted to repair, recovery, or greater 
travel time. 
 
35
In the U.S., evidence suggests that flood compensation decreases average coverage levels selected by households, 
but does not reduce insurance uptake (Kousky et al., 2013).   
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governments have often tried to institute mandatory, and typically subsidized, flood insurance 
programs in an attempt to reduce the liability of the general taxpayer to pay for ex post flood 
compensation.  However, these programs require new expenditures by taxpayers, such as 
subsidies to make the insurance attractive to households, and the administrative costs for 
program operation and advertisement.  
4.2.2 Flood insurance 
Prior to the 2011 flood, less than 1% of households in Thailand had flood insurance (Orie 
and Stahel, 2013).  During this flood disaster, the national insurance market was severely 
disrupted as Thailand’s flood risk was re-assessed.  As a result, the government-sponsored 
National Catastrophe Insurance Fund (NCIF) was created in 2012 in order to stabilize insurance 
markets and make affordable policies available to households.  Under the NCIF, the Thai 
Government serves as the “insurer of last resort” for flood insurance policies.  Insurance payouts 
only occur after flood events that are declared a catastrophe by the Thai Government.  
Households can purchase policies with coverage levels up to THB 100,000 (US$ 3,200) at 
premium rates of 0.5% of coverage.  This coverage limit is comparable to median losses due to 
the 2011 flood, US$3,089 (Nabangchang et al., 2015).  In areas highly prone to flooding, such as 
most of the Greater Bangkok Area, the NCIF premiums are lower than market-based premiums 
(Threemingmid, 2013).   
 The NCIF premiums are not calculated based on estimates of actual flood risk.  Flood 
risk maps are not publically available in Thailand that would allow for risk-based pricing.   Flood 
claim payouts are based on the maximum level of flood water in a dwelling and not damage 
verified by a claims adjuster.  This means that water must enter a dwelling in order for a claim to 
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be made.  This requirement may provide a disincentive to take preventive measures to stop water 
from entering.   
 Despite the establishment of NCIF, insurance coverage by 2013 amounted to only 6% of 
households countrywide, or 1.3 million households (Prayoonsin, 2013).  In the Greater Bangkok 
Area (Bangkok, Nonthaburi, and Pathum Thani provinces), insurance coverage is higher than the 
national average (15%) (based on data from (NCIF, 2013).  Most locations in the Greater 
Bangkok metropolitan area are considered by the NCIF to be highly prone to flooding.   
 Low uptake of flood insurance is an issue in many countries. In U.S., only half of 
households in flood prone areas have flood insurance despite federal mandates and publically-
available flood risk maps (Kriesel and Landry, 2004; Dixon et al., 2006).
36
  Scholars believe that 
flood insurance take-up in the U.S. is low relative to the social optimum (Kriesel and Landry, 
2004; Kunreuther et al., 2013).  Major reasons why households fail to purchase flood insurance 
include (i) low risk perception, (ii) lack of awareness of insurance, (iii) lack of understanding of 
insurance, (iv) price, and (v) reliance on government aid.  Lack of understanding and awareness 
of flood insurance are the focus of the information intervention in this study.  In Bangkok, only 
60% of participants in the information campaign field experiment were aware of the 
Government’s flood insurance program prior to the intervention.  Yet, the randomized 
experiment that tested the use of the information campaign evaluated in this BCA study found a 
relatively small treatment effect (4%) (Chapter 3).  Therefore, even after receiving information, 
few households purchased the subsidized insurance.  Possible explanations include low risk 
perception and the non-monetary costs of time and effort to purchase insurance.   
                                                          
36
In the U.S., about 20% of flood insurance policies are intentionally subsidized.  On average, premiums are a less 
than half of actuarially fair levels (Beider, 2009). 
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Low risk perception regarding the probability and consequences of an event is 
particularly relevant for floods, which are low frequency, high consequence events.  Many 
individuals can treat low probability events as zero probability (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Kunreuther et al., 2002).  Systematic underestimation of flood risk is a well-documented barrier 
to flood insurance purchase.  Even after a major disaster or after receiving risk information, 
individuals might be overly optimistic about their risk level (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; 
Kunreuther et al., 2013).  In addition, non-monetary costs of adopting an action, such as time and 
effort, can also pose a barrier to insurance purchase.  Within the field of energy efficiency, non-
monetary costs are gaining increasing attention as an explanation for low uptake of privately 
beneficial interventions (Sallee, 2014; Fowlie et al., 2015).  In the case of flood insurance, 
households would need to incur inconvenience costs, time costs, and cognitive effort in order to 
purchase a policy.  These processing costs of implementing an action are typically not accounted 
for in cost-benefit analyses and are not included in this study.   
4.2.3 Information Campaign to Increase Insurance Uptake  
 An intervention to increase household uptake of subsidized flood insurance could 
potentially enhance household and social welfare.  The information campaign provided 
households with practical details about a subsidized insurance available in Thailand as well as 
social norms regarding purchase decisions of households in their district.  Practical information 
about flood risk in Bangkok and how to purchase insurance was delivered via an in-home visit in 
the form of a pamphlet and short video.  Social information was provided two weeks later in the 
form of a front gate hanger.  The social information conveys a description of average household 
losses from the 2011 Bangkok flood and prevalence of catastrophe insurance uptake by 
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households within a respondent’s district.  A full description of the campaign is provided in 
Chapter 3. 
4.3  Theoretical Approach to Estimate Welfare Effects of Information Intervention 
4.3.1 Household Perspective 
 In order to conceptualize a household’s insurance decision and how an information 
campaign might influence decision making, I use a modified version of the classic expected 
utility (EU) framework presented in Smith (1968).  Chapter 3 provides a more detailed 
description of this framework.  Consider a utility-maximizing household with wealth W that is 
making a decision on the level of flood insurance coverage (I) to purchase.  The household faces 
two states of the world, that a flood occurs or not, with annual probabilities of p and 1-p of these 
two states.  The cost of insurance per unit of coverage is c. If the house is flooded, the household 
will incur a cost of flooding (L) and receive an insurance claim of 𝐼. Any coverage level can be 
selected up to the lesser value of L or coverage limit.  The household may receive government 
disaster compensation (G).  When deciding to purchase insurance, a household will bear costs of 
searching for information (F).   
 The household is assumed to be risk averse, with strictly increasing and concave utility 
function.  The von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility for an insured household can be 
determined by the sum of the utilities in each state, weighted by the probability of each state.  
The optimal amount of insurance can be determined by maximizing expected utility: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝐸[𝑈(𝑊)] = 𝑝 ∙ 𝑈[𝑊 − 𝐿 + 𝐼 − 𝑐𝐼 − 𝐹 + 𝐺] + (1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑈[𝑊 − 𝐿 − 𝑐𝐼 − 𝐹]           (4.1) 
   𝐼 
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The optimal level of I will be influenced by L, F, G, and the relative magnitudes of p and c.  In 
order to determine the optimal coverage level (I
*
), the household’s expected utility is maximized 
over I.  A household will select insurance coverage up to the point where marginal utility in the 
state with flooding is equal to the marginal utility in the state without flooding (as shown in 
Appendix B).  Full insurance coverage (I
*
=L) will be selected if several conditions hold: (i) 
insurance is actuarially fair (c=p), (ii) search costs are zero, (iii) household’s perceived 
probability of loss equals the insurer’s estimate, (iv) household is risk averse, (v) no 
compensation is anticipated, and (vi) coverage limit imposed by insurer is not less than L. 
 EU theory is an appropriate framework if it is assumed that low flood insurance demand 
can be explained by a lack of complete information (e.g. flood probability and magnitude of loss) 
and individuals use heuristics to make decisions.  Therefore, with full information and no time 
constraints, individuals would not need to rely on these mental shortcuts.  An information 
campaign could be justified depending on its costs and the value of providing information 
regarding insurance and flood probability in order to improve decisions.  Observed insurance 
behavior could move closer to that described by EU theory. 
 Consider a rational household that is deciding between the status quo (relying on ex post 
government flood aid) and purchasing subsidized insurance, as shown in Figure 4.1.  This 
household is aware that subsidized insurance is available.  However, prior to an information 
intervention, the household is not willing to pay subsidized or actuarially fair premiums.  It is 
assumed that insured households must forgo most flood aid, as is the case in many countries.  
Therefore, households face a tradeoff and must weigh the relative net benefits of aid and 
subsidized insurance.  Both aid and subsidized insurance are assumed to provide limited 
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compensation for flood losses.  The maximum level of ex post flood aid (Aid) is assumed to be 
less than the subsidized insurance coverage limit (Ilimit) and wealth at risk (Iwealth). 
 Flood aid is treated in this analysis as an insurance policy with a zero-premium.  The 
annual expected amount of flood aid received by a household is equal to the product of ex post 
compensation and the flood probability (p).  Yet, from the perspective of the household, the 
value of aid is equal to the area under the demand curve (B1 + E1). 
 Alternatively, the household can purchase subsidized insurance.  Any amount of 
coverage can be selected, up to the coverage limit (Ilimit) at a subsidized premium of s.
37
  If the 
premium rate was zero, the household would purchase coverage for the total value of wealth at 
risk, equal to Iwealth.  This household has relatively low demand for flood insurance and the choke 
price is equal to the actuarially fair premium rate.  This household will not purchase insurance 
prior to the information campaign since the net benefit of insurance (B2) is less than that of aid 
(E1).    
 The information campaign is expected to increase household demand for coverage.  
Benefits of the information campaign, at the household level, can be measured as the change in 
area of consumer surplus between the values of Aid and Ilimit (Figure 4.1).  For this household, 
the intervention causes an outward shift in demand due to reduced search costs, increased 
awareness about insurance, and changed flood risk perceptions.  It is assumed that the campaign 
causes demand to shift just enough such that households are willing to pay subsidized premiums 
(∆A2 + B2 + ∆B2 + ∆C1 > E1).  The net benefit of the information campaign for this household is 
equal to ∆A2 + B2 + ∆B2 + ∆C1 - E1.     Part of the net benefit of insurance is attributable to 
consumer surplus above the actuarially fair price (area A2), which implies that some households 
                                                          
37
Subsidized insurance allows households to purchase coverage at a premium rate below the actuarially fair level. In 
Thailand, insurance is offered at a fixed premium rate of 0.5%, which in high-risk areas is below the actuarially fair 
rate.   
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value insurance beyond the amount of expected annual claims.  However, as Figure 4.1 is drawn, 
most of the benefit is attributable to consumer surplus due to subsidized premiums (areas B2, 
∆B2, and ∆C1).  This benefit to households attributable to subsidized premiums is a transfer 
payment from taxpayers.   
Figure 4.1 Household insurance demand, Type 3 household 
 
Before Information Campaign   Post-Information Campaign 
 
 
 
 The household described above represents one of several possible types of households.  A 
typology of households is developed based on awareness of insurance (unaware or aware), 
baseline willingness to pay for insurance (actuarially fair rate, subsidized rate, or less than 
subsidized rate), and insurance purchase decision after the information campaign.  No data exist 
for household demand for subsidized flood insurance in Bangkok.  Therefore, illustrative 
calculations are made, based on assumed demand curves for a typology of households.  In 
addition, assumptions are made regarding the number of households categorized as each type in 
the typology so that costs and benefits can be aggregated to a population total.   
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Table 4.1 presents a total of six possible household types.  However, only four types of 
households would be targeted by an information provision campaign.  Households that are aware 
of insurance and willing to pay either actuarially fair or subsidized premiums would have 
purchased insurance prior to the campaign.  Since the campaign targets uninsured households, 
these types of households are not considered in this BCA study since they would have already 
purchased insurance.  Furthermore, households that do not purchase insurance after the 
information campaign (Type 4) are only included in the BCA in terms of their information 
campaign costs.  These households are assumed to receive zero benefits from the campaign. 
 
Table 4.1 Types of households, by awareness of insurance and demand 
 
 
Willingness to Pay (baseline) 
 
Actuarially fair Subsidized < Subsidized 
Post-treatment 
insurance decision: Purchased Purchased Purchased 
Didn't 
purchase 
Unaware 
(at baseline) 
Type 1 Type 2 
Type 3 Type 4 
Aware             
(at baseline) 
- - 
 
Benefits will vary across households, largely influenced by baseline awareness of the 
insurance program and the extent to which the intervention increased insurance demand.  In 
addition to the household describe above (a Type 3 household), there are three other household 
types that would be targeted by the information campaign, as depicted in Figure 4.2.  For all 
household types, it is assumed that Ilimit  is greater than Aid, but less than Iwealth.  Type 1 and 2 
households are assumed to have a relatively high demand for coverage, with the choke price 
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exceeding the actuarially fair premium rate (c=p).  Type 1 would purchase coverage equal to Ilimit 
at the actuarially fair premium, while Type 2 would purchase Ilimit at subsidized premiums.  The 
total benefit of aid to Type 1 and 2 households is equal to the area under the demand curve (A1+ 
B1 + E1).  The portion of the benefit above the actuarially fair price of coverage (c=p) is 
represented by A1, while B1 + E1represents the amount of aid transferred from taxpayers to 
flood-affected households.  Therefore, the net social benefit of aid is equal to A1, which is the 
difference between household benefits (A1+ B1 + E1) and taxpayer cost (B1 + E1).  
 The net benefit of subsidized insurance to households is equivalent to the annual 
expected claim, less the annual premium and loss of flood aid (compared to the status quo). Prior 
to the information campaign, the net benefit of insurance for Type 1 and 2 households (A2 + B2 + 
C1) exceeds that of aid (E1).  Part of the net benefit of insurance is attributable to consumer 
surplus above the actuarially fair price (area A2), which implies that some households value 
insurance beyond the amount of expected annual claims.
38
  Households also benefit from 
subsidized premium payments (B2 + C1), which represent a transfer payment from taxpayers to 
flood-affected households.  Yet, Type 1 and 2 households are not insured at baseline due to lack 
of awareness of the insurance program and/or incomplete information regarding flood aid and 
insurance.  It should also be noted that Type 1 households would have bought the same amount 
of insurance coverage without the subsidy.  The net social benefit of aid is equal to the benefit 
that households receive (A2 + B2 + C1), less the cost of subsidized premiums that taxpayers bear 
(B2 + C1).  
                                                          
38
These additional benefits of insurance include consumption smoothing and risk reduction and emotional goals 
(Krantz and Kunreuther, 2007).   
 
 
Figure 4.2 Household insurance demand (Post-Information Campaign), by household type 
 
Type 1       Type 2       
 
 
 Type 4 
   
1
5
5
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 In contrast, Type 3 and 4 households have relatively low demand and are not willing to 
pay the subsidized insurance premium.  The choke prices for households of Type 3 and 4 are 
equal to the actuarially fair rate and subsidized rate, respectively.  For these households, the net 
benefit of insurance at baseline (B2) is less than that of aid (E1).  Therefore, had Type 3 and 4 
households known about insurance, they would not have purchased it prior to the information 
campaign. 
 The information campaign is expected to cause demand curves to be generated for 
households that are unaware of insurance.  Total benefits of purchasing insurance are 
summarized in Table 4.2 for each household type.  Type 1 households will have a benefit of A2 + 
B2 + E2 – E1, while Type 2 households have a benefit equal to A2 + B2 + C1+ E2 + E3 – E1. For 
households of Types 3 and 4, the demand curve will shift.  After the information campaign, the 
benefit of a Type 3 purchasing insurance will be ΔA2 + B2 +ΔB2 + C1+ E2 + E3 - E1.  For a 
household of Type 4, the shift in demand is not large enough for insurance to be preferred over 
flood aid. Benefits will vary across households, largely influenced by baseline awareness of the 
insurance program and the extent to which the intervention increased insurance demand.   
 Benefits can be aggregated across all households.  An aggregate benefit measure is equal 
to the change in area of consumer surplus between the values of Aid and Ilimit (Figure 4.3).  This 
magnitude of this area is influenced by the extent to which households with high demand lack 
information about insurance at baseline.    
 
 
Table 4.2 Summary of Demand for Insurance Coverage, by household type 
 
 
  Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
      
Pre-
intervention Post-intervention 
Pre-
intervention 
Post-
intervention 
Household demand     
 
      
Choke price > c=p > c=p c=p > c=p s < c=p 
WTP for Ilimit c=p s - s - - 
 
    
 
      
Total Benefit     
 
      
     Aid A1 + B1 + E1 A1 + B1 + E1 B1 + E1 B1 + E1 + ΔB1 +ΔA1  B1 + E1 E1 +ΔE1 + ΔB1 
     Insurance 
A2 + B2 + E2 - 
E1 
A2 + B2 + E2 + 
C1 + E3 - E1 
- 
ΔA2 + B2 +ΔB2 + C1+ 
E2  + E3 - E1 
- - 
Consumer Surplus 
(above actuarially fair)     
 
      
     Aid A1 A1 - - - - 
     Insurance A2 A2 - - - - 
Deadweight Loss      
 
      
     Aid - - D D D D 
     Insurance - D - D - D 
 
 
 
  
1
5
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Figure 4.3 Market Demand for insurance, after information campaign 
 
 
Panel A. Assumption: lack of insurance awareness at baseline  Panel B. Assumption: full information regarding insurance at baseline 
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4.3.2 Societal Perspective 
 Other key stakeholders include insurance providers and taxpayers. Insurers are assumed 
to not earn economic rents.  Their costs include claims paid and administrative costs, and normal 
returns to capital at risk, all of which are assumed to be covered by premium payments and/or 
government subsidies.  For insurance providers, the net benefit of an information campaign will 
be equal to premium payments, both those paid by households (𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑦) and subsidized by 
government (𝑚𝑠𝑢𝑏), less claims paid (𝐼), multiplied by the number of new policyholders (n): 
  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠 = [(𝑚𝑠𝑢𝑏 + 𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑦) − 𝐼] ∙ 𝑛  =   0              (4.2) 
Taxpayers bear costs under both an ex post aid and flood insurance program.  Aid represents a 
transfer payment between taxpayers and households.  Households receive the annual expected 
flood aid payment, while taxpayers incur the cost of the transfer plus any associated 
administrative costs.  Flood aid that is displaced due to increased insurance uptake is a gain for 
the taxpayer, but a loss for insured households.  Under an information campaign to increase 
insurance uptake, taxpayers bear the cost of the campaign (info) in addition to the portion of 
insurance payments that are subsidized (𝑚𝑠𝑢𝑏) and administration costs of insurance (𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐼).  
Yet, taxpayers will have reduced costs of an ex post aid (aid) and associated administrative costs 
(𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑑).   Taxpayer burden increases with campaign costs and size of subsidizes for 
insurance payments.  The net benefit of the campaign for taxpayers, relative to the status quo, is 
equal to: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠 = [[∆𝐴𝑖𝑑 + ∆𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐼 − 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 − 𝑚𝑠𝑢𝑏] ∙ 𝑛]   − 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜    (4.3) 
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From the perspective of households, the net benefit of the campaign, relative to the status quo, is 
equal to the change in consumer surplus above the actuarially fair premium (CSact), plus claims, 
and less insurance premiums paid (𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑦)  and change in ex post aid (aid).  The values of CSact 
are aggregated across all households of type i.  When applying this method to the BCA in this 
study, assumptions are made regarding the number of households categorized as each type.
39
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠 = ∑ [∆𝐶𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖]𝑖 + [𝐼 − 𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑦 − ∆𝐴𝑖𝑑 ] ∙ 𝑛          (4.4) 
In addition, deadweight loss is generated by both the flood aid program and subsidized 
insurance.  Deadweight loss associated with flood aid (𝐷𝑊𝐿𝑎𝑖𝑑) and insurance (𝐷𝑊𝐿𝐼) is equal 
to the area between the actuarially fair rate and household demand curve.  From an economic 
perspective, this deadweight loss exists because households of Type 3 and 4 value flood 
compensation less than the cost borne by taxpayers.  This holds both for compensation in the 
form of aid and insurance.  Deadweight loss will increase with the amount of the subsidy and 
will decrease with demand for coverage.  
 Net benefits to society are equal to aggregate benefits, less costs across all stakeholders.   
Taxpayers bear the cost of the information campaign, subsidized premium payments, and 
administrative costs, but incur lower flood aid payments for insured households.  Insured 
households benefit from subsidized premiums, limited flood aid, and consumer surplus, but must 
pay the subsidized portion of insurance premiums.  The net social benefit of the information 
campaign is equal to the households’ change in consumer surplus above the actuarially fair 
premium relative to the status quo of ex post flood compensation, less the cost of the information 
campaign, administrative cost of insurance, and deadweight loss.   
                                                          
39
As discussed in the Methods section, the base case assumes the following distribution of household types: 44% 
Type 1, 44% Type 2, and 11% Type 3, based on the characteristics of new policyholders in Chapter 3. 
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𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦 = ∑ [∆𝐶𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖 ∙ 𝑛𝑖]𝑖 + [∆𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑑 − ∆𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐼 − 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 ∓ ∆𝐷𝑊𝐿𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝐷𝑊𝐿𝐼] ∙ 𝑛  
    (4.5) 
Social welfare implications of the information campaign will differ considerably based on ex 
ante awareness of insurance.  As the proportion of households that are Type 1 and 2 increases 
(i.e. those that have high demand but incomplete information), social benefits of the intervention 
are depicted in Figure 4.3, panel A.  The shift in demand due to the campaign results in an 
increase in consumer surplus, both attributable to households willing to pay more than actuarially 
fair rates and those who only find insurance attractive at subsidized premiums.  The total benefit 
of the information campaign to households is equal to the area of ∆A +∆B+∆C.  Deadweight loss 
(∆D) is associated with these new policyholders since the cost to government of subsidizing 
insurance (∆B+∆C+∆D) is greater than the value that policyholders derive from the subsidy 
(∆B+∆C).  Deadweight loss can be created by both aid and insurance, as depicted in Figures 4.1 
and 4.2.  The sign of the net social benefit of the campaign (compared to status quo) is 
indeterminate and depends on the relative magnitude of the consumer surplus above the 
actuarially fair premium and deadweight loss.   
 However, if households are fully aware of insurance at baseline, and thus make an 
informed decision not to purchase, net benefits of a campaign that encourages new policy 
purchases are those represented in Figure 4.3, panel B.  In this case, households of Types 1 and 2 
would have purchased insurance prior to the intervention.  Therefore, only Type 3 and 4 
households would be targeted by the information campaign.  If no households are convinced that 
the value of insurance exceeds the actuarially fair price, then net benefits are equal to ∆C.  These 
benefits accrue to insurance policyholders.  However, from the perspective of society, there are 
no social benefits associated with this consumer surplus since benefits are associated with 
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subsidized premiums and the cost of subsidies must be incurred by taxpayers.  In fact, net social 
benefits would be negative given the cost of the information campaign and deadweight loss of 
subsidized premiums. 
4.3.3 Observations from Conceptual Framework 
Several important observations can be drawn from the conceptual framework.  First, the 
distribution of subsidies is largely skewed towards higher income households, under either an ex 
post aid or flood insurance program.  Aid programs can especially benefit higher income 
households when compensation is based on the magnitude of the property damages, but less so 
when fixed payments are distributed to all households.  Under a subsidized insurance program, 
subsidies received increase with coverage level.  Since higher income households are both more 
likely to purchase insurance and to purchase higher coverage levels, subsidies will largely accrue 
to these households. 
Second, as flood aid (Aid) approaches maximum insurance coverage (Ilimit), the more 
attractive the aid program will be to households.  From the taxpayer perspective, the relative 
attractiveness of aid and insurance is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of the subsidy 
for insurance payments, and the cost of the information campaign. 
Third, the closer in magnitude wealth at risk (Iwealth) and Ilimit become, the less attractive 
insurance is relative to aid.  This implies that low-income households with wealth at risk below 
Ilimit will perceive flood aid to be more attractive than wealthier households.  Aid will cover a 
relatively large portion of wealth at risk for these low-income households.   
Fourth, net social benefits of the information campaign depend heavily on household 
demand for insurance and baseline awareness of insurance.  The largest benefits are associated 
with households with high demand for insurance that are unaware of the program.  As baseline 
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awareness increases, net social benefits decrease.  Furthermore, as the demand curve becomes 
more convex, the less attractive insurance will be (since the area of A2 + B2 + C1 will decrease).  
As mentioned previously, a limitation of the analysis is that no data exists for household demand 
for subsidized flood insurance in Bangkok.  Therefore, the study makes illustrative calculations 
based on assumed demand curves for a typology of households.    
4.4  Fieldwork, Data, and Methods 
4.4.1 Fieldwork and Data 
 Fieldwork for the two sources of data used in this BCA was conducted in Greater 
Bangkok Metropolitan area, within some of the communities most affected by the 2011 flood.  
Communities included in both studies were a mix of low-income and middle-income areas 
(Chapter 3; Nabangchang et al. 2015).  Data from the field experiment described in Chapter 3 are 
used to specify several BCA parameters including the level of flood compensation and treatment 
effect of the information campaign.  Responses are used from 397 participants in the field 
experiment.  Households included in the study owned their home, were not insured against 
flooding, and were affected by the 2011 flood.  The field experiment included two rounds of 
household surveys.  A second data source, Chapter 1), is used for insurable flood loss estimates 
that are an input for estimating household insurance demand, as described in Section 4.4.3, 
below.  The survey of 469 households involved two rounds of in-person questionnaires that 
inquired about economic costs incurred during the 2011 flood and socioeconomic status. 
4.4.2 Methods 
 The focus of this BCA study is to present illustrative calculations that demonstrate how  
welfare implications could be estimated for an information campaign to increase subsidized 
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insurance uptake in Bangkok.  The assessment analyzes how net social benefits differ between 
the status quo (flood aid) and the information campaign.  A hypothetical information campaign is 
assumed to target a population of 500,000 households that reside in areas inundated by the 2011 
Thailand flood.  The treatment effect of the campaign is assumed to be 4% for all household 
types (Types 1 to 3), based on the findings of Chapter 3.  Net benefits to society of each 
alternative are equal to aggregate benefits, less costs across all stakeholders.   Taxpayers bear the 
cost of the information campaign, subsidized premiums, and administrative costs, but incur 
lower flood aid payments for insured households.  Insured households benefit from subsidized 
insurance payments, limited flood aid, and consumer surplus, but must pay the subsidized 
insurance premiums.  The net social benefit to society is equal to the households’ change in the 
portion of consumer surplus above the actuarially fair premium, less the cost of the information 
campaign, administrative cost of flood aid and insurance, and deadweight loss.  All benefit and 
cost categories are described in Section 4.4.3. 
 While the information campaign occurs only once, costs and benefits will accrue to 
stakeholders over a period of several years.  The BCA assumes that annual costs and benefits of 
a one-time information treatment in year 1 unfolds over a ten-year period.
40
  Streams of costs and 
benefits across this period are estimated in net present value (NPV) terms, using a social discount 
rate of 4% (in the base case). The persistence of the treatment effect is unknown since no prior 
information experiments have been conducted for insurance and the outcomes of the first 
experimental study were measured six months after treatment (Chapter 3).  Base case 
assumptions regarding the durability of the treatment effect are developed based on Michel-
Kerjan et al. (2012).  The base case assumes a logarithmic decline in insurance uptake among 
                                                          
40
Ten years in the median length of policy tenure in the base case, based on Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012).  It is also 
the length of time found by Gallagher (2014) for post-disaster increase in insurance uptake to decline to baseline 
levels. 
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new policyholders.  Therefore, 4% of targeted households are expected to purchase insurance 
immediately after the information campaign, but this number of policyholders in subsequent 
years declines due to non-renewal of policies.  New policies are assumed to be purchased only 
immediately after the campaign.  The rate of decline reported in Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012) is 
adjusted for the median length of residency reported by Bangkok households.
41
  This trajectory 
implies that about half of policies will still be in-force nine years after the intervention. 
4.4.3 Definitions and Estimation of Cost and Benefit Categories 
 This section describes definitions and estimation techniques for cost and benefit 
categories included in the analysis.  Many categories represent transfer payments, which are 
perceived as costs to some stakeholders, but benefits to others.  Table 4.3 summarizes parameter 
values included in the BCA for base, downside, and upside assumptions.  In the BCA, each 
category, with the exception of information campaign cost, is estimated for three types of 
households (Types 1-3) and then multiplied by the number of new policyholders assumed to be 
of a given household type.  
Household Insurance Demand  
 Limitations of estimating insurance demand in Bangkok are acknowledged.  Little 
information is available regarding insurance demand in Thailand.  Demand cannot be 
constructed using observed purchases due to the presence of (i) a fixed premium rate and 
therefore no price variation across households and (ii) a purchase mandate for households with 
mortgages.   
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Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012) analyzes length of flood insurance tenure for all new policies issued in the U.S. from 
2001- 2009.   Findings suggest that much of the decrease in uptake of new policies can be explained by relocation.  
Importantly, the average annual rate of relocation is much greater in the U.S. (16%) than among Bangkok 
households that participated in the information field experiment (3.5%).  
 
 
Table 4.3 Key parameters for Benefit Cost Analysis 
    
Value estimates  
(US$ per insured household) 
Cost category Description Base case Downside Upside 
Aid Ex post flood compensation provided by national government 800 320 3200 
     Aid (all households) Portion of aid automatically distributed to all households in 
designated disaster-affected areas 
160 320 0 
     Aid (only uninsured households) Portion of aid distributed via application to uninsured 
households 
640 0 3200 
Adminaid  Administrative cost associated with distribution of flood aid 177 32 800 
I Annual expected claims for an NCIF insurance policy with 
US$ 3200 in coverage 
25 25 25 
mpay Portion of annual insurance premium, paid by households 16 16 16 
msub 
Portion of annual insurance premium, subsidized by 
government 
9 9 9 
AdminI  Administrative cost associated with insurance marketing, 
communication with policyholders, and claim adjustment 
2 2 1 
Info Cost of information campaign 1.3 1.9 0.7 
      
    Parameter Value  
Other parameters Description Base case Downside Upside 
Admin cost: insurance  Administrative cost of insurance (% of premium) 12% 15% 8% 
Admin cost: flood aid  
Administrative cost of flood aid (% of annual expected 
compensation) 22% 12% 27% 
Treatment effect (%) 
Increase in insurance uptake attributable to the information 
campaign  4.3% 2.3% 11% 
Flood probability Probability of a flood similar in magnitude as the 2011 event 0.008 0.010 0.007 
 
1
6
6
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  With limited information, demand is estimated for households of Type 1-3 (i.e. 
households that are most likely to purchase insurance after receiving information from the 
campaign).  In Chapter 3, I find that all new policyholders selected the maximum coverage level 
(US$ 3,200).  This suggests that insurance is most attractive for those with insurable flood losses 
equal to or greater than Ilimit.
42
  Furthermore, insurable losses (i.e. cost of repair and replacement 
for house, contents, and vehicles) during the 2011 Bangkok flood were relatively low.  Median 
insurable losses were US$ 1,443 and about one-third of households had losses below the median 
level of government flood aid (US$ 800) (Nabangchang et al., 2015).  Households with insurable 
losses nearly equal to the value of flood aid would be expected to forgo insurance.  Only 28% of 
households had insurable losses greater than Ilimit.   
 The household demand curves used for the BCA are based on two assumptions.  First, 
households are expected to insure all losses if the premium is zero.  Among households likely to 
purchase insurance (i.e. those with insurable losses greater than Ilimit), median insurable losses 
during the 2011 Bangkok flood were US$ 6,538 (THB 204,300).  For all household types, it is 
assumed that at a premium of zero, households demand US$ 6,538 in insurance coverage.  
Second, the demand response function for flood insurance in Bangkok is assumed to be linear. 
Demand is estimated for three types of representative households that are likely to purchase 
insurance after the information campaign (Types 1-3).  
 For each of these household types, the assumed linear demand function connects the 
horizontal intercept (i.e. coverage level selected at a premium of zero) and demand at the 
actuarially fair or subsidized premium rate (Table 4.4).  Type 1 households are assumed to be 
willing to pay the actuarially fair rate (c=p) for US$ 3,200 in coverage, while Type 2 are 
                                                          
42
Insurable losses are out-of-pocket expenses to repair and replace house structure, contents, and vehicles.  These 
losses do not include foregone income or value of household time devoted to repair, recovery, or greater travel time. 
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assumed to be willing to pay the subsidized rate.  Meanwhile, Type 3 households are willing to 
pay the subsidized rate only after the information campaign.  Table 4.4 also presents the implied 
elasticity values for each household type at the actuarially fair and subsidized premium rates.  
Demand is more elastic at subsidized premiums compared to actuarially fair, which follows the 
findings of Landry and Jahan-Parvar (2011).   
 The base case assumes the following distribution of household types: 44% Type 1, 44% 
Type 2, and 11% Type 3, based on the characteristics of new policyholders in Chapter 3.
43
  In 
sensitivity analysis, the upside assumption is that all new policyholders are Type 1, while the 
downside case assumes new policyholders are Type 3.  In the upside case, the information 
campaign serves to raise awareness of the NCIF program among households with relatively high 
demand for insurance.  In contrast, the downside case assumes that households have full 
information prior to the information campaign.  Therefore, the households for whom insurance is 
a rational purchase will be insured at baseline (Types 1 and 2).
44
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This base case assumption is based on the nine households that purchase insurance after the information campaign 
in Chapter 3.  At baseline, four households are willing to pay the actuarially fair rate or greater for US$ 3,200 in 
coverage.  These four households are considered to be Type 1 since they stated that the information campaign made 
them aware of flood insurance and/or program details.  In addition, four households are willing to pay the subsidized 
rate and were not aware of flood insurance and/or program details at baseline (Type 2).  One household is not 
willing to pay the subsidized rate at baseline, but purchases insurance after the information campaign (Type 3). 
 
44
There is some evidence against this case.  Insurance appears to be a rational purchase for nearly one-third of 
households included in Nabangchang et al. (2015).  Yet, only about 11% of these households (14 out of the 133 
households with losses greater than US$ 3,200) are insured. 
 
 
Table 4.4 Estimated Household-level Coverage Demand, by household type 
 
  Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Weighted 
Avg. 
 
Demand for Ilimit WTP c=p WTP subsidized rate 
Choke price c=p (at baseline); WTP subsidized 
rate (post-intervention) 
Across all 
household 
types 
       Pre-intervention Post-intervention   
 Household demand     
  
  
 
Demand function 
 I= -13,559,000∙c + 
204,300 
 I= -20,860,000∙c + 
204,300 
I= -26,559,000∙c + 
204,302 
I= -26,559,000∙c 
+ 232,795   
 Elasticity at actuarially fair price 
(coverage in terms of % of losses) -1.0 -3.7 - -7.2   
 Elasticity at subsidized price 
(coverage in terms of % of losses) -0.5 -1.0 -1.9 -1.3   
 Choke price (rate) 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.009   
      Choke price (US$) 48.2 31.3 24.6 28.0   
 Consumer Surplus  
(above actuarially fair) 
    
  
 
     Aiduninsured 4.1 1.2 0.0 0.4 2.4 
†
 
     Aidinsured 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 
*
 
     Insurance 8.9 2.5 0 1.3 5.2 
*
 
Deadweight Loss  
    
  
 
     Aiduninsured 0 0 0.38 0 0.0 
†
 
     Aidinsured 0 0 0.02 0 0.0 
*
 
     Insurance 0.0 2.4 5.6 3.1 1.4 
*
 
 
Note:  
†
 Represents average value across three types of households for status quo flood aid program (pre-intervention).   
*
 Represents average value across three types of households for information campaign (post-intervention). 
1
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Consumer surplus and Deadweight loss 
 The principal economic benefit that insurance provides is consumer surplus above the 
actuarially fair premium, as discussed in Section 4.3.  Therefore, the ‘consumer surplus’ reported 
in the BCA results refers to the benefits that accrue to policyholders who are willing to pay more 
than the actuarially fair rate.  Consumer surplus is also incurred due to subsidized premiums.  
However, this surplus is already accounted for in the claims that households receive and is equal 
to total claims, less the premium payment.   
 The consumer surplus of flood aid and insurance is equal to the area between the 
household demand curve and actuarially fair rate.
45
  The base case assumption is that insured 
households receive a small, automatic cash transfer (aidinsured=US$ 160), while uninsured 
households also receive additional aid available through an application in addition to the 
automatic transfer (aiduninsured=US$ 800).  In the base case, the consumer surplus for an average 
new policyholder is the weighted average total consumer surplus for the three types of 
households.  In the status quo scenario, the weighted average consumer surplus (above the 
actuarially fair price) of flood aid is US$ 2.4 each year.
46
  The weighted average consumer 
surplus (above the actuarially fair premium) of insurance claims for new policyholders in the 
base case is US$ 5.2 each year.  Consumer surplus of insurance exceeds deadweight loss for all 
household types except Type 3 (as shown in Table 4.4).  Therefore, as the proportion of Type 3 
households increases, the information campaign will have a lower net social benefit. 
                                                          
45
The consumer surplus associated with the two levels of aid is estimated as  ∫ 𝐼(𝑐)𝑑𝑐 − ∫ 𝑐𝑝
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
0
 =
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
0
 1
2
(𝑐𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑘𝑒−𝑐𝑝)∙ 𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖 , where i=insured, uninsured.  The term cp is the actuarially fair rate of insurance, while I is the 
household demand curve for flood compensation.  Similarly, the consumer surplus associated with an insurance 
purchase is estimated as  ∫ 𝐼(𝑐)𝑑𝑐 
𝐼𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑
− ∫ 𝑐𝑝
𝐼𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑
= [1
2
(𝑐𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑘𝑒−𝑐𝑝)∙𝐼𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡] − [
1
2
(𝑐𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑘𝑒−𝑐𝑝)∙𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑]. 
 
46
In order to report average consumer surplus estimates, the weighted average must be taken across all three 
household types included in the estimation of benefits.  The weights are based on the proportion of households 
classified as each type.  The base case assumes the following distribution of household types: 44% Type 1, 44% 
Type 2, and 11% Type 3.  
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 Deadweight loss associated with flood aid is equal to the area between the actuarially fair 
rate and household demand curve, and between compensation values of zero and the flood aid 
level.  The deadweight loss of insurance is equal to the area between the actuarially fair rate and 
household insurance demand curve, and between compensation values of the insurance coverage 
level and flood aid received by uninsured households.
47
  In the base case, the deadweight loss for 
an average new policyholder is the weighted average deadweight loss for the three types of 
households.  Deadweight loss will increase with the amount of the subsidy.  The weighted 
average deadweight loss of insurance claims for new policyholders in the base case is US$ 1.4 
per year, which is entirely attributable to insurance uptake.  In the status quo scenario, the 
weighted average consumer surplus of flood aid (above the actuarially fair premium) is US$ 
0.04.   
Flood aid and associated administrative cost 
 Aid represents a transfer payment between taxpayers and households.  In Thailand, 
insured households must forgo most flood aid.
48
  Both of these options provide limited 
compensation for flood losses.  Flood aid that is displaced due to increased insurance uptake is a 
gain for the taxpayer, but a loss for insured households.
 49
  The status quo scenario assumes that 
uninsured households receive US$ 800 in flood aid after a flood occurs.  Under the information 
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The deadweight loss associated with the two levels of aid is estimated as  ∫ 𝑐𝑝
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
0
− ∫ 𝐼(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖
0
, where i=insured, 
uninsured.  The term cp is the actuarially fair rate of insurance, while I is the household demand curve for flood 
compensation.  Similarly, the deadweight loss associated with an insurance purchase is estimated as 
∫ 𝑐𝑝
𝐼𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑
− ∫ 𝐼(𝑐)𝑑𝑐 
𝐼𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑
. 
 
48
All Thai households are entitled to receive flood aid that is automatically dispersed after a disastrous event.  After 
the 2011 flood, all registered households received US$ 160 immediately after the flood.  Yet, additional aid that 
might become available via an application would not be available to insured households (up to US$ 960 in 2011).  
Therefore, flood insurance displaces a large amount of aid. 
 
49
Flood aid and insurance claims are only paid if a flood event occurs.  Therefore, values of flood aid and claims are 
converted to annual expected values by multiplying by the annual probability of a flood similar in magnitude to the 
2011 event (p=0.008).   
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campaign, it is assumed that insured households receive only the small, automatic cash transfer 
distributed immediately after a disaster (US$ 160), in the base case.
50
  Insured households will 
not be eligible for additional aid that is available via application (up to US $960).  
Administrative costs of distributing flood aid are assumed to be about 20% of disbursed aid 
(DDPM, 2013; Threemingmid, 2015).  Sensitivity analysis tests how net social benefit estimates 
change under downside and upside assumptions regarding flood aid.  The downside case 
assumes that an automatic transfer of US$ 320 is available to all households, while the upside 
case assumes aid of US$ 3,200 (equal to insurance coverage) is only available via application to 
uninsured households.   
Insurance claims, premium payments, and administrative costs 
 The net benefit of subsidized insurance to households is equivalent to the annual 
expected claim, less the annual premium and loss of flood aid (compared to the status quo). 
Insurers are assumed not earn economic rents.  Insurer revenues from policyholders plus 
subsidies received from government are equal to the claims paid and administrative costs. The 
value of premium payments is estimated as the premium rate multiplied by the coverage level.  It 
is assumed that all new policyholders select the highest coverage level (Ilimit) of US$ 3,200 and 
pay an annual premium of US$ 16. The annual expected claim (US$ 25) is greater than the 
premium paid by households (US$ 16).
51
  The difference between these two values (US$ 9) is 
the subsidized portion of the insurance premium which is paid by government (taxpayers).  In 
addition, taxpayers pay the administrative costs of insurance.  Administrative costs are assumed 
                                                          
50
All registered households in Thailand are eligible for automatic flood aid (Threemingmid, 2015).  However, 
insured households are not able to apply for additional aid for documented repair expenses. 
 
51
Regardless of flood risk level, households in Thailand pay a fixed premium rate of 0.5%.  The return period of a 
flood similar to the 2011 event is assumed to be 130 years, which implies p=0.008 (DHI, 2012).  It is assumed that if 
a flood similar to the 2011 event occurs, the households that are targeted for the information campaign will be 
flooded.  The probability that high-risk households are flooded (0.8%) exceeds the premium rate (0.5%). 
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to be 12% of the premium, with a range from 8 to 15%, based on estimates from the National 
Catastrophe Insurance Fund (Threemingmid, 2015). The cost of administering insurance policies 
includes marketing, communicating with potential policyholders to clarify contract terms, and 
claim adjustment.     
Cost of information campaign  
 The cost of the information campaign includes cost of information materials and delivery 
to households.  Costs are estimated for an information campaign that targets 500,000 uninsured 
households in the Greater Bangkok area.  Insured households are not targeted and can be 
identified from NCIF purchase records.  Delivering two rounds of information requires labor, 
transportation, printed materials, and a short video.  Cost components are summarized in Table 
4.5.  Labor to deliver the first-round of information is expected to be compensated at US$13 per 
day.  It is expected that meeting with households and conveying the information will take an 
average of 25 minutes.  Labor to drop-off the second-round information leaflet is compensated at 
the minimum daily wage rate of US$10. Transportation costs are estimated to be less than US$ 2 
per day for each enumerator.  Administrative costs are incurred in the form of field supervisors 
and a campaign manager.
52
  Under these assumptions, the total cost per targeted household is 
about US$ 1.30, while the cost per new policyholder is US$ 30.  Costs of the information 
campaign are assumed to range from nearly US$ 1 to US$ 2 per targeted household.
53
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Each field supervisor oversees a team of 12 enumerators and daily compensation is four times the minimum daily 
wage rate.  The campaign manager oversees the field supervisors and is compensated US$ 63 per day. Campaign 
manager compensation is much greater than median civil servant wages, US$36 (Nabangchang et al., 2015). 
 
53
Under downside assumptions, the campaign cost is US$ 1.91 per targeted household.  This assumes a video cost of 
US$500, daily wage rate of US$ 16, and first-round transport cost of US$ 2.6 per day.  Field supervisors oversee 15 
enumerators and are compensated at three times the minimum daily wage rate.  The campaign manager is 
compensated at US$ 32 per day.   The upside assumptions include zero cost for the video (by using the pre-existing 
video from the field experiment), daily wage rate of nearly US$ 10, and first-round transport cost of US$ 1 per day. 
Field supervisors are assumed to oversee ten enumerators and administrators are compensated at base case rates.  
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Table 4.5 Costs of Information Campaign 
 
 
Base Case Downside Upside 
n= 500,000 targeted households Total Cost 
(US$) 
Per targeted 
household 
Total Cost 
(US$) 
Total Cost 
(US$) 
First round (practical information)     
  Information materials     
      Development of short video 300 - 500 0 
    Informational brochure 32,000 0.06 32,000 32,000 
Delivery of information     
      Labor 333,333 0.67 500,000 200,000 
    Transport 50,000 0.10 80,000 30,000 
Second round (social information)     
  Printed material: leaflet 8,000 0.02 8,000 8,000 
Delivery of information     
      Labor 50,000 0.10 80,000 30,000 
    Transport 8,333 0.02 16,667 5,000 
Administrative cost 155,556 0.31 236,444 63,037 
Cost per targeted household 1.28  1.91  0.74  
Cost per newly insured household 30 82 17 
 
Note: Exchange rate US$ 1 = THB 31.25, October 2013 
 
4.5  Results  
4.5.1 Base Case Results 
 Streams of costs and benefits over the study period are estimated in net present value 
terms and summarized in Table 4.6.  Results indicate that the information campaign does not 
deliver net social benefits relative to the status quo flood aid program, under base case 
assumptions.  The expected net benefit to society of the status quo flood aid program is US$ 
49,336 (US$ 2.3 per household), assuming a 4% discount rate.
54
  In contrast, the information 
campaign results in a net cost to society of US$ 347,215 total, or about US$ 16 per household.  
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This is the net cost of providing aid at baseline to the 23,806 households that are expected to purchase insurance 
after the information campaign. 
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Under base case assumptions, the status quo flood aid program appears to be preferable to the 
information campaign, both from the perspective of society and taxpayers.   
 The status quo flood aid program is associated with one social benefit category 
(consumer surplus above the actuarially fair premium) and one social cost (administrative cost of 
flood aid).  Taxpayers bear the cost of flood aid payments and associated administrative cost.  
Meanwhile, households receive benefits of the flood aid and associated consumer surplus.  
Under the information campaign, consumer surplus remains the only social benefit and amounts 
to US$ 776,232.  The largest social cost is the implementation of the information campaign, 
which has an expected net present value of US$ 613,002.  This cost is borne in the first year and 
benefits are generated into the future.  Since the bulk of costs are borne early on, NPV estimates 
slightly change with the discount rate assumption.  As the discount rate increases, greater weight 
is given to costs in early years and therefore the NPV estimate decreases.  Other social costs 
include the administrative cost of new insurance policies (US$ 230,027) and administrative cost 
of flood aid (US$ 101,147).  In addition, deadweight loss is associated with new insurance 
policies since some households are only willing to purchase insurance at subsidized premiums 
and therefore do not value insurance more than the actuarially fair premium. 
 Taxpayers are also worse off under the information campaign since they incur greater 
costs (US$ 2.5 million) than in the status quo scenario (US$ 1.3 million).  Greater costs are 
largely due to expenses associated with the information campaign and subsidizing household 
insurance premiums.  The annual premium subsidy (US$ 8.6 per new policyholder) is greater 
than the median level of flood aid in the status quo scenario (US$ 6.2).  This is due to the large 
premium subsidy and greater coverage offered under the insurance program.  If the premium 
subsidy and flood aid for policyholders were eliminated, taxpayers would prefer the information 
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campaign (assuming that increased insurance uptake remained the same).  New policyholders 
benefit from the information campaign due to the greater coverage levels offered by insurance, 
compared to flood aid.  The benefit to new policyholders is much greater under the information 
campaign (US$ 2.3 million total, or US$ 107 per new policyholder) compared to the status quo 
(US$ 1.4 million total, US$ 64 per new policyholder). 
 
 
Table 4.6 Benefit-Cost Results: Base Case 
  
Status Quo: 
Net Benefit 
NPV 2% 
(US$) 
NPV 4% 
(US$) 
NPV 6% 
(US$) 
Information 
Campaign:  
Net Benefit 
NPV 2% 
(US$) 
NPV 4% 
(US$) 
NPV 6% 
(US$) 
Newly insured 
households 
Aid 1,188,465 1,073,134 973,796 Aid 514,265 457,676 409,326 
CSact 325,369 293,794 266,598 CSact 853,853 776,232 709,069 
        I 3,370,998 3,077,287 2,822,351 
        mpay -2,191,149 -2,000,237 -1,834,528 
 
Subtotal 1,513,834 1,366,928 1,240,394 Subtotal 2,547,967 2,310,959 2,106,218 
Insurance Providers 
        msub + mpay 3,370,998 3,077,287 2,822,351 
        I -3,370,998 -3,077,287 -2,822,351 
 
        Subtotal 0 0 0 
Taxpayers Aid -1,188,465 -1,073,134 -973,796 Aid -514,265 -457,676 -409,326 
 
Adminaid  -262,651 -237,163 -215,209 Adminaid  -113,653 -101,147 -90,461 
 
        msub -1,179,849 -1,077,050 -987,823 
 
        AdminI  -251,982 -230,027 -210,971 
 
        Info -625,022 -613,002 -601,436 
 
                
 
Subtotal -1,451,116 -1,310,296 -1,189,005 Subtotal -2,684,771 -2,478,903 -2,300,017 
Total (Society) CSact 325,369 293,794 266,598 CSact 853,853 776,232 709,069 
  Adminaid  -262,651 -237,163 -215,209 Adminaid  -113,653 -101,147 -90,461 
          AdminI  -251,982 -230,027 -210,971 
          Info -625,022 -613,002 -601,436 
  DWLaid  -8,080 -7,295 -6,620 DWLaid  -2,350 -2,065 -1,823 
          DWLI  -194,119 -177,205 -162,525 
  Total  54,638 49,336 44,769 Total  -333,273 -347,215 -358,147 
 
Note: All costs and benefits represent annual expected values. Premiums and administrative costs are incurred each year.  Payouts of flood aid and insurance 
claims are only incurred after a flood event, and therefore these values are converted to annual expected values by multiplying by the annual probability of a 
flood similar in magnitude to the 2011 event (p=0.008).   
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Table 4.6. (Continued) 
  
Information Campaign:  
relative to status quo 
NPV 2% 
(US$) 
NPV 4% 
(US$) 
NPV 6% 
(US$) 
Newly insured 
households 
ΔAid  -674,200 -615,457 -564,470 
ΔCSact 528,484 482,438 442,470 
I 3,370,998 3,077,287 2,822,351 
mpay -2,191,149 -2,000,237 -1,834,528 
 
Subtotal 1,034,133 944,031 865,823 
Insurance Providers 
msub + mpay 3,370,998 3,077,287 2,822,351 
I -3,370,998 -3,077,287 -2,822,351 
 
Subtotal 0 0 0 
Taxpayers ΔAid  674,200 615,457 564,470 
 
ΔAdminaid  148,998 136,016 124,748 
 
msub -1,179,849 -1,077,050 -987,823 
 
AdminI  -251,982 -230,027 -210,971 
 
Info -625,022 -613,002 -601,436 
 
        
 
Subtotal -1,233,655 -1,168,606 -1,111,012 
Total (Society) ΔCSact 528,484 482,438 442,470 
  ΔAdminaid  148,998 136,016 124,748 
  AdminI  -251,982 -230,027 -210,971 
  Info -625,022 -613,002 -601,436 
  ΔDWLaid  5,729 5,230 4,797 
  DWLI  -194,119 -177,205 -162,525 
  Total  -387,912 -396,551 -402,917 
 
Note: All costs and benefits represent annual expected values. Premiums and administrative costs are incurred each year.  Payouts of flood aid and insurance 
claims are only incurred after a flood event, and therefore these values are converted to annual expected values by multiplying by the annual probability of a 
flood similar in magnitude to the 2011 event (p=0.008).   
1
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4.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Base case results suggest that the status quo policy is preferred to the information 
campaign from the perspective of a benefit-cost criterion.  Yet, under certain conditions, the 
information campaign might be preferred. Deterministic sensitivity analysis tests parameter 
assumptions by calculating NPV estimates under upside and downside values of all key 
parameters.  Parameter values are summarized in Table 4.3 for base, downside, and upside cases.  
Each key parameter is modeled as an uncertain value (e.g. the upside and downside values are 
used in lieu of the base case assumption), while holding all other parameters at base case values.  
Particular focus is placed on assumptions regarding insurance demand and insurance policy 
tenure.   
 From the perspective of society, net benefit estimates of the intervention are most 
sensitive to the insurance demand assumption, flood probability, cost of information campaign, 
and the treatment effect (Figure 4.4).  The only assumption that makes the information campaign 
preferable over the status quo is higher insurance demand.  It should be noted that the base case 
assumes relatively high demand since a linear demand function is assumed.  In contrast to 
demand, costs of the intervention greatly increase with higher flood probability.
55
  Cost of the 
information campaign is not low enough, even under the upside assumption (US$ 0.7 per target 
household) to make the information campaign less costly than the status quo policy.  Overall, 
results of the sensitivity analysis imply that the viability of an information campaign greatly 
depends on flood probability and insurance demand.   
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Both flood probability and the insurance demand assumption drive the magnitudes of consumer surplus and 
deadweight loss.  The actuarially fair rate of insurance is equal to the flood probability.  Therefore, as the probability 
of a flood increases, consumer surplus associated with insurance decreases while deadweight loss rises. 
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Figure 4.4 Sensitivity of NPV estimates to key parameter values (logarithmic decline in 
insurance uptake) 
 
 
 
Insurance demand 
Assumptions regarding insurance demand greatly influence net social benefit estimates 
through their influence on the relative magnitude of consumer surplus (above the actuarially fair 
premium) and deadweight loss.  In the upside case, all households that purchase insurance after 
the campaign are assumed to be Type 1.  These households are willing to purchase insurance at 
premiums above the actuarially fair rate, but lack information regarding the insurance program.  
Therefore, the information campaign serves to raise awareness and inform these households 
about conditions of the flood insurance policies.  Under this assumption, the information 
campaign is less costly than the status quo policy at discount rates of 2% and 4%.   
 In the downside case, all new policyholders are assumed to be of Type 3.  These 
households are persuaded by the information campaign that insurance is worth purchasing at 
subsidized rates.  They do not value insurance above the actuarially fair rate.  Therefore, there is 
no consumer surplus (above actuarially fair) under this downside assumption and the information 
campaign is much more costly that the status quo (Figure 4.4).  Given that many Thai households 
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were unaware of the insurance program prior to the intervention, the upside demand assumption 
appears to be more likely than the downside assumption.  
Duration of treatment effect 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted for the durability of the treatment effect.  The base case 
assumes that new policyholders will gradually fail to renew their policies.  If greater policy 
retention exists, then the information campaign will be less costly than in the base case.  The 
upside case assumes all new policyholders retain their insurance policies over the ten-year study 
period.  Findings from Kousky (2011) support this assumption.
56
  The cost of the intervention 
assuming constant uptake (US$ 261,736) is about 20% less than the base case (US$ 347,215).  
Coupled with optimistic assumptions of other key parameters, the information campaign can 
become preferred to the status quo (Figure 4.5).   
 The downside case assumes that new policies attributable to the information campaign 
will follow a linear decline such that, by the end of the study period, all new policyholders have 
allowed their insurance to lapse.  This is based on observations from Gallagher (2014), which 
examines how insurance uptake in the U.S. responds to a flood event.
57
  Under this pessimistic 
assumption, flood aid is the only parameter that can allow the information campaign to be less 
costly than the status quo (Figure 4.6).  
 
                                                          
56
Kousky (2011) evaluates insurance tenure using all policies active in St. Louis County, Missouri from 2000-2006.  
The study finds that the majority of lapsed insurance policies can be explained by the annual relocation rate of 14%.  
Kousky (2011) provides evidence that insurance tenure in Bangkok might be expected to be relatively stable, given 
long median residency periods among Bangkok households (20 years) compared to U.S. households (5 to 6 years) 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2015).  Kousky (2011) might offer advantages over Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012) since it 
includes all policies-in-force, not only the small portion of policies that are newly written. 
   
57
Gallagher (2014) finds that insurance uptake rapidly increase during the year after a flood and then steadily 
decreases to baseline after nine years. The downside case is considered to be the least likely scenario since Gallagher 
(2014) does not control for household relocation and the type of treatment (i.e. flood occurrence) differs from the 
information campaign.   
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Figure 4.5 Sensitivity of NPV estimates to key parameter values (upside insurance uptake 
assumption) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Sensitivity of NPV estimates to key parameter values (downside insurance uptake 
assumption) 
 
 
 
4.6  Discussion 
 This analysis reveals several important insights regarding flood insurance and 
interventions to encourage voluntary purchase of new policies.  First, the information campaign 
does not pass a cost-benefit test.  The intervention only has a modest effect on insurance uptake.  
Furthermore, the intervention to encourage insurance uptake results in net costs to society due to 
subsidized premiums and the cost of the information campaign.  However, the intervention fails 
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to produce net benefits when accounting for economic costs and benefits across all stakeholders.  
While mandatory insurance programs offer the potential to spread fixed costs across many 
policyholders, the costs of voluntary programs will tend to be spread across relatively fewer 
individuals. 
 Second, the information campaign is not justifiable on the grounds of serving a 
vulnerable population or reducing the burden on public budgets.  Taxpayers incur greater costs 
under the information campaign (US$ 2.5 million) than in the status quo scenario (US$ 1.3 
million).  This greater burden on taxpayers is largely due to subsidized premiums.  In addition, 
the conceptual framework reveals that the distribution of subsidies is largely skewed towards 
higher income households.  Flood insurance does not benefit low-income households since only 
those that own enough property at risk are likely to purchase insurance policies.  Therefore, the 
information campaign will shift benefits towards higher income households, while taxpayers 
bear greater cost.  As an alternative policy, lump sum aid payments could shift benefits to low-
income households. 
 Third, disaster aid and insurance programs should be better coordinated.  A variety of 
interactions between these two strategies influence household decision making, taxpayer burden, 
and the economic cost of disaster policy.  The presence of disaster aid can reduce demand for 
insurance and hinder the establishment of a flood insurance program.  As the magnitude of flood 
aid approaches the maximum insurance coverage, the more attractive relying on aid will be to 
households.  In Bangkok, many low-income households received flood aid that exceeded their 
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insurable losses due to the 2011 flood.
 58
  In order to reduce the incentive for households’ to 
underinsure, flood aid could be limited to low levels.   
 Fourth, both the conceptual framework and sensitivity analysis of insurance demand 
imply that the largest benefits of the information campaign are associated with better informing 
households that have high insurance demand.  Less benefit is associated with persuading 
households with low demand to purchase insurance at subsidized rates.  The information 
campaign could be economically attractive under optimistic assumptions regarding persistence of 
the campaign treatment effect and household insurance demand.  Further research is warranted 
regarding these two important parameters.  This finding has implications for other information 
interventions.  Social norm interventions have become increasingly popular as a means of 
influencing individual behavior.  Yet, the net economic benefits of these social norm 
interventions are unknown.  It appears likely that social norm interventions that are intended to 
inform households (e.g. about other household’s behavior so that learning about optimal 
behaviors can occur) will offer larger benefits than those intended to persuade (e.g. social 
pressure to motivate behavioral change). 
 Overall, the BCA finds that limited government flood aid is preferable to an information 
campaign to increase insurance uptake in Thailand.  This suggests that ex post flood aid could be 
a reasonable policy in cases where the alternative is a voluntary insurance program with 
subsidized premiums.  
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Lower-income households in Bangkok are less likely to find flood insurance attractive. In the flood cost survey of 
households in Bangkok conducted by Nabangchang et al. (2015), nearly half of low-income households (103 out of 
210 low-income households) received more government aid than their direct house and content losses. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, the four chapters offer insight into the role of information in mitigating the costs 
of natural disasters.  As communities around the world consider risk mitigation and adaptation 
options, greater knowledge of disaster impacts and household response can inform crucial policy 
decisions.  Furthermore, information provision could improve decisions related to flood risk 
mitigation since households often lack of complete information.  The major findings and 
limitations of each of the four chapters are summarized below. 
Chapter 1 demonstrates that it is practical and feasible to collect household-level data on 
flood costs.  These microeconomic data produce a more comprehensive view of disaster impacts.  
Furthermore, they are an important input for the evaluation of flood control mitigation and 
preventive measures.  The use of household surveys offers the ability to capture a wide range of 
cost types from a broad range of households.  This is especially true in developing countries 
where record keeping tends to be poor and considerable economic activity occurs in the informal 
sector.  Results indicate that median household flood costs were about US$ 3,089 due to the 
2011 flood in three of the most severely affected neighborhoods of greater Bangkok.  This cost is 
equal to about six months of self-reported household expenditures.  Economic costs were higher 
for middle-income households than for poor households because they had more property at risk.  
While the total flood cost was substantial for many households, structural damages to homes 
were surprisingly low, given the depth and duration of the flood.  Building practices in Thailand, 
such as concrete dwellings, may have lessons for flood-prone communities around the world
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seeking to reduce potential losses.  Houses did not incur permanent structural damage; therefore 
repair costs were relative low (about 2% of the self-reported market value of the house). 
 The two main limitations of Chapter 1 are related to the survey instrument design.  The 
design relied on self-reported flood costs and omitted several cost categories.  Self-reported costs 
can be prone to bias since flood-affected households might have incentive to overestimate 
damage, especially if the estimate influences the distribution of aid (UN and World Bank, 2010).  
Future research could identify recorded disaster costs and use these estimates either in lieu of or 
to cross-check survey responses.  Data sources could include insurance claims or approved flood 
aid applications.  Future work could also include omitted cost categories such as residual losses 
and motor vehicle scrappage value.  In addition, several cost categories were omitted.  Chapter 1 
did not account for property damaged that households did not repair or replace.  Also, if a motor 
vehicle was rendered inoperable due to the flood, the survey instrument did not capture a specific 
scrappage value.  Future work could estimate accurate scrappage value by accounting for vehicle 
model, year, and mileage.   
Chapter 2 finds that social media use allowed households to reduce losses during the 
2011 flood in Bangkok.  Propensity score matching reveals that social media use enabled 
households to reduce mean total losses by 37%, using a nearest neighbor estimator.  Average 
loss reductions amounted to US$ 3,708 to US$ 4,886, depending on the matching estimator.  
These reductions are in relation to comparable households (i.e. those who are well-educated, 
higher-income, and have multi-story houses), rather than the general population.  Social media 
offered information that was not available from other sources, such as localized and nearly real-
time updates of flood location and depth.  With knowledge of current flood conditions, 
households could move belongings to higher ground before floodwaters arrived.  It appears that 
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social media households focused their ex ante mitigation efforts on moving belongings as high as 
possible.  These findings suggest that using social media users as sensors could better inform 
populations during natural disasters, particularly in locations that lack real-time, accurate flood 
monitoring networks.  Therefore, expanded access to the internet and social could especially be 
useful in developing countries, ungagged basins, and highly complex urban environments.  User 
updates on social media could especially be useful if they were aggregated and used as input for 
user-generated flood maps.  There is also an enormous opportunity for disseminating 
government disaster communication through social media.  Overall, this study demonstrates the 
enormous potential of social media for effective flood preparation.  Disaster preparedness 
requires accurate, timely, and readily accessible information to guide household decisions.  
Social media sites have the potential to provide crucial information that could save lives and 
reduce property damage. 
Limitations of Chapter 2 include self-reported online behavior and possible non-
observable differences between social media users and others.  Future work could make use of 
observed internet usage during disasters on social media sites.  However, such analysis would 
need to match observed usage with credible estimates of disaster losses.  Future work could also 
address potential differences between social media users and other households that were not 
captured in this study.  An experimental research design would be a methodically desirable way 
for capturing the true effects of social media on disaster losses.  However, implementing such a 
design in a disaster situation could raise moral concerns.  
The experiment presented in Chapter 3 demonstrates that the combination of practical 
and social information can encourage flood insurance purchases and thus reduce household 
welfare losses due to floods.  Results indicate that the information intervention increased 
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insurance purchases by about four percent, but no effect was detected for home retrofits.  This 
effect is nearly equal to the increase in uptake that the national insurance program in Thailand 
has achieved through all other means since its establishment.  If scaled up to include all 
uninsured, flood-prone households in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, nearly 60,000 additional 
households could be insured.  Results from this experiment are important for the Thai 
Government’s flood insurance strategy, and may have relevance for flood prone areas around the 
world.  The study contributes to the literature on experimental evaluation in the field of 
environmental policy as well as household demand for flood insurance. The results suggest that 
well-designed information interventions could increase household uptake of flood insurance, 
without additional mandates or premium subsidies or mandates. 
Limitations of the experiment are that only short-term treatment effects are measured and 
outcomes are self-reported.  Future work could use recorded purchase data and capture long-term 
treatment effects.  The persistence of the effect is unknown beyond six months after treatment 
and it is unclear how long new policyholders retain their policies.  In addition, testing less costly 
information interventions, such as mass media campaigns, could also be useful in order to 
determine how information deliver mode affects household response to treatment.  More 
generally, expanding field experiments to other types of climate adaptation actions could 
produce valuable lessons for public policy. 
Chapter 4 presents a benefit-cost analysis of a practical and social norm information 
intervention.  Rigorous accounting of costs and benefits across all stakeholders is crucial to 
inform policy.  Results suggest that the information campaign to increase voluntary insurance 
purchases will not raise social welfare, under base case assumptions.  Furthermore, the 
information campaign is not justifiable on the grounds of serving a vulnerable population or 
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reducing the burden on public budgets.  Yet, the campaign could be economically attractive if 
base case assumptions regarding insurance demand and policy tenure do not hold.  Sensitivity 
analysis of insurance demand suggests that the largest benefits of the information campaign are 
associated with better informing households that have high insurance demand.  Less benefit is 
associated with persuading households with low demand to purchase insurance at subsidized 
rates.  This finding has broad implications for other information interventions.  It appears likely 
that social norm interventions that are intended to inform households (e.g. learning about optimal 
behaviors can occur through knowledge of other household’s behavior) likely offer larger 
benefits than those intended to persuade via social pressure or other means. 
Two data limitations in Chapter 4 are household insurance demand and the length of 
insurance policy tenure.  Little is known about either of these, particularly in developing 
countries.  Further research is warranted regarding persistence of the campaign treatment effect 
and household insurance demand.   
Each of the four chapters provides insight into how flood impacts can be mitigated and 
managed in the face of urbanization and climate change.  Low-lying megacities, such as 
Bangkok, present new challenges for disaster risk mitigation.  In these productive urban centers, 
neither massive evacuations nor limits on concentrations of people and assets are desirable.  
Rather than encourage relocation of people and assets, risk mitigation strategies in megacities 
must focus on how to reduce expected losses.  Information could play a vital role in allowing 
individuals to take effective actions to reduce flood losses.  Further research is needed to 
determine the types and sources of information that are most useful to households and how 
incomplete information compares to other barriers to risk mitigation.   
 
 
APPENDIX A: PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING –ESTIMATION OF BALANCING SCORE 
 
 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Propensity Score Matching, Full Sample 
 
  Full sample (N=469)   Social Media Households(N=55)   
Households without social 
media (N=414)   
Variable Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max   Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max   Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max   
Outcome Variable                               
Total Flood Losses (US$) 4,903 6,069 13 48,914 
 
6,665 6,244 780 29,180   4,669 6,014 13 48,914 
† 
Household and Housing 
Characteristics                               
Annual Household Expenditure 
(US$) 8,459 6,214 990 38,835   14,214 8,073 2,990 38,835   7,694 5,499 990 36,112 
† 
Cars owned (number) 0.9 1.0 0 5   1.5 1.1 0 5   0.8 0.9 0 5 
† 
Household members (number) 4.3 2.0 1 17   3.9 1.6 1 9   4.4 2.0 1 17 
  
Size of property (sq. m) 287 235 18 2400   334 194 120 880   281 239 18 2400   
One-story building 0.3 0.5 0 1   0.1 0.3 0 1   0.4 0.5 0 1 
† 
Low-income neighborhood 0.5 0.5 0 1   0.1 0.4 0 1   0.6 0.5 0 1 
† 
Survey Respondent 
Characteristics                               
Age of Respondent 49.2 12.1 19 80   42.0 10.2 19 70   50.1 12.0 19 80 
† 
Married 0.8 0.4 0 1   0.7 0.4 0 1   0.8 0.4 0 1 
  
Education level                               
     High School or Vocational 0.33 0.47 0 1   0.20 0.40 0 1   0.35 0.48 0 1 
† 
     College or higher 0.29 0.45 0 1   0.64 0.49 0 1   0.24 0.43 0 1 
† 
 
†
 denotes significant difference at the 5% level between households with and without social media use 
1
9
3
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Table A2. Logit Regression Estimates for Balancing Score 
 
 
    Coefficient z-statistic   
Household and Housing Characteristics           
Annual Household Expenditure (Thai baht)   2.5E-06 *** 3.370   
    (0.00)       
Cars owned (number)   0.23 *** 3.100   
    (0.07)       
Household members (number)   -0.38 ** -2.500   
 
  (0.15)       
Household members, squared   0.02   1.250   
 
  (0.01)       
Size of property (sq. m)   0.00   -0.110   
    (0.00)       
One-story building   -0.90   -1.190   
 
  (0.75)       
Low-income neighborhood   -0.70   -1.230   
    (0.57)       
Survey Respondent Characteristics           
Age of Respondent   -0.08 *** -5.550   
    (0.01)       
Married   -0.50 *** -2.640   
    (0.19) 
  
  
Education level           
     High School or Vocational   -0.24   -0.740   
    (0.33)       
     College or higher   0.50   0.940   
    (0.53)       
            
Constant   2.22 ** 2.24   
    (0.99)       
            
Observations   469       
Likelihood ratio test   -124       
P-value   0       
Psuedo R
2
   0.27       
 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table A3. Balancing Score Estimates 
 
 
  Statistic       
Matched Sample Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Obs inside 
common support 
Obs in each 
sample 
% 
excluded 
    Treatment -1.01 1.41 -4.99 1.43 48 55 -13% 
    Comparison -3.23 1.61 -6.97 0.65 345 414 -17% 
 
 
Note: The last column (% excluded) refers to observations outside the region of common support, which is defined 
as the maximum of the minimum values and the minimum of the maximum values. 
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APPENDIX B: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION FIELD 
EXPERIMENT 
 
 In order to conceptualize the possible channels through which information might 
influence insurance and home retrofit decisions, I develop a conceptual framework that slightly 
modifies the expected utility (EU) model.  The central assumption of EU theory holds – that 
households will maximize expected utility.  The model presented represents a comprehensive 
decision in which a household simultaneously considers insurance, self-protection, and self-
insurance options. 
 Consider a utility-maximizing household with wealth W that is making a decision on the 
level of flood insurance coverage (I) to purchase as well as expenditures on self-protection (Sa) 
and self-insurance (Sb).  The household faces two states of the world, floodwaters entering their 
property or not, with annual probabilities of p and 1-p of these two states.  To some extent, the 
probability and loss associated with floods is endogenous since actions can be taken to self-
protect or self-insure.   
 The probability that floodwaters enter the house is influenced by an exogenous 
component and Sa.  The exogenous component of risk will vary across households based on a 
variety of factors including precipitation patterns, topography, and proximity to waterways.  The 
monetary and time costs of Sa and Sb will be incurred regardless of whether or not flooding 
occurs.  If the house floods, the household will incur a loss (L).  The magnitude of L will be 
influenced by W, an exogenous component of loss (XL), and Sb. 
 The cost of insurance per unit of coverage is c. If the house is flooded, the household will 
receive an insurance claim of I and may receive disaster relief and compensation (D).  When 
deciding to purchase insurance or undertake home retrofits, a household may bear costs of 
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searching for information (F).  Thus, if the house does not flood, the household will still pay the 
annual insurance premium (cI) and F.   
 The household is assumed to be risk averse, with strictly increasing and concave utility 
functions.  The optimal amount of insurance, self-protection, and self-insurance can be 
determined by maximizing expected utility E[U(I, Sa, Sb)]:  
 
𝐸[𝑈(𝐼, 𝑆𝑎, 𝑆𝑏)] = 𝑝(𝑋𝑝, 𝑆𝑎) ∙ 𝑈[𝑊 − 𝐿(𝑊, 𝑋𝐿, 𝑆𝑏) + 𝐼 − 𝑐𝐼 − 𝐹 − 𝑆𝑎 − 𝑆𝑏 + 𝐷] + 
       (1 − 𝑝(𝑋𝑝, 𝑆𝑎)) ∙ 𝑈[𝑊 − 𝑐𝐼 − 𝐹 − 𝑆𝑎 − 𝑆𝑏]            (B.1) 
  
                     where 0 ≤ 𝐼 ≤ 𝐿  
 
Based on this model, a household will take action if the difference in EU between states of taking 
an action and no action is greater than the cost of the action.  For insurance, the amount of I 
selected will be partly influenced by L (selected coverage increases with L) and the relative 
magnitudes of p and c (which will influence the decision to incur F).  In order to determine the 
optimal level of insurance coverage (I
*), the household’s expected utility must be maximized 
over I.  The first order condition for insurance purchase is: 
𝑝 ∙ 𝑈′[𝑊 − 𝐿 + 𝐼 − 𝑐𝐼 − 𝐹 − 𝑆𝑎 − 𝑆𝑏 + 𝐷](1 − 𝐹 − 𝑐) 
 −(1 − 𝑝)𝑈′[𝑊 − 𝑐𝐼 − 𝐹 − 𝑆𝑎 − 𝑆𝑏](𝐹 + 𝑐)     = 0         (B.2) 
 
Therefore, a household will only purchase insurance if the marginal utility in the state with 
flooding is equal to the marginal utility in the state without flooding.  The benefit of insurance 
must equal its cost.  If the insurance premium (c) is set at an actuarially fair price, such that the 
premium is equal to the probability of flooding, then the expected insurance payout received by 
the household will be zero.  In this case, where c=p, the first order condition for insurance 
purchase becomes: 
𝑈′[𝑊 − 𝐿 + 𝐼 − 𝑐𝐼 − 𝐹 − 𝑆𝑎 − 𝑆𝑏 + 𝐷] 
        −𝑈′[𝑊 − 𝑐𝐼 − 𝐹 − 𝑆𝑎 − 𝑆𝑏]     = 0           (B.3) 
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This implies that when insurance is offered at an actuarially fair price, the optimal level of 
coverage (I
*
) is equal to the total flood loss (L), less any disaster compensation that is anticipated 
by the household.  A risk averse household will be expected to purchase full insurance if 
insurance is offered at actuarially fair rates and if no compensation is anticipated.  However, this 
actuarially fair premium (equal to cL) is not realistic for a private insurer.  In order to cover 
operating costs and/or make a profit, private insurers charge a loading factor and therefore the 
household would be expected to purchase less than full coverage (i.e. the selected policy will 
have a deductible).
59
  In addition, the household may anticipate some level of disaster 
compensation.  As insurance coverage decreases in response to premium prices, so does the 
extent of moral hazard that could be encouraged by full coverage (Arrow, 1962).  Yet, if 
coverage decreases in response to anticipated compensation, then the extent of moral hazard does 
not decline. 
 This conceptual model does not assume that information is freely available, as in the 
classic EU model.  Furthermore, it improves upon the model of insurance choice by Kunreuther 
et al. (2009) by (i) defining the hazard event as floodwaters entering a household’s property 
rather than flood occurrence, and (ii) considering a comprehensive insurance, self-protection, and 
self-insurance decision.  Defining the hazard event in this way allows households to influence 
the probability (through self-protection) and loss (through self-insurance) associated with the 
event.  In addition, considering a household’s overall flood risk protection decision allows trade-
offs between different types of strategies to be accounted for. 
 This study relies on this conceptual model rooted in EU theory for understanding 
household flood mitigation behavior.  However, it should be noted that some major underlying 
                                                          
59
A loading factor is a specified percentage of the total premium that will allow the insurer to make a profit and 
cover operating costs such as marketing and claim adjustment. 
199 
 
assumptions may not hold when households face low probability risks.  When evaluating low 
frequency hazards, households may rely on heuristics and demonstrate biases (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1974; Slovic, 1987). 
Expected Effects of Information Treatment 
 Households often lack perfect information when making decisions regarding insurance, 
self-protection, and self-insurance.  Yet, information is necessary to be aware of actions that can 
be undertaken, accurately assess probability and magnitude of a loss, and know the costs and 
possible benefits of various actions.  Particularly for low-probability events, such as large floods, 
households tend to lack adequate risk information.  In the absence of information, individuals 
rely on subjective assessments of risk.  If risk is underestimated, then even cost-effective actions 
may seem too costly. 
 The information treatment used in this study was expected to address the information 
failure regarding flood risk mitigation strategies and influence households in three ways.  First, it 
raises awareness of flood insurance and several home retrofit options.  Second, the information 
provides useful inputs into a household risk mitigation decision such as the probability and 
magnitude of flood loss faced by Bangkok households, insurance premiums and coverage levels, 
and how to purchase insurance.  Last, the social information could lead households to update 
their risk perceptions, perceived utility gain of actions, and their investment decision based on 
the behavior of others. 
 Raising awareness alone might be an effective strategy in encouraging households to take 
action.  The government catastrophe insurance agency in Thailand, the National Catastrophe 
Insurance Fund, has not conducted household-level communication campaigns, perhaps because 
there is a mandatory insurance purchase requirement for households with mortgages 
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(Threemingmid, 2013).  Yet, the vast majority of Thai households remain uninsured against 
flooding due to the prevalence of households without mortgages and thus not being bound by the 
mandatory purchase requirement.  Past communication efforts by the NCIF have been limited to 
press conferences and informational materials to be distributed by insurance and real estate 
companies.   
 Next, the practical component of the information treatment is expected to reduce the cost 
of searching for information (F) as well as increase the accuracy of perceived probability and 
magnitude of flood loss.  In order to make informed decisions, households require information 
regarding flood risk, costs of possible actions, and how to undertake actions.  With the practical 
information, households can update perceptions of exogenous flood risk (Xp, XL) and become 
aware of the insurance premiums (c) and coverage levels available in Thailand. A household 
often lacks perfect information on risk characteristics (e.g. probability and magnitude of loss) 
and options for insurance coverage levels and premiums.  An individual will not devote time and 
expenditures to collecting information if the costs of searching are perceived to be high relative 
to possible benefits of protective action (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004). 
 Lastly, the social information component of the treatment could enable social learning 
regarding a household’s optimal level of insurance coverage (I).  This is particularly relevant for 
households that are uncertain about their production function, as shown by Beshears et al. (2015) 
and Cai et al. (2009).  Households are highly influenced by actions of their neighbors, even when 
they are not aware of the motivations underlying those actions (Somanathan, 2010).  Through 
social information, households may update their perceptions of flood risk and utility gain of 
insurance.  In addition, households may re-evaluate their risk mitigation decisions.  
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 Based on this conceptual framework, the study hypothesizes that household inaction in 
Bangkok is partially driven by a lack of awareness of insurance and home retrofit options and 
how to execute these actions.  By receiving practical and social information, treatment 
households should have greater awareness of mitigation options.  Furthermore, treatment 
households should be more likely to seek further information on flood insurance, how to protect 
against flood damage, and flood risk in their area. 
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APPENDIX C: METHODOLOGY OF INFORMATION FIELD EXPERIMENT 
 
The randomized field experiment was designed to test the effect of practical and social 
information on the uptake of flood insurance and home retrofits. It was conducted in two districts 
of Bangkok most affected by the 2011 Thailand flood. The 364 participating households were 
first interviewed in-person in October and November, 2013. During this baseline in-person 
interview, respondents were asked about their flood risk perception, prior flood experience, 
previous home retrofits to reduce flood loss, and socioeconomic characteristics. Also during the 
baseline interview, treatment households received practical information.  Two weeks later, social 
information treatment was delivered.  A follow-up interview was conducted by telephone in May 
2014 to measure outcomes.   
Information Intervention 
 The information intervention included both practical and social information.  The 
practical information was delivered via an informational pamphlet and a short video (2 minutes) 
about flood risk in Bangkok and how to purchase insurance and undertake home retrofits.  The 
pamphlet also compared damage costs that a household might face with and without insurance.  
For example, if a flood similar to 2011 occurs, households may face average home and content 
damage of THB 85,000, based on survey work by Nabangchang et al. (2015).  However, if a 
household is insured, then such damages would be covered, and the net cost to the household 
would be the annual premium (e.g. 500 baht if coverage of 100,000 baht is selected).   The 
pamphlet also provided a contact list of insurance companies.   
 The social information treatment was delivered as a front gate hanger. It conveyed a 
description of average household losses from the 2011 Bangkok flood and prevalence of flood 
insurance uptake by households within a respondent’s district.  Within the two districts selected 
203 
 
for the study, insurance uptake was 24% in Bang Bua Thong and 15% in Don Mueang (NCIF, 
2013).
60
  These insurance coverage rates were conveyed in the social information treatment as 
“one in four households” in Don Mueang and “one in six households” in Bang Bua Thong.  The 
social information treatment also included a second copy of the information sheet on how to 
purchase insurance and a contact list of participating companies.   
Information Spillover 
 This study accounted for possible information sharing between treatment and control 
households.  If control households received the intervention information, this might spur them to 
purchase insurance and thus result in an underestimation of the treatment effect.  The extent of 
spillover is controlled through the information treatment design.  Only treatment households 
could receive the short video and in-person explanation of information provided in the practical 
information brochure.  Therefore, possible spillover is limited to printed materials and second-
hand descriptions of the in-person treatment.  While many experimental studies do not address 
the extent of spillover, this study does so by asking during follow-up survey whether or not 
households received flood insurance information from their neighbors.   
Baseline and follow-up survey implementation  
 Household survey instruments were designed based on literature reviews and revised 
based on feedback from local collaborators and the results of pre-test interviews.  Trained 
enumerators and field supervisors administered the baseline survey and information treatment in-
person in October and November 2013.  A follow-up survey was administered via Skype and 
telephone in May 2014 to record outcome variables.  A total of 448 valid baseline surveys were 
                                                          
60
A district is analogous to a county in the United States and is divided into sub-districts.  Insurance uptake at the 
district level in Bang Bua Thong and Don Mueang districts is moderate, 24% and 15% of the population, 
respectively.  Yet, within the 11 sub-districts of these two districts, uptake varies from 2 to 72% (DOPA 2013; NCIF 
2013).  Within the four sub-districts selected for the study, insurance uptake ranges from 2 to 25%. 
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completed.  In the follow-up survey, the attrition rate was 19%. Not answering the phone and 
refusal (rate of 6%) were the most prevalent reasons why households were not included in the 
follow-up survey.  
 The baseline survey consisted of questions on socioeconomic characteristics, knowledge 
regarding flood risk and behavior, exposure to flood informational messages, and household 
home retrofit actions to reduce flood loss.  Both at baseline and follow-up, households were 
asked about awareness of flood insurance being available as well as awareness of Bangkok 
generally being a flood prone area.  Risk perception in terms of flood probability and expected 
damage was also recorded both at baseline and follow-up.  The survey elicited respondents’ 
perceived probability of a flood of similar magnitude as the 2011 event, within the next five 
years, on a scale of 0 (will not occur) to 10 (will certainly occur).  Perceived level of damage 
from a flood of similar magnitude as the 2011 event was recorded as high, somewhat high, 
somewhat low, or low. 
 The follow-up survey collected key outcome variables, such as insurance purchase and 
nine types of home retrofits.  All key outcome variables are represented as binary indicators of 
whether or not a household took a particular action.  In addition, households were asked about 
their progress in making an insurance purchase decision – whether they had not thought about it, 
decided not to buy, or decided to buy but had not done so before the follow-up interview.  
Information seeking, knowledge variables, and risk perception were also of interest.  The follow-
up survey inquired whether respondents had contacted an insurance company regarding flood 
insurance.  Households also reported whether or not they had sought information about flood risk 
in their area, how to protect against flood damage, and flood insurance.   
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Sampling procedure 
 A multistage cluster sampling procedure was used to select participant households.  This 
procedure included three stages – (1) sub-district, (2) community, and (3) household.  While a 
sampling frame was available for sub-districts and communities, one was not available for 
individual households within a community.  Therefore, sub-districts and communities were 
randomly sampled with probability proportional to size, while households within a community 
were sampled via a ‘random walk’.  In the first stage, two sub-districts were randomly selected 
among the sub-districts in Don Mueang and Bang Bua Thong districts that had less than 30% 
flood insurance coverage.  The selected sub-districts in Bangkok were Don Mueang (2% 
insurance coverage) and Sanambin (2%), while the selected sub-districts in Nonthaburi were 
Bang Bua Thong (21%) and Bang Rak Phatthana (25%) (DOPA, 2013; NCIF, 2013).  In the 
second stage, communities were stratified into income groups (low-income and upper-income) 
and sampled with probability proportional to size – resulting in seven low-income and seven 
upper-income communities.   
 In the third stage, households were selected within the 14 chosen communities.  To select 
households, a random walk procedure was followed.  Within a given neighborhood, half of 
enumerators interviewed households located on the left side of the street, while the other half of 
enumerators conducted interviews on the right side of the street.  For each community, an 
interval of houses to visit was determined based on total number of houses in the community.  
The intervals helped to cover a large portion of the neighborhood and reduced the ability of 
enumerators to only interview households that were at home during the first visit.  To participate 
in the baseline survey, respondents were required to (i) be homeowners, (ii) not currently have 
flood insurance, (iii) not planning to move within a year, and (iv) willing to provide a telephone 
number for a follow-up interview.  Once an eligible household was identified, enumerators used 
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block randomization sequences to assign the household to a treatment group.  Block 
randomization sequences were created within each of the 14 study neighborhoods in order to 
obtain treatment and control groups of equal size at each site. 
